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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE PROBLEM 
This study is an investigation of the influence of traditional 
values on urban life in Iraq, with special reference to Baghdad, the 
capital of Iraq. Very much has been said about the function of the 
city as a social form exerting an independent causal effect on other 
forms of social organisation and on behaviour. The classical urban 
sociologists believed that city dwelling was likely to eliminate 
traditional family construction, kinship system and conventional 
behaviour. The present study attempts to test these assumptions - 
through a comparative analysis of three different groups of 
household heads : urban natives [city born], migrants and villagers 
[control group]- and to recognize the diffusion of traditional values, 
norms and customs in urban dwellers' behaviour and attitudes, as 
reacted in the contacts and social relationships among them. 
Baghdad has a long urban history, dating back more than a 
thousand years, although it has declined and been devastated several 
times during its history. After 1258 A. D, successive invasions by 
Persian and Ottoman armies destroyed the city and compelled most of 
its inhabitants to flee, either to other agglomerate centres or to small 
towns and villages. As a result, Baghdad in the eighteenth century 
and the first half of the nineteenth century was no more than a 
collection of small hamlets. 
However, the city faced new era of increase and urbanization 
after the First World War, due to two main factors: 
A) the rapid and vast increase, in migration from rural to urban 
areas since the end of second world war; 
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b) the natural increase which reflects the improvement in health 
economy and education. 
The process of urbanization in Iraq, particularly Baghdad, has 
developed even more rapidly in the last four decades, mainly because 
of successive waves of rural migrants, especially from the southern 
regions: Mysan, Wasit, Thi-Qar, Muthana and Qadisya. Migrants 
predominate demographically and socially in the city, and most of the 
city's inhabitants have a deep-rooted rural background. In moving to 
the city, they have taken with them the attitudes, values, norms and 
beliefs of their villages, so that the cities have become, in effect, 
huge villages. In other words, in Iraqi cities, especially Baghdad, the 
process of urbanization has not necessarily been accompanied by 
"urbanism" as a way of life. Thus, in the major cities in Iraq, 
particularly Baghdad which has more migrants than any other, 
traditional values are sharply reflected in the social behaviour, and 
in most aspects of lifestyle. 
Thus the thesis is concerned with the similarities and 
differences between the three sets of household heads; it dwells on 
their rural or urban origins, their education, age, sex, occupation, 
income and their attitude toward many aspects of social organization. 
To test the diffusion of traditional characteristics among the 
indigenous of Baghdad city, in relation to the factors outlined above, 
the thesis accords priority to four salient issues : 
A) family organization, including the family structure, power, and 
authority, women's roles, and patterns of marriage ; 
B) kinship networks in city social life, among those in both rural and 
urban categories; kinship control over marriage, loyalty and nepotism, 
mutual aid and obligations. 
C) attitudes to neighbours and neighbourhood participation and 
relationships, including the role of neighbours as a source of social 
control ; 
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D) attitude to social time, with reference to differences in social 
activities, such as work, leisure, punctuality, keeping appointments 
and general outlook on the dimension of time. 
These issues might shed light on our assumption that Baghdad 
city is deeply exposed to what has been called "the ruralization of 
the city". 
1.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A. RUJRAT, -URBAN CHARACTERTSTTCS 
Large numbers of sociologists and anthropologists have been 
concerned with both poles of society, the rural and urban 
communities. Some of them defined "community"" in organic terms, for 
example H. Spencer, who stressed the spontaneous competition and 
mutual interdependencies that emerge from living together(l). A. 
Comte regarded "community" as a psychic phenomenon, stressing the 
shared sentiments underlying social consensus and collective 
action(2). H. Main compared earlier forms of Greek, Roman and east 
Indian society with later forms. In his terms, peasant society 
represents a balance between familial and territorial society. It is a 
compromise adjustment between a society of status and society of 
contract(3) In' Durkheim, peasant society forms a special type of 
relatively stable compromise between the social segment and the 
social organ. In its adjustment of local culture to the civilization of 
cities, the solidarity of the tribe is preserved in conjunction with the 
market and within the nation. 
(4). 
As F Tonnies put it, the peasant group is a form of society in 
which neither Gesellschaft nor Gemeinschaft is strongly present at 
the expense of the other; both are to be observed in a condition of 
equilibrium. Tonnies had already expressed the idea that Gemeinschaft 
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phases of society are based upon maternal love, the sex instinct and 
blood kinship. These direct bonds, when strong, tend to regulate the 
other activities of life, in so far as these other activities do not 
through force of circumstance, destroy the original social bond. 
Gesellschaft phases of society are based upon contractual economic 
relationship of a material sort. In the Gemeinschaft the social 
organization is paramount and in the Gesellschaft the economic gain is 
of greater significance(5). As he pointed out: 
Gemeinschaft is old; Gesellschaft is new as a name as well 
as a phenomenon. All praise of rural life has pointed out 
that the Gemeinschaft among people is stronger there and 
more alive; it is the lasting and genuine form of living 
together. In contrast to Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft is 
transitory and superficial. Accordingly, Gemeinschaft 
should be understood as a living organism, Gesellschaft 
as a mechanical aggregate and artifact(6). 
The distinction he draws between the two forms of human 
association, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, has become the basis for a 
succession of typologies, and the departure point of the more recent 
academic sociologists such as Redfield and Wirth. H. Becker accepted 
the separation of sacred society and secular society, but he saw that 
systems articulated to each other by social interaction which he 
termed more specifically "sacred-secular continuum"(7). 
Max Weber in his study of the historical development of cities, 
developed various concepts of the city in terms of its economic 
activity, its relationship to agriculture and its administrative status. 
He reviewed the city in socio-economic rather than demographical or 
ecological terms. He wrote: 
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We wish to speak of a" city" only in cases where the 
local inhabitants satisfy an economically substantial part 
of their daily wants in the local market, and to an 
essential extent by products which the local population 
and that of the immediate hinterland produced for sale in 
the mark et or acquired in other ways. In the meaning 
employed here the "city" is a marketplace(g) 
Accordingly, Weber's theory, based on useful economy, 
expressed the occurrence of complex sets of social interaction. In this 
regard, he described the city as rational, as opposed to the irrational 
rural community(9). 
In his essay entitled "Community within Communities", R. 
Redfield described the "community "as rural or folk society, composed 
of people all related to one another. It is made up of several 
matrilinear, extended families, each embracing several nuclear families. 
The people of the community occasionally combine into co-operation 
parties and the community also provides wives and children. Most 
marriages are made within the community; a man may find a wife in 
another community, but this occurs very rarely because of the 
distance between communities, the disposition of the men of the 
community to keep their women to themselves and the rule of 
matrilocal residence which would compel a man if he married a women 
from another community to move away from home('0)9 
In his well-known deductive theoretical essay, "The Folk 
Society and the Culture", Redfield regarded the peasant, like the 
tribesman, as living in terms of common understandings which are 
rooted in tradition and which have come to form an organization. The 
sanctions that control conduct are likely to be prevailingly sacred. 
The familial organization is strong. There is little disorganization and 
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little crime(111). Elsewhere in his work, he described folk society in 
more detail. He pointed out : 
The population of any one group is homogeneous in that 
in race and costume any individual is much like any 
other. The group is isolated from others. The technology 
is simple. The community approaches economic self- 
sufficiency. The division of labour is simple, activities 
appropriate to the sexes are sharply distinguished, but 
activities carried on by any one member of a sex-and-age 
group are much the same as those carried on by others 
of that group. There is little or no use of writing, or if 
writing is used it is a mere adjunct to oral tradition and, 
like the latter, serves to conserve the local heritage. The 
habits of members of the society tend to correspond with 
customs, The society is relatively integrated in that the 
component groups are closely interdependent and the 
ways of life are correspondingly interrelated and 
consistent with one another. Change in the society is 
slow. The prevailing forms of control are informal and 
traditional, and control to the members of the society 
appears in large degree spontaneous. The intimate and 
primary institutions, such as the family and the local 
group, play relatively large parts in that organization of 
the groups and institutions which make up the society. 
Many objects, conceptions, and forms of control partake 
of those qualities of unquestionable power and prestige 
which we denote as "sacred"(12). 
Briefly stated, Redfield's scheme defined an ideal-type, the 
"folk society" which is the polar opposite of urban society, the folk- 
type of society is characterized as follows: 
Such a society is small, isolated, nonliterate, and 
homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity. 
The ways of living are conventionalized into that 
coherent system which we call "A culture". Behaviour is 
traditional, spontaneous, uncritical, and personal, There is 
no legislation or habit of experiment and reflection for 
intellectual ends. Kinships, its relationships and 
institutions, are the type categories of experience and 
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the familial group is the unit of action. The sacred 
prevails over the secular; the economy is one of status 
rather than of the market(13 ). 
For L. Wirth, "Community" emerged as natural, unplanned 
symbiotic ties developed. People initially lived together on the basis 
of close spacial proximity, kinship ties, and both competitive and 
common interaction. Out of these sprang a division of labour and 
organic or "ecological" interdependence. Wirth used the concept 
"community" to designate this "natural "interdependence(14) 
Since then many sociologists have defined "community" as a 
major pole in society, e. g. MaCiver and Page (1949)(15), Long(1958) 
(16), Stein (1960)(17), Webber (1964)(18). 
In contrast, many sociologists and anthropologists have used 
the term "urban" to refer to the contractual pole of the society. L 
Wirth, for instance, uses the term "society" to refer to the: 
willed and contractual relationship between men which.... 
are less directly affected than their organic relationships 
by their distribution in space. 
(19) 
On the other hand, Wirth like other classical European social 
theorists such as F. Tonnies and E. Durkheim, believed that the 
overwhelming trend in the modern world consisted in a world-wide 
evolution from community to society-like social relationship; from 
status-based to contractual relations; from homogeneous aggregates 
tied together by "mechanical solidarity" to heterogeneous units based 
on complex division of labour; from primary to secondary group 
affiliations; and from folk to urban culture(20). Moreover, he believed 
that such indifference to others made people more cynical, 
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sophisticated, secular and normless, as the bonds of kinship, of 
neighbourliness, and the sentiments arising out of living together for 
generations under a common folk tradition are likely to be absent, or 
at best, relatively weak in an aggregate the members of which have 
such diverse origins and backgrounds(21)' Thus, the transitory, 
superficial and secondary nature of most human interaction replaces 
the primary social ties of family, kinship and neighbourhood, that 
once securely anchored the personality in a structure of stable socio- 
economic control. 
Wirth did not believe that size alone determined the nature of a 
society as urban or folk; he argued, "The characterization of a 
community as urban on the basis of size alone is obviously 
arbitrary" 
(22). He felt that the community as urban could best be 
understood when viewed in the light of a number of sociological 
propositions concerning the relationship between a) size of population 
b) density of settlement c) heterogeneity of inhabitants and group 
life which can be formulated on the basis of observation and 
research(23). 
In Wirth's view, the ecological and demographic structure of 
city life, particularly the large size, high population density and 
heterogeneous population mix resulting from urbanization, produced 
numerous social and social-psychological consequences which, taken 
together, constituted a new pattern of culture, "a way of life" that 
he termed "urbanism" (24). 
In "Urbanism as a way of Life", Wirth attempted to define the 
city as a permanent settlement characterised by three key structural 
features; large size, high density, and social heterogeneity. Each of 
these structural characteristics is treated as a distinct, independent 
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ecological variable. Wirth recognized that the three tended to be 
interconnected in the real world, for instance, large numbers living 
in a restricted area produce a high density of settlement. 
Nonetheless, he believed that it was fruitful to treat each variable 
separately. Having posited size, density and heterogeneity as three 
irreducible components of a city, the rest of Wirth's classical article 
attempted to derive a set of hypotheses about the relationship 
between urban social organization, personality, and behaviour from 
his basic definition of the city(25). It is useful to consider Wirth's 
own summary of the basic proposition advanced in his deductive 
theory. He states: 
Large numbers account for individual variability, the 
relative absence of intimate personal acquaintanceship, 
the segmentalization of human relations which are largely 
anonymous, superficial and transitory, and associated 
characteristics. Density involves diversification and 
specialization, the coincidence of close physical contact 
and distant social relations, glaring contrasts, a complex 
pattern of segregation, the predominance of formal social 
control, and accentuated friction, among other phenomena. 
Heterogeneity tends to break down rigid social structure 
and to produce increased mobility, instability and 
insecurity, and the affiliation of the individuals with a 
variety of intersecting and tangential social groups with 
a high rate of membership turnover. The pecuniary nexus 
tend to displace personal relations, and institutions tend 
to cater to mass rather than individual requirements. The 
individual thus becomes effective only as he acts through 
organized groups. (26) 
Shortly before, Simmel had put forward much the same 
deductive method, but Simmel used social rather than ecological 
characteristics. Some of his conclusions were incorporated by Wirth. 
For instance, Simmel held that compared with rural society, urban 
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society demanded greater punctuality and exactness from urban 
residents in order for them to meet their obligations in the tightly 
interconnected web of urban functions. This requirement, in turn, 
forced the individual to be more rational and precise and less 
impulsive, if he was to survive in the city realm. Moreover, the city 
sets up a deep contrast with small towns and rural life; in the 
metropolis the rhythm of life and sensory mental imagery flows more 
quickly, there is more hierarchy and less familiarity. Precisely, the 
sophisticated character of metropolitan psychic life rests less and 
less upon deep felt and emotional relationships such as widely 
permeate in rural and semi-rural milieu(27). 
The city, finally, is something more than congeries of individual 
men, and of social conveniences, streets, buildings, electric lights, 
tramways and telephone etc; something more also than a mere 
constellation of institutions and administrative devices; courts, 
hospitals, schools, police, and so on: 
The city is rather, a state of mind, a body of customs 
and traditions, of organized attitudes and sentiments that 
inhere in these customs and are transmitted with this 
traditions. The city is not in other words, merely a 
physical mechanism and an artificial construction. It is 
involved in the vital processes of the people who 
compose it; it is a product of nature and particularly of 
human nature(28). 
Moreover "urbanism as a way of life"; is not confined to the 
cities and towns, although it emerges from the great metropolitan 
centres. It is a way of behaving, and that means one can be very 
urban in his thinking and conduct, although living in a village; on 
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the other hand, a very non-urbanized person may live in a most 
urbanized section of a city(29) 
Later, a large number of sociologists and anthropologists 
argued the ideal-types of rural and urban social systems, depending 
on the basic contrary hypotheses of Redfield-Wirth, for instance, Haer 
(1952)(30), Martindal (1.958)(31), Dewey (1960)(32), Greer (1962)(33), 
Fuguitt (1963) (34), Mann (1965)(35), Fischer (1971)(36) . 
Mann [1965], believed that urbanism can still be usefully 
understood by using rural-urban contrast"(37) Low and Peek 11974] 
concluded that rural-urban differences still exist, furthermore 
urbanism and rurality are real. 
(38) Lewis [1965] who strongly 
objected to the Redfield continuum suggested that there was a need 
to redefine the terms, folk, rural and urban "if we are to establish 
meaningful, causal relationships among them"(39). Pahl [1968] warned 
that the notion of rural-urban continuum which, arose in reaction 
against the polar-type dichotomies, carried with it the danger of 
over-readily accepting a false continuity. 
00) Fuguitt asserted that 
throughout history, the city and countryside have been 
interdependent, and that interdependence has recently highly 
increased(41). Hauser (1965) attacked both Wirth and Redfield's ideal 
type constructs. He asserted that both parts of these dichotomies 
(folk-urban continuum and rural-urban dichotomy) represented 
complex systems of variables which have yet to be unscrambled. "The 
dichotomizations perhaps represent all too hasty efforts to synthesize 
and integrate what little knowledge has been acquired in empirical 
research"(42). Miner (1952), citing much of the criticism raised 
against the Redfield continuum, claimed that he disagreed with a 
remarkable number of these viewpoints, because they constituted as 
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he wrote: " a criticism of Redfieled rather than the continuum". Even 
so, he rejected the continuum ideal-type and implicitly tended to 
favour the rural-urban dichotomy. 
(43) Duncan (1963), in his 
discussion of rural-urban continuum, warned that students should 
take a careful look at the continuum hypothesis before admitting it to 
the professional argot. He asserted that such a hypothesis does not 
withstand careful examination. His analysis of census data provided 
fundamental evidence in favour of a rural-urban dichotomy rather 
than a continuum. He concluded that careful inductive classifications 
of communities are of "greater scientific value than hypothetical 
constructs like the rural-urban continuum" 
(44). 
Haer, in contrast, favoured the concept of rural-urban 
continuum rather than the conventional rural-urban dichotomy. He 
stressed that the continuum concept may be useful in making more 
precise the meaning of the attributes usually subsumed under the 
rubrics "rural and urban"(45). Mitchell (1969) strongly supported the 
continuum. He thought that the continuum typology is more tangible, 
especially among the traditional societies. He stated: 
Between the tribal and urban extremes there are many 
intermediate types; the rural, semi-industrial societies lie 
well between the two extremes. 
(46) 
Dewey, after reviewing eighteen books and articles on this 
subject, counted a total of forty elements mentioned in the definitions 
of urbanism. These elements were: 
1) Heterogeneity 2) impersonality 3) division of labour 4) 
anonymity 5) mobility 6) segmental roles 7) class differences 8) 
predatory relations 9) emphasis on time 10) new family role 11) 
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employment pattern 12) multiple dwelling units 13) more female 
employment 1.4) secularism 15) non-agricultural life 16) 
cosmopolitanism 17) tenancy 18) complexity 19) tolerance 20) 
superficiality 21) low fertility 22) sophistication 23) commercialisation 
24) liberalism 25) automation 26) literacy 27) creativity 28) blase 
attitude 29) stereotyping 30) critical attitude 31) utilitarianism 32) 
formal controls 33) interdependency 34) subjective outlook 35) intense 
occupational space 36) social participation 37) transiency 38) 
individualism 39) objectivity 40) practicality. 
(47) 
He found it was unclear which were specifically urban 
characteristics and which were not. Only one characteristic, 
"heterogeneity", was mentioned by the majority (as many as eleven of 
eighteen authors). The other characteristics were less popular. 
However, the present researcher believes that these theories 
have not taken into account the diffusion of rural characteristics 
over the city, which is reflected in the rurality [as a way of life] of 
the city, in contrast to the usual presumption that it is the city 
which changes the out-skirts and the countryside. Thus we need to 
examine the other viewpoint. 
B. A CONTRASTING VIEW: THIRD WORT, D CTTTES 
Since Wirth called attention to the city phenomenon in his 
famous essay, "Urbanism as a Way of life"(1938), sociologists and 
anthropologists have paid more attention to studying the city. Thus, 
a large number of studies appeared afterwards either to test Wirth's 
theory or to create a new direction to study the city. 
Obviously, Wirth's theory is not adequate to interpret urban 
life in the Third World; indeed, it seems inadequate to interpret 
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urban life in the United States itself. Buttel and Flinn (1975) asserted 
that the American population changed from 95% rural in 1795 to 74% 
urban in 1970. Despite this change, they pointed out the common 
expression " You can take the boy out of the country, but you can't 
take the country out of the boy". Moreover there were prevailing 
American beliefs that rural life was natural for man, while city life 
was artificial and evil. Their assumption that agrarian values were 
widespread in the general population of the United States, was borne 
out empirically. Most of the sample respondents tended to agree with 
agrarian statements, with little difference between the rural and the 
urban subsample. 
(48) 
M. Axelord (1956) found interaction with relatives as manifested 
in friendship networks and mutual aid to be important in all age and 
socio-economic status groups. 
(49) Greer (1956) reported a similar 
finding in his study of Los Angeles. He indicated that 73 % of the 
high urban families and 76 % of the low urban families were part of 
family networks(50). Similarly Sussman (1953) studied 154 maintained 
mutual assistance patterns among relatives of middle class in 
Newhaven(51). O'Neill (1982) empirically found that kinship network 
among dockland communities (North Humberside-England) represents 
close contacts between relatives such as aunts, uncles cousins and 
grandparents at home or in the neighbourhood which might 
frequently occur(52). lie concluded: 
Work-based communities like Dockland are more likely to 
be close-knit because relatives see a great deal more of 
one another than if they commute either out of, or into, 
the neighbourhood(53) 
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Bell and Boat (1957), using interviews with men in four 
neighbourhoods in San Francisco, found that informal relationships 
within the neighbourhood are fairly frequent and likely to be 
personal, close and intimate. The frequency and the nature of 
informal participation vary with the economic and family 
characteristics of the neighbourhoods. Kin are generally more 
important in each neighbourhood(54). 
Recent research (1988) on the urban community in the United 
State reports that 49% of the respondents get together with relatives 
at least once a week and another 13% reported that they get together 
with relatives a few times a month. Further 44% of the respondents 
visited most frequently with relatives(55). Strauss (1969) 
demonstrated empirically from a purposive sample of 448 married 
women in Minnesota, that ruralness and working- class status are 
associated with greater kinship interaction, compared with urbanness 
and middle-class status. He concluded: r 
... the kin network is often a deterrent to the rapid 
adoption of modern psycho-social characteristics, it does 
not follow that interaction with the extended kin can or 
should be eliminated even in societies desperately 
needing to modernize(56) 
Suttles (1972) strongly opposed Wirth's dichotomy. lie assumed 
that informal social control, for instance, is inadequate to cope with 
the heterogeneity, thus the city might be divided into several 
communities (villagelike) basis on primary relations as a main 
resource for social control(57). 
In England (the cradle of modern urbanization in the World) 
some kinship ties remain. Young and Willmott (1960) in their study of 
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a middle-class London suburb, showed that 25 % of parents in their 
seventies lived with married children and the percentage increased to 
41 % for those aged 80 and over. Childless couples also turned to the 
extended family in old age"(58) Pahl (1970) emphasized that people 
who moved only a short distance would be able to maintain kinship 
linkages with parents and siblings. Similarly, where people from a 
similar area move into a nearby town, they are able to provide each 
other with social and economic support. He states: 
For Irish immigrants coming from a similar part of 
Ireland and settling together in a quarter of an English 
town, or for local migrants from nearby villages, the 
social control and cultural patterns of the previous milieu 
may be maintained(59). 
If Wirth's theory is not entirly applicable in a Western 
metropolis, it is still less so in the Third World cities. 
In the major cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America, one can 
clearly observe extensive kinship networks, 'deep family ties, close 
relationship with neighbours and friends; in brief, one can see 
primary relationships dominating in the city realm. Studies such as 
those by Abu-Lughod (1962)(60), Aldous (1968)(61), Mangin (1970)(62), 
Magnarella (1974)(63), Gutkind (1974) (64), Levine and Levine 
(1979)(65), Pons (1980)(66), Arunn and Williams (1983)(67) and Lowder 
(1986)(68), well represent this. Some of them empirically tested Wirth's 
hypothesis, and found that cities in the Third World are lacking the 
urban ingredients described by Wirth [ segmentalization, anonymity, 
superficiality, transience, formal social control, heterogeneity.. etc. ]. 
The city and town have maintained the folk community characteristics; 
primary relationships and deep ties. Contrary to Wirth's view, the 
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family does not lose its function and its importance. Its core values 
are incorporated into the beliefs and behaviour of city dwellers. 
Roberts(1978) argued that internal migration in Latin America, 
had played a fundamental role in the urbanization process. He 
asserted that "urban populations are floating populations". In Peru, 
for instance, about 60% of the inhabitants of its major cities were 
born outside the city. He concluded: 
The contribution of migration to urban growth is, 
however, a cumulative one; children of migrants born in 
towns or cities are counted as part of the natural 
increase of urban places. Consequently even in those 
countries in which net migration contributes a minor 
fraction of urban population growth, the migration 
experience may still be an important one in the urban 
social structure(69). 
Abu-Lughod (1971) found that metropolitan Cairo maintained 
both the old and the new orders, which existed and flourished side 
by side. She emphasized that "Cairo combines the passing 
traditionalism and agrarianism of an Egypt that has existed for 
centuries with industrial modernism of an Egypt yet-to-be"(70). 
Lloyd (1973) asserted that the term "urban" is not valid to use 
in the African context. The urbanization process usually involves the 
sudden movement of rural tribesmen into modern cities, shaping their 
social structure(71). Similarly, Gilbert (1982) emphasized that the so- 
called modern cities of Africa, Asia and Latin America, developed as 
result of the colonial system, who used them as trade and 
administrative centres. Into these cities, large numbers of rural 
migrants moved, eventually in massive waves. Thus, cities recognized 
today as being of the Third World, first emerged with extremely 
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different urbanization characteristics, those of the Western 
countries 
(72). 
Disputing the assumption that Western urbanization meant the 
end of traditional kinship systems, Flanagan (1990) emphasized that 
kinship systems in Third World cities remain powerful. He gave many 
examples of the effectiveness of kinship systems in Brazilian, 
Peruvian and African cities, but he viewed kinship in economic rather 
than cultural terms: "The key variable in understanding the operation 
of kinship in urbanization is economic, not cultural"(73). 
Aldous, from his experience in West Africa, concluded that 
status in the city was an achieved and not an ascribed status based 
on family membership. He found that the extended family in African 
cities is indeed functional"(74) Magnarella, in his study of some 
principal cities in Turkey, found that most people in Turkey 
consulted their fathers when making important decisions; only 5.5 % 
of his study sample claimed not to consult their fathers(75). Similarly, 
one can easily observe the mutual aid among relatives in Tehran as 
Brunn and Williams mentioned 
(76). Kin networks are also widespread 
in Delhi's population particularly among the migrants who formed 
more than 70 % of the entire population of the city(77). 
Mitchell (1987) directed questions to 1,392 informants of various 
education levels in Rhodesia, asking each to indicate whether he 
considered himself to be very definitely a townsman, mainly a 
townsman, partly a townsman and partly a countryman, mainly a 
countryman, or very definitely a countryman). He found that the 
majority, 56%, regarded themselves as partly townsmen and partly 
countrymen. Only 9.6% of them claimed that they were very definitely 
townsmen and 11.1% said they were mainly townsmen, while 15. % said 
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they were mainly countrymen and 8% saw themselves as very 
definitely countrymen. The results confirm that rural characteristics 
prevailing in the city and influence all aspects of life; in other words 
the city is exposed to what may be called "ruralization"(78). In the 
same context, Ahu-Lughod (1969) asserted that urban economic 
structure alongside rural to urban migration helps to sustain 
traditionalism and bring new ruralism within Cairo. She emphasised 
that an unknown but sizeable proportion of the city inhabitants were 
not true townsmen, but rather countrymen; living in but not of the 
city(79). Petersen (1971) tested Abu-Lughod's hypothesis. Her 
empirical findings, supported the hypothesis as a generalization based 
on direct evidence about the rurality of Cairo(80). 
In Latin America, as in most TWCs, the basic unit of social 
organization is the family. In Mexico city, for instance, family ties 
appear to remain very strong(81). Dotson (1978) claimed that large 
and medium cities in the less developed world with special reference 
to Mexico City, remain villages in their residential function to quite 
an astonishing degree. He assumed that movement from an rural to an 
urban environment does not necessarily mean a change of occupation; 
it may mean nothing more than rural-dwelling agriculturalists 
becoming urban-dwelling agriculturalists. Thus ruralism still very 
much prevails by occupation as well as psycho-social identity. 
(82). He 
concluded that "the urban dwelling farmer is real' 8, A Similar 
result was found in Peru, where the family remains the strong unit 
in the city as well as in the village. This might be due to the 
massive influx of rural migrants, and the nature of settlement in 
scattered or slum areas. 
(84) 
20 
Thus, Wirth's hypothesis, and even Redfield's continuum, which 
is regarded as more rational than Wirth's dichotomy, seem to be 
inappropriate in the Third World. Rural migrants in many 
underdeveloped countries came directly to the large cities and the 
capitals. There was widespread mutual assistance and obligation 
among relatives, neighbours and friends. This means, of course, that 
there is a high level of primary relationship. For instance, the 
inhabitants of central Lagos were found to be like their rural 
counterparts, continuing to regard the needs of their relatives as 
their first responsibility. They supported aged relatives as well as 
parents, and it was customary to present their elderly relatives with 
gifts in cash or kind when visiting them. They often contributed to 
the wedding costs of their younger brothers, the up-bringing of 
their nephews and nieces, and helped married sisters. Such aid was 
coupled with open-handed hospitality and gifts to relatives(85) Marris 
concluded that: 
All Nigerians..... are very loyal to their family group, 
they regard their membership in it with pride and 
affection, and derive a deep sense of emotional security 
from it. (86) 
Similar traits can easily be seen in other TWCs, particularly in 
the Middle East, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
1.3 THE PRESENT STUDY 
There has been the remarkable assertion that the city may be 
viewed as a firm, 
(87) fusing all the population to cope with its style 
of life, to create what Ledermann called the "urban entity""(88) Racial 
or ethnic groups, rural migrants or any other kind of aggregations 
would be apart from the city system and urban atmosphere. Although 
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some of these ethnic or religious groups might maintain their 
traditions, in general they became absorbed into the city atmosphere 
[the way of life]. This implies increased effectiveness of the 
individual, formal control, and the abolition of the family role in 
controlling and arranging individuals' activities and relationships. 
However, we have seen that this may be only partially true for 
western cities, and still less so in TWCS. The researcher in this 
study advocates the view that the family is the main unit in the 
TWCs, bringing many obligations and commitments: close ties, vital 
kinship relations, extended family, patriarchal authority, endogamy, 
cooperation with neighbours and little concern for time . These may 
be described as characteristics of a rural community. 
In this context, the researcher aimed to examine the following 
features: 
A. The nature and the composition of the family in the city, its 
status, pattern of its members' relationships and authority;. 
B. The power of kinship ties, and obligations to relatives; 
C. The nature of neighbours and neighbourhood and their 
participation in social control; 
D. How the city dwellers view time as a criterion of social activities 
and life rhythm . 
Meanwhile the following two main questions are raised: 
1. To what extent have city dwellers acquired rural traits, values, 
norms and manners, and to what extent have they maintained 
hypothesized urban traits? 
2. Is there any sort of double standard of personality, or dualism, in 
which modern and traditional ways live and flourish side by side in 
the city? 
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1.4 THE ATRFA AND THE POPULATION OF THI; STUDY 
The major part of this study was carried out in four districts 
on both side of Baghdad [two districts in Al-Karkh, on the left bank 
of the Tigris river and two districts in Al-Russafa, on the right 
bank of the Tigris]. The other part [the control group] was 
conducted in Sakran Village which is established about 115 km south 
of Baghdad. 
The main reasons for having chosen Baghdad as the area of 
this study are: 
a. It is a large urban centre in Iraq and one of the largest capitals 
in the Middle East. 
b. It has about one-third of all the Iraqi population. 
c. It is the main destination of migrants in Iraq, ' as well as having 
the most concentrated urban population. 
All these reasons are very important for this study. In 
contrast, Sakran village, from which the control group came, is a 
homogeneous village where everybody knows everyone else, because 
all the village dwellers are blood relatives. Moreover the ecology of 
the village is very simple ; the village consists of three streets, each 
comprising about 35 households. All the village inhabitants work in 
agriculture. The fact that the researcher knows everybody in the 
village, its distance from Baghdad, and its purely rural 
characteristics, as described in the literature, were other reasons for 
the selection of this village. 
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SIMPLE MAP OF BAGHDAD CITY ILLUSTRATE 
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1.5 THE RESEARCH METHODS AND FIELDWORK 
The methods of this research depended primarily on interview 
guided by a preset questionnaire, which was handed to the heads of 
families in Baghdad and Sakran village, during the period from 
October 1990 and January 1991. 
The great problem confronting the researcher was the Gulf 
crisis which led to the closure of Iraqi borders and prevented the 
researcher from returning as intended, to obtain the data himself. 
The researcher was therefore forced to send the questionnaire to his 
colleagues in the sociology department and psychology department of 
the University of Baghdad. A. Yassin Mustafa who recently obtained 
his Ph. D from the sociology department in Hull University in 
September 1990, held with him the Arabic formula of the 
questionnaire, and obtained the data in association with Salih, K. 
Hussen, assistant professor in psychology University of Baghdad and 
Amin, M. Abdilal, assistant professor in statistics, University of Al- 
Mustansirya. I am very grateful to them 
The researcher had hoped that after the crisis , he would be 
able to return and re-collect the data, not because it is inadequate 
but to ensure that all the work was under his own control. 
Unfortunately the duration of the crisis has so far made this 
impossible. Thus it is necessary to depend on the data collected by 
the colleagues mentioned above, who have considerable experience in 
this field. 
It must be acknowledged that the study was done under unique 
and difficult circumstances: the fear of the confrontation with America 
and its Allies, following upon the hard experience of eight years of 
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war with Iran. The researcher made every effort to control the steps 
of the study and had the benefit of valuable collaborators; 
nevertheless, the findings may to some degree reflect the 
circumstances of that year, and of Iraqi society during a period of 
many years war of strife. 
1.6 THE PILOT STUDY AND THE REFEREES 
The pilot study was designed to reveal the significant variables 
for the construction of the questionnaire and to test the 
meaningfulness of every item. The sample included 20 respondents, 
most of them post-graduate students in Hull University, about 80 
percent of them have lived in Baghdad city; 50 percent have lived 
there all their life, and 30 percent have spent more than five years 
there. The interview with each individual lasted about half an hour, 
each interview being followed by informal discussion. 
The respondents in this group were divided into two sets: 18 
males and 2 females; all of them were over 30 years of age, and only 
four of them were single, so they recognised the responsibility of the 
family; most of them asserted that the extended family is the main 
unit in Iraqi society, and is reflected here or in their permanent 
home, characteristic remarks included the following: 
- When I was in Baghdad, I used to live with my parents, brothers 
and sisters and their wives and children under one roof. 
-I have bought about three thousand pounds worth of goods for my 
extended family and relatives as gifts. 
-I am studying hard to save my face when my family and relatives 
receive me. 
- My original family support me morally and materially even though I 
now have family of my own. 
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-I exchange visits with our Iraqi colleagues and friends here and 
share many things; we are a part of Baghdad community. 
- We are urban dwellers but we have to maintain our original values 
and obligations. 
The respondents viewed favourably most of the questionnaire 
items except for a few terms, which were changed in accordance with 
their suggestions. Meanwhile the researcher, under his supervisor's 
consultation, showed the first draft of the questionnaire to a 
committee in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology in 
this University. The committee consisted of: 
1. Mr. C. Creighton 
2. Dr. D. Booth 
3. Mr. Ray Francis 
4. Mr. L. Hill 
They discussed and asked about every item in the 
questionnaire and provided some very useful advice, with regard to 
which the construction of the questionnaire was modified. The 
researcher then returned the revised draft for checking.. 
1.7 CONSTRUCTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The main device used in this study was a standardized 
questionnaire, which could provide data to describe the rural aspects 
of urban life in Baghdad city. The questionnaire was designed to 
collect data which included social characteristics of family structure, 
its interactions and activities in an urban centre in Iraq. 
The questionnaire was designed having regard to a review of the 
literature in the field of urban sociology, and particularly studies in 
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Asia and the Middle East, with special reference to the urban 
characteristics in Iraq. 
The questionnaire was formulated in English and afterwards 
translated into Arabic. To check the validity of the translation, the 
researcher sent three copies of the questionnaire in both English and 
Arabic, to three referees selected from his colleague in the 
Department of Sociology in the University of Baghdad. The 
respondents were asked for their help and told: "This information will 
be used only for scientific purposes, so we do not need your name 
and address. For that reason we need your cooperation to fill in the 
questionnaire truthfully, not just what you have believe, but also 
what do you actually do and how you behave" 
Following the pre-test [pilot study] and the committee's advice 
the questionnaire was revised; some questions were modified and some 
were refined to make them easier to answer for persons with limited 
education. As modified, the questionnaire provided space for both 
males and females to respond. 
The questionnaire in its final formulation consisted of five 
general sections each of which included a number of questions, plus 
general information as follows: 
A. GENFRAT, TNFORMATTON: including, sex, age, education, occupation, 
place of birth, marital status, family income, age at marriage, number 
of children and family composition. [see appendix 1] 
B. THE URBAN FAMILY: 
1. Power structure of the family. 
2. Family planning. 
3. Women's position and status. 
4. Marriage: Polygyny, choice of mate, age at marriage. 
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C. KTNSNTP NETWORK AND 
1. Kinship control over marriage. 
2. Loyalty and nepotism. 
3. Mutual obligations. 
4. People attitudes toward each other as "kin". 
D. NFTGHROUJRS AND NEIGHBOUJRHOOD. 
1. Neighbours relationships. 
2. Mutual obligations. 
3. Neighbourhood and social control. 
4. Neighbours' attitudes. 
E. SOGTAT, TTMF; 
1. Time perception: lateness and punctuality. 
2. Time budget. 
3. Rhythm of life. 
4. Teinporal orientation. 
In the last section, the researcher adopted a Likert's scale to 
measure the attitudes of the respondents toward social time [social 
activities]. This scale was used because it is practical, relatively 
simple and inexpensive, and does not (like the Thurston scale) assume 
that the judges can determine a scale value independent of their own 
attitudes. (89) 
The scale consisted of 12 items, covering four areas of social 
time [see chapter eight]. To avoid any margin of error or any 
tendency to stereotyped response, statements were worded in both 
positive and negative forms; six of the items were stated positively, 
so that strong agreement with them reflected a positive attitude, 
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while the other items were reflected a negative attitude. Both were 
clearly differentiated at the ends of the continuum. 
Values on a five-point continuum were assigned to indicate a 
positive and negative attitude towards time as a criterion of social 
activity rhythm. 
All the 20 Iraqi students employed in the pilot study were asked to 
react to the formulation of the statements to increase the face 
validity of the items. Split-half method was used to evaluate the 
internal consistency of the scale. The reliability coefficient according 
to Pearson's correlation was(0.86) for the 12 item scale. 
1.8 THE SAMPLE: 
After the preparation of the questionnaire, the researcher 
selected a sample of 300 heads of families, two hundred from Baghdad 
city and one hundred as a control group, from Sakran village, south 
of Baghdad. The sample was divided into three categories according 
to the nature of resident; natives [city born], migrants and pure 
rural. 
According to the last general census in 1987, Baghdad within 
the boundaries of Amant Alassima [the capital province] comprises 
nine major residential areas, five on the right bank of the Tigris 
river, namely, Al-Russafa, Al-Adhamiya, Al-Thowra, Baghdad Al- 
Jadeeda and Al-Karada Al-Sharquah, and four on the left bank: Al- 
Karkh, Al-Kadhemiya, Al-Mansour, and Al-Dura. These are divided into 
76 sub-sectors and the latter are divided into a further 360 districts. 
The researcher recognized that a comprehensive survey of so 
many districts would be almost impossible, and would require more 
time and money than were available. Thus, the researcher selected at 
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random four districts: two from the right bank of the Tigris river 
and two from the left bank. The selection operation regarded two 
factors: 
1. The concentration of the natives [city born] and the migrants. 
2. The variety of the sample areas in the city. 
In the first stage of the sample selection, the following 
districts were chosen: [Al-Safina] neighbourhood [district) in Al- 
Adhamiya area(90 which is one of the oldest residential areas in the 
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right bank of Tigris river, where most of its population are 
natives, 
(91) Al-Chewader Neighbourhood in A1-Thowra area, 
(92) 
where 
most of the population are migrants;. Al-Mutanaby Neighbourhood in 
AI-Mansour area, 
(93) 
where most of the population are natives, and 
Al-Noor Neighbourhood in Al-Shaala(94) sub-division of Al-Kademiya 
area. 
These areas were randomly chosen according to Weisberg and 
Rowen's note: 
If a town fell into your sample, for example, you would 
randomly choose the neighbourhoods to be interviewed 
maybe one area in the northeast corner, another on the 
near south side, and a third in a western suburb. At the 
next stage, a sample of blocks would be chosen in each 
Neighbourhood, and at the next stage, a sample of houses 
would be chosen on each block(95). 
After the general division, further division was made, in the 
second stage each of these selected areas was divided into blocks 
and a random sample of blocks was selected. 
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The final stage was for all residential units in each selected 
block to be listed and a random sample of 2,4,6,... residents from each 
block selected, to give a total of. 50 from each sampled district. 
The total of 200 respondents of the sample was confined to 
heads of the family, because the study focused on family ties and the 
family's activities in an urban centre. 
The second part of the sample, which consisted of 100 
respondents from a rural area, were selected as a control group. This 
part of the fieldwork was easier because all of the dwelling units 
were systematically selected, as a case study. Sakran Village(96) 
comprises 103 households which were covered by a comprehensive 
survey. Afterwards the researcher discarded two uncompleted copies 
and one for statistical reasons, bringing the total number of the 
sample 300 heads of family. 
1.9 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSTS 
Following the operation of transferring the crude data of the 
questionnaire into the computer, the researcher used the statistics 
package for social sciences program (SPSSX) which has been utilized 
in data processing, cross-tabulation and analysis. It was also found 
that chi-square was very useful for measuring the significant 
differences between the groups of the sample. 
The technique of comparative analysis has been used. To 
execute this comparison, the researcher has used frequency and 
percentages. This method has great value because it shows the 
diffusion of the traditional values into urban dweller's behaviour that 
the researcher assumed to be real part of the urban inhabitants' 
manners and attitudes. In the same context the researcher was 
anxious to test the impact of some independent variables such as sex, 
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age, education and occupation on family ties, kinship obligations, 
neighbours and neighbourhood to ascertain the differences and 
similarities between the two main groups [urban and rural]. He 
therefore undertook to merge both natives and migrants groups, 
regarding them as an urban unit, and compared them with the control 
group (pure rural]. This necessitated cross-tabulation and some 
statistical measurements such as chi square and Pearson correlation 
coefficient, which had already been used. 
For the attitudes of the respondents towards social time, one-way 
analysis of variance was adopted. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
URBANIZATION IN ASIA 
AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
2.1 TNTRODUCTTON 
Urbanization in the Middle East as in most Asian countries, 
first occurred to a significant extent during and after the first World 
War, but it accelerated after the second World War. It has been a 
remarkable phenomenon, with the urban areas more than doubling 
their population in less than three decades, as we shall see. 
The key factors behind this phenomenon have been the huge 
rural migration, together with the natural increase, which reflects 
improvement in the economic situation, health, education, and 
communication, leading to decreased mortality, and to increased 
fertility. In other words there have been more births than deaths. 
Although this phenomenon has been very important for the 
progress of these countries, it has left pathological effects in social 
life such as over-urbanization, rurality, slum areas and so on. 
In fact, the social features of the city seems to be similar to 
those of the rural counterpart: norms, values and habits are the 
commonplace of the two settings. The traditional family still stands 
firm against the winds of change, maintaining its old role over its 
members, for instance, "the new family is not recognized as a 
separate and independent entity. The son continues to be under the 
direct authority of his father or parents" 
(1). Kinship and 
neighbourhood have a great effecting on the social interaction, 
forming the invisible structure of the city. 
In this chapter the researcher will attempt to define the 
features of urbanization in Asia with particular reference to the 
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Middle Eastern countries, because they have shared similar cultural 
characteristics, closely related with the purpose of the present study. 
2.2 URRANTZATTON TN ASTA 
A considerable number of studies have discussed the process of 
urbanization in Asia. These have investigated many aspects of urban 
life, especially the rapid and vast growth of cities and its causes, in 
an often specialized way, appropriate to the purposes of this thesis. 
This urbanization process is quite different from that occurring in 
western countries today. Therefore, most of these studies now agree 
that the theory of demographic transition, as developed on the basis 
of the experience of western countries, is inadequate in the Asian 
context. It does not adequately explain, for instance, the pattern of 
fertility, family size and close relationships in the cities as well as in 
the villages throughout the "Third World"(2) which reflect the 
traditions in both types of settlement; these did not- persist in 
western urban communities. These studies are well represented by K. 
Davis (1954, i961,1965,1975)(3)ß P. Hauser (1957)(4), D. Bogue and K. 
Zachariah (1961)(5), T. Wilkinson (1961,1963)(6), the U. N- ECAFE 
Secretariat (1964)(7), R. Murphey (1966)(8), T. McGee (1971)(9)' O. 
Lynch (1974)(1(), Gilbert and Gugler (1982)(11), and J. Gugler 
988)(12). (1( 
The main feature of these studies was the explanation of urban 
growth or urban revolution in McGee's terms 
(13), 
according to two 
main factors: 
1) The flow of migration from rural to urban areas, reflecting 
economic growth and consequent "pull" of the city's attractions, 
as compared with poor conditions on the land; 
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2) The natural increase (through an excess of birth over deaths) K. 
Davis. indicates that the second component of urban increase 
was of high significance, as he states: 
If Asia's urbanization is distinguished neither by its level 
nor by its speed, what is it distinguished by ? One way 
in which it differs from past history is in the ingredients 
or components of urbanization, For instance, its city 
population is growing more rapidly than city populations 
grew in the past, and its rural population is doing the 
same. Furthermore, the source of city population growth 
is different; rural-urban migration plays a lesser role, 
natural increase a greater one. 
04) 
Although, Davis did not give priority to the rural rural-urban 
migration factor in Asian urban growth, he did not neglect it. 
However, this factor should not be taken for granted, but should be 
examined by turning to other relevant researches. D. J Bogue and K. C. 
Zachariah supposed that: 
Rural-urban migration is by far the major component of 
urbanization and is the chief mechanism by which all of 
the world's great urbanization trends have been 
accomplished. This being the case, there is great 
potential profit in focusing on rural-to-urban migration 
as a way of deepening one's understanding of the 
urbanization process(15) 
Similarly R. Murphey pointed out: 
In Asia the very large and continuing role is played by 
rural-urban migration. Almost every large Asian city has 
apparently owed half or more of its recent rapid growth 
to migration, but even so general a statement must be 
qualified since the nature of migration makes accurate 
counting difficult and since in most Asian cities it is 
clear that many if not most migrants continue to maintain 
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close ties with their rural origins and periodically return 
there 06)" 
With this phase of urban growth in Asia, it is very important 
to recognize that more than half of the inhabitants of most cities 
were born outside the city. For example, more than 70 % of the 
population of Bombay city appears to have been born outside the 
city. This means that it is always a minority which feels "at home" in 
the city, the majority are "strangers". Similarly, it was found that in 
Djakarta about three-quarters of the city's population was born 
outside that city. 
(17) 
In communist China, the growth of the urban population was 
rapidly increased after 1949, obtaining an annual average rate of 
increase over four times that of the total population. From 1949 to 
1960, aggregate urban population more than doubled; 60% of all the 
increase in national population was accounted for by the urban 
increase. This rapid increase was mainly attributed to rural-urban 
migration(18). As Kirkby (1985) stated: 
Indeed, the impact of migration on urban population 
growth increased greatly through the first decade of the 
people's republic. Before 1953, net migration accounted 
for over 70 per cent of total urban growth(19). 
Dwyer (1971) regarded both natural increase and migration as 
the only factors responsible for the rapid rates of urban population 
increase in along Kong. He asserted that such phenomenon is in 
common with other parts of Asia and the non-Western countries(20). 
Ramachandrant (1989) attributed the rapid pace of urbanization 
in India to rural-urban migration. In less than two decades, urban 
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population increased nearly three times, from 62 million in 1951 to 159 
million in 1981. The proportion of urban population to total population 
increased at a slower pace, from 17.6% to 23.7% for the same period. 
The slower pace of increase is attributed to the high fertility of both 
rural and urban population, which diminish the differentiation 
between the two sets(21). 
Goldstein (1971) ascribed the rapid pace of urbanization in 
Thailand to heavy rural migration, which more than trebled the 
population of Bangkok in about two decades(22). 
In Iran, migration to the major cities, especially Tehran, is of a 
remarkable proportion. The city of Tehran grew at the rate of 5.9% 
per year during the years 1956-1966, of which 4% is attributed to 
rural to urban migration. These figures do not reflect the large 
amount of temporary migration which accounts for a sizeable 
proportion of Tehran population. Thus migration certainly responsible 
for the size of the major cities in Iran(23). 
The growth of many, if not most of Asia's cities, including the 
main cities, was the result of the following factors : 
a) the low land-population ratio arising from rapid population growth 
in relation to agricultural resources; people left rural areas, in 
brief, because there was no way, in the existing social land- 
tenure and technological conditions, of procuring a livelihood 
on already over-populated land or by technically obsolescent 
handicrafts. 
b) the disruption and disorganization produced by the Second World 
War and the political change which followed as result of which 
many of the cities of Asia became choked with refugees who in 
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seeking occupation and advancement have swelled the urban 
population. 
c) The lure of urban existence to which large parts of the peasant 
population were exposed as the result of military service, as 
well as migratory refugee flows. 
d) Seasonality of employment in agriculture which creates migratory 
flows, bringing many people in contact with the attractions of 
city life. 
e) The great cities which already exist create the tendency further to 
centralize industrial, commercial, and service development in 
them. Such a tendency may detract from the growth potential 
of other cities and may produce further concentration in the 
primate or great cities at the expense of the rest of the 
national economy. 
(24) 
According to this theoretical approach, we have an inductive 
view, that the urban growth in Asia has been exceptionally rapid, not 
only because of unusually rapid increase in the urban proportion of 
the population due to rural-urban migration, but also because of the 
rapid increase in the total population to which this proportion is 
applied. 
Returning to Davis's emphasis on natural population increase, 
this arose, evidently because there are no outstanding differences 
between rural and urban growth; the traits of urban life are 
something like those in the rural areas, or in Roberts's terms "it is a 
city of peasants"'(25) However, we need now to ask, did the 
processes of urbanization create "urbanism" as a way of life in urban 
Asia's milieu? While no clear-cut answer will be found, we shall try to 
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investigate some relevant studies to provide broad overviews of 
urbanization in the provinces or primate cities, by T. 0 Wilkinson 
(1961,1963)(26) 0. Lynch (1974)(27)t D. Pocock (1974)(28) and M. Rao 
(1974)(29). All of these writers agree that there are no essential 
differences between the rural and urban milieu in most Asian 
countries. As Pocock states: 
Where it is recognized that city and village are elements 
of the same civilization, how does the question of their 
continuity arise ? Is it not because the sociologist has 
assumed (almost unconsciously )a division which his 
later observations would lead him to mend?. If we have 
posited the village from the outset we have automatically 
opposed it in our minds to the city. When we come to 
knit up what we have broken, we can only do it by way 
of description of the relationships between the two 
entities..... it would appear impossible to recognize the 
"orthogenetic" character of India's cities and villages and 
at the same time to think of comparing them separately 
with their "equivalents" elsewhere. 
(30) 
In Japan the tenacity of the traditional agrarian way of life, 
even in present day highly industrial Japan, has been supported by 
both governmental policies and economic factors "Against this 
background the presence of agriculturalists or at least an agrarian 
way of life within Japan's urban population becomes 
understandable" (31). Despite all the changes, in the major cities, the 
main residential areas in modern Japan still maintain many 
characteristics of the old traditional city. Although the new men take 
up residence as big businessmen, chairmen of industry, military 
leaders and government officials, they inherit and carry on many of 
the old traditions and values, drawing upon the same heritage as a 
source of prestige. 
(32) 
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In his careful and profound study, M. A. Qadeer [1974] assumed 
that urbanism might bring smaller and nuclear families, lower 
mortality and fertility rates and higher proportion of females to 
males, but substantially he found little differences between rural and 
urban areas in three countries in south Asia: India, Pakistan and 
Bangla Desh. Using household size, he observed a slightly smaller 
household in Indian urban areas, while similar households in Pakistan 
and Rangla Desh were a hit larger. 
Table 2-1 Size of Household 
Areas/Countries India Pakistan Bangla Desh 
Urban 5.0 5.7 5.6 
Rural 5.2 5.5 5.4 
Source: Qadeer, Op. Cit. P. 269 
He concluded that the household size in both rural and urban 
areas indicates that family structure has not undergone the kind of 
change normally associated with urbanization. The consanguine family 
in these countries continues to be a very cohesive unit. Blood 
loyalties are strong and kinship ties are continually reinforced by 
religious institutions and economic considerations. 
(33) lie asserted 
that " Urbanization is not affecting these ties to any appreciable 
degree" (34). 
In this context King (1980) emphasised that urbanization does 
not modernize social structures in Asian cities. The less tangible 
sphere of changes, is in values, attitudes and forms of social 
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relationships. He concluded that the commonplace in most Asian's 
cities is the pervasiveness of rural forms of social organization 
r 
values 35). 
One of the most important facets of the traditional values is 
that of the right authority in the family, which is confined to the 
oldest married male. Lazar (1.979) assumed that "because men were 
held to have appropriate moral qualifications, family authority was 
limited to older married men"(36). 
In Korea, despite large scale urbanization, industrialization and 
modernization, the family still plays many vital roles in shaping the 
society. Using Chang's words: 
The family and later the clan have provided its members 
with an identity. The clan gave status to each member so 
that his position would be identified and clarified, thus 
establishing a channel of command. The family regulated 
the sex drive and reproduction. Through elaborate rules 
which specified a child's relations to others, the birth 
order, sex, and generation pyramid usually predetermined 
his activities throughout his life(37). 
The extended family and kinship system seems to be very 
active in many other Asian societies regardless of residential areas. 
In Tibetan society, for instance, the kinship system encompasses 
multiple meanings, describing people sharing common agnatic descent 
from recognized ancestors; patrilineal descent(33). A similar system is 
found in Nepal, where the patrilineal system, clans, lineage, and joint 
family have remained more or less unaltered in Western Nepalse 
society(39). 
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In Indonesia Krausse [1979] observed that due to massive 
migration from rural areas, traditional values have been shaping the 
urban culture. He pointed out: 
It is quite conceivable that such a large population 
equipped with rural values and life style, is as much 
involved in sh 6pg the culture of the city as it is 
adjusting to it. 1 
It is now commonplace that the rural and traditional forms of 
social organization, values, norms, attitudes, and social order persist 
in many cities in East and West Asia and the Middle East, which 
indicate that it is false to presuppose a dichotomy between rural and 
urban social structure. Thus, city life as Versluys has asserted is not 
necessarily as atomized as it has been emphasized to be, but often, 
on the contrary, shows a certain cohesiveness which would help the 
rural migrant to adapt himself relatively easily to the city life, which 
in Asian cities particularly does not fundamentally differ with that in 
the village(41) 
2.3 URRANTZATTON TN THE MTDIThE FAST 
Most countries in the Middle East experienced an urban 
explosion, almost at the same time, after the second World War. in 
addition, most of these countries are "over-urbanized" 
(42) because the 
cities faced a heavy, rapid, and apparently continuous migration from 
rural areas. These cities were unprepared for the influx because of 
their degree of economic development. It is not quite clear how this 
greater quantity affects the urban process, but for urban theory it 
might well mean only that these countries were pushed more quickly 
into urbanization. 
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According to I. M. Lapidus, most of the city dwellers in the 
Middle East were born outside the city. He assumed that a sizeable 
portion of the people who lived in Middle Eastern cities were born in 
villages. Indirect but massive evidence of this exists in the fact that 
the population of most Middle Eastern cities is increasing at a higher 
rate than that of the countries in which they are located(43). For 
instance, Baghdad whose population was about 1,100,000 in 1965, had 
increased almost 800 per cent since 1904, when it had approximately 
140,000 people 
(44). Similarly, Turkey's urban population distributed 
among its six largest cities, more than doubled in less than thirty 
years(45). Aleppo in Syria has doubled, rising from 218,289 in 1930 to 
465,960. (46) 
Generally speaking, most of the Middle East cities at least 
doubled in size over one or two decades; Cairo in 1947 had a 
population three times the size of what it had been forty years 
previously and more than one-third of these people had not been 
born there(47). J. Abu-Lughod, thought that "migration from rural 
areas has been chiefly responsible for Egypt's soaring rate of 
urbanization" 
(48). In the same context, A. Abou-Zeid, supposed that 
the rapid pace of urbanization cannot be explained by rapid natural 
increase in the urban centres, particularly in Cairo "It must be the 
result of a powerful multitudinous drift of migrants from countryside 
to the towns and cities. "(49) 
Consequentially, there are three main reasons for the vast and 
rapid urban growth in the Middle Eastern cities: 
a) the flow of migrants from rural areas to cities, particularly to the 
primate cities, which was the main source of urbani. zation(50); 
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b) the natural increase (the excess of birth over death) which in the 
urban areas is still as high as in the rural, accounting for half 
the annual rate of urban growth(51); 
c) the administrative division, which has increased the city 
population; that means some hamlets and villages around the 
primate cities have been reclassified as part of those cities, 
according to the administration distribution of the 
population(52). 
G. Baer asked, " What are the causes of this urbanization 
process which characterises much of the Arab East, and why has it 
become so much more rapid within the last generation ? "(53). In his 
opinion some of the following factors should be considered: 
a) the economic and social conditions which impel peasants and 
tribesmen to leave their agricultural areas. This factor operates 
in two main ways: In Egypt the peasants were driven to cities 
by a rapid natural increase in the population which outpaced 
the increase of farm land by its great density(54). In Iraq, the 
drift to the city had its roots in the system of land tenure(55); 
b) the economic development of the towns and cities that attracted 
the rural population. It should be stressed that this economic 
development was due to : 1) discovery and exploitation of oil 
sources 2) emergence of the industrial cities 3) flow of capital 
from oil revenues(56); 
c) political factors, which include the concentration of government 
institutions in the urban centres, and the considerable increase 
in the number of people employed in government departments. 
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Another political factor of importance which spurred the 
process of urbanization in the Middle East during the second 
World War, was the presence of the allied forces in the area, 
particularly in the towns and their immediate vicinity, which 
attracted thousand of villagers to the towns and cities(57); 
d) The social and cultural change, which brought about or speeded 
up urbanization, through closer links between agriculture and 
the market, in addition to the development of education(58). 
The strength of these "pull" and "push" factors varies from 
one region to another, and also changes over time, but over all 
Middle East countries, these factors were mainly responsible for 
urban growth, so the vast and rapid growth of the cities did not 
create an urban lifestyle, and did not solve their rural ills, as 
evidenced by the shanty and slum areas throughout the cities. For 
instance, Amman the capital of Jordan, grew from 12,000 in 1958 to 
247,000 in 1961. A good part of it is slums, and urban amenities are 
lacking most of the time for most of the people. Greater Baghdad in 
1960 had an estimated 850,000 people; its slums, like those in many 
underdeveloped countries, are in two zones: the central part of the 
city and the outlying areas. Here are the shanty "sarifa" areas, 
characterized by self-built reed huts; these areas account for about 
45 per cent of housing in the entire city and are devoid of amenities, 
including even latrines(59). These consequences of rapid urban 
growth have been as being in terms of the continual ruralization of 
the cities(60). 
In fact, the morphology of the city in the Middle Eastern 
countries is somewhat similar to that in the industrial countries: 
including motorways, traffic lights, paved streets, schools, police 
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stations, modern buildings etc. However, the similarity does not 
extend to the social relationships which reflect the rural style of life, 
because the majority of the urban populations are not only rural. by 
birth, but also in culture , so the rural migrants bring their culture 
patterns with them to the city, and there are several ways in which 
their cultural. patterns affect aspects of city culture. One of these 
ways is the contribution of rural migrants to the socio-cultural 
distinct quarters which are a feature of Middle Eastern citiesl(61)In 
this respect, Morroe Berger, noted that: 
the most striking aspect of the Arab city is its 
separation into "quarters" each with its homogeneous 
population, its law and its custom. The quarters were 
related to each other chiefly through a common 
subordination to the central regime and through 
commerce. In other respects, each quarter was until 
recently a city unto itself"(62). 
In Bab-Altibbani of Taripoli, Lebanon, there is a residential 
cluster of Alawites from Jabal Alnsariyya in Syria and in the Qubba 
section of the city there is a community of Maronites all from the 
same village. Physically, these two clusters are integral parts of the 
city itself. Their inhabitants maintain village ties and to some extent 
they operate their own shops, but in other ways they are parts of 
the city itself. Each cluster has a definite reputation for certain 
kinds of behaviour and for performing certain kinds of work. 
Obviously they contribute to the very essence of Tripoli's urban 
heterogeneity(63). 
Similar behaviour has been reported from Turkey, P. Susuki 
(1966) describes the Anatolian peasants in Istanbul, showing how they 
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have retained aspects of their traditional lifestyle: they have 
maintained village endogamy, and established their own mutual fund 
covering funeral expenses and transportation fares to and from the 
home village(64). He states: 
I found village solidarity to be exceedingly strong for 
these migrants. Among the "Kiriniites", mutual aid, village 
endogamy, and its concomitants and parakinship system 
have been fostered in the city(65). 
Under the same stimulus Allan Schnaiberg (1970) noticed that 
the villagers in Ankara, had retained some traditional organization; 
extended family, patrilineality and patrilocality. They were established 
in a squatter area, composed of many other village groups clustered 
together(66). 
Finally, J. Ahu-Lughod assumed that as the villagers who were 
driven from the village by dearth of land and opportunity and 
attracted to the city had a low capacity for assimilation, they tended 
to build for themselves within the city, a replica of the culture they 
had left behind(67)4 
Maintenance of village ties naturally implies communication, but 
more than this, it is maintained by a number of activities: 
1) regular returns to the home village for weddings, funerals and 
other ceremonies; 
2) regular exchanges of gift and visits; 
3) commuting on a monthly, weekly or even daily basis(68). 
One of the possible consequences is that cities in the Middle 
East have two group of residents, natives and migrants, living and 
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flourishing. side by side, creating a "dualism" by means of mutual 
adjustment. 
Accordingly, this part of the thesis is concerned with studies 
of four aspects of urban life. The discussion begins with a brief 
review of studies concerning the study of family structure and 
marriage. It is followed by discussion of the kinship network and 
relationship with neighbours. Finally, we review studies of the use of 
"social time". Our study of rural aspect in the city is confined to 
those variables which are of particular importance in exploring the 
presence of the rural feature in urban life. 
2.4 FAMTT1Y STRUCTURE AND MARRIAGE 
In general, there seems to be no real distinction made in 
studies between the family, marriage and kinship; all are interrelated, 
Therefore, it is only possible to discriminate between them as regards 
methods. 
Six structural properties have been identified as 
characterizing the Middle Eastern Islamic family system. These 
properties existing in rural and urban settings alike(69), are : 
a) Extended family structure. According to R. Patai, the Muslim family 
is definitely extended. That is, under traditional circumstances 
prevailing in the majority of cases, the family constituting one 
household consists of an elderly man, his wife or wives, his 
unmarried daughters, his unmarried as well as married sons, 
and the wives and children of the latter(70 . However, Goode 
dismisses this description as ideal rather than real. He believes 
that the principle of the extended family under one roof is 
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rarely practiced(71). Elsewhere, Goode states that it is likely 
that many Arabs have at some time lived in an extended family, 
either as adolescents, or as adults keeping their married sons 
at home(72). The ideal is of psychological importance, however, 
for it reveals wishes and values widely held, and it helps to 
inculcate notions of family loyalty, and solidarity in each new 
generation. Accordingly, E. Prothero and L. Diab pointed out: 
Student of family structure have come to realize that 
family "types" are simply positions on a continuum. 
Though we speak of "extended" and "nuclear" families as 
qualitatively different, there are many individual and 
nuclear elements in "extended families" and many group 
and extended characteristics to be found in nuclear 
families(73). 
b) Patrilineal descent. The Arab Muslim family is patrilineal, which 
means that each man is regarded as belonging to the family to 
which his father belongs. Each individual derives his identity 
from the father and his paternal relatives(73). 
c) Patriarchal authority. This means that the father is master of his 
own conjugal family, and the eldest male is the head of the 
entire extended family grouping(75 . As C. S. Coon puts it: 
The family is a large patriarchal household, with a 
considerable staff of domestics, and capable of handling 
most of the needs of its members in preparing food and 
clothing and in bringing up children(76). 
d) Polygamous marriage. Moslim law permits a man to have up to four 
wives at the same time, but only if he can treat them with 
equal justice and provide adequately for them. Although this 
tradition has been widespread in the past it is extremely rare 
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nowadays. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the king, the princes, 
and the rich still have sizeable harems; in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, 
Egypt, however, the example of the leading families is that of 
monogamy(77). 
e) Endogamy. Another aspect of traditional behaviour that is 
undergoing change is the custom of endogamy, i. e, marriage 
within the same lineage, sect, community group, village or 
neighbourhood. Like others, this custom reflects the fact that 
the family rather than the individual constitutes the 
fundamental social unit. The advantages of endogamy lie not 
only in the convenience of lower bride-price and the retention 
of family wealth and property within the clan, but in the 
strengthening of kinship solidarity and avoidance of rupturing 
close relationships between the bride and her immediate kin(78). 
In the context of the above, a large number of studies of 
family life in the Middle East have focused on the Arab preference 
for marrying relatives: R. Patai (1955)(79), J. Gulick (1968)(80), E. 
Prothero and L. Diab (1974)(81), and D. Eickelman (1981)(82). 
According to these studies the ideal wife for young man is the 
daughter of one of his father's brothers (hint aam). Thus a girl can 
not marry other than her father's brother's son without his consent. 
In the city endogamy, both parallel-cousin and cross-cousin marriage 
are still noticeable, but on the decline(88). 
A number of studies by social scientists have investigated 
Muslim families in the Middle East(84). From these it can be 
determined that the average number of living children per nuclear 
family is between 5 and 7. J. Gulick has summarized recent studies of 
household size of Muslim families of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, 
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finding means ranging from 5.2 to 8.9. He argues that these numbers 
represent a large number of children born to one couple, rather than 
an extended family living under one roof(85}. 
Using fertility as an index of family size, A. Omran (1980) found 
that in Kuwait, Algeria, Libya and Jordan, fertility appears to be 
lower in rural areas while in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Syria 
and Iraq, it is slightly greater(86). 
As regards age of marriage it seems to be generally agreed 
that the majority of Arab people marry at a young age. The Cairo 
1970 census showed an average age at marriage of 19.7 years among 
females and 27.4 among males. In sum, the evidence strengthens the 
view that age at first marriage for females is relatively low in Arab 
countries 
(87 ). 
2.5 KTNSITTP STUDTFS 
Most sociologists and anthropologists who have studied kinship 
systems have defined kinship primarily in terms of genealogical 
criteria. For instance, E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1951) defined a man's kin 
as "those persons with whom he is genealogically connected through 
his fattier and mother "(85). 
Although this approach is not valid in cross-culture studies as 
D. Eickelman determined (89), it is suitable to the study of Middle 
Eastern kinship, because the kinship system in the Middle East 
primarily depends on blood ties(90). 
However, the term kinship in the Middle East is more complex, 
including a large groups with a social structure " that evolved to 
take care of legal and political problems that the extended family can 
not handle"(91). The large kin groupings are as follows: the tribe 
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(gabilah) while is usually subdivided into two or more sub-tribes 
(Ashirah). Each sub-tribe, in turn, is commonly divided into two or 
more subdivisions (firgah) ; the firgah comprises two or more further 
divisions (fakhdh) ; the fakhdh is divided in to two or more complex 
families (hamulah) and finally the hamulah into two or more related 
extended families(92). 
In his study W. Goode thought that kinship had declined in 
importance in urban Middle East. He pointed out: 
In the city these groupings are still based on family 
membership, but precisely because their main activities 
are taken over by the state or by other urban social 
agencies they weaken and lose their meaning(93). 
Thus he suggested that it was possible to distinguish between 
urban Arab and folk (peasant and nomad) kin grouping(94). He wrote: 
If one had visited Baghdad 200 years ago one might also 
have reported that the " hamulah" is disappearing, or 
tribal organization is no longer important(95). 
While the nature of kinship has changed somewhat over time, it 
still provides a strong and highly valued basis for life in most towns 
and cities in the Middle East. People may work at a wide range of 
jobs and only a few relatives share housing, but extended families 
still have an important role in resolving conflicts, mutual aid, and 
support in crisis such as illness, marriage, death and so on. In 
Morocco, for instance, closeness in urban and rural communities: 
... carries a contextual meaning which ranges imperceptibly 
from assertion of recognized ties of kinship to 
participation in faction alliances, ties of patronage and 
clientship and common bonds developed through 
neighbourliness; closeness is constituted by compelling 
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ties of obligations. Often closeness is expressed as "blood 
ties (96). 
Similarly, J. Gulick (1968) mentioned that the important and 
binding kinship ties are not limited to the members of individual 
household; ideally, brothers are expected to support each other 
throughout life. There are stronger expectations of this sort among 
cousins and other relatives; in this respect he states: 
The conventional expectations of Lebanese culture(and of 
Arab culture generally) are that adult brothers will 
remain in contact with each other, and be mutually loyal 
and helpful throughout life. Each man is normally the 
head of his nuclear family, but he also has obligations to 
his brothers and to his parents as long as they live(7). 
J. Gulick considered this to be the result of the extended 
family which was separated into different households. He thought that 
the conventional expectations of the brother-sister relationship are a 
little more complex. As long as she is unmarried, a girl or young 
woman is thought of as being under the direct care of her parents, 
brothers and other sisters. When she is married, the sentiments 
involved in that care are not erased, but the woman also comes under 
the care of her husband and his brothers. However, if the marriage 
ends in separation, or if the woman is widowed and has no children 
to care for her, her brothers are still responsible for her(98). 
Elsewhere J. Gulick wrote that all the variations of kinship occur in 
Middle Eastern villages and "that probably all of them including 
"tribal groups" occur in Middle Eastern cities"(99). In the same sense 
A. Al-Wardi refers to the tribal alliances between city dwellers and 
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rural people(100). In this respect, the view of J. Abu-Lughod is very 
important. She stated: 
Middle Eastern culture places a high value an personal 
relationship, even at a sacrifice of privacy and internal 
development. This, combined with a system of relationship 
based on the extended kinship group, serves to increase 
the number of primary ties far beyond what western 
sociologists, reasoning from their own experience, dare to 
assume possible. This network of personal associations 
enmeshes not hundreds but thousands of individuals(101). 
Briefly, kinship ties are more expanded in Arab communities in 
both rural and urban milieu, and play a key role in social interaction 
and solidarity, which seems to be an common feature in Arab 
countries('°2). As J. Gulick (1989) summerized: 
All. indications are that Middle Eastern city environments 
sustain strong family life pattern, neighbourhood support 
systems, and communal religious activities, not only in 
the remaining preindustrial quarters but in the newer 
section as well(103). 
2.6 NRTCTiROURS AND NETGHROUJRHOOD STUDTF S 
Although there have been no independent studies of neighbours 
and neighbourhood in the Middle East, some related information may 
be found in social interaction or city planning studies. However, in 
traditional societies it is difficult to distinguish between kinship and 
neighbours, particularly in small communities such as hamlets, 
villages, small towns, or districts in large cities, because the local 
community is not merely a collection of people who happen to be 
settled and working in the same limited area; it is also a social unit 
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with a large degree of internal organization through which its 
inhabitants cooperate in their economic activities, their ritual life and 
their leisure pursuits(104). 
Neighbours in the Middle East play a significant role as an 
informal social control. As Gulick says: "A fear of the neighbour's 
gossip is very troublesome" 
(105). Elsewhere he referred to "a lively 
Neighbourhood life"(106) which, of course, implicitly reflects a 
positive view of the relationship of neighbours with each other. 
J. Abu-Lughod regarded the neighbourhood in Cairo city as the most 
important informal social institution -after the family- for migrants in 
the city. She regard that social life in the city is confined more and 
more to the immediate neighbourhood: 
The cohesiveness of the neighbourhood is strengthened 
by the tendency of persons from the same village to 
settle together. Similar to the situation elsewhere, it is 
the women, children and very old persons who are the 
most active participants in neighborhood-centred social 
life (107). 
Similarly, N. Al-Messiri thought that the neighbourhood in Cairo 
city is very important. In her empirical study, she emphasized that 
there was awareness of mutual rights and obligations between each 
other, particularly in the major life occasions such as birth, marriage, 
funerals and so on. 
Al-Messiri's study is very interesting, because she places 
together so many important factors of the neighbourhood; the one to 
be dealt with first being the aspect of primary relationships and 
social control. The neighbourhood is seen as a grouping of people 
who have primary relationship with each other to such degree that a 
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real social control is exercised over their relationships; moreover, she 
stresses that neighbourhood groups have a collective spirit(108 . 
In Baghdad, neighbours affect each other under various 
circumstances, because they regard each other as being like 
relatives. Although neighbours in Baghdad may move or transfer 
from one quarter to another in time , they keep in touch(109), if not 
by exchange of visits, then by telephone, and they continue to 
share with each other on the main life occasions. 
2.7 SOCTAT. TIME 
The literature on social time in the Middle East is very limited. 
E. Evans-Pritchard (1940) collected data from the Sudan on "Nuer". 
Although the data may now be outdated, it can be regarded as a 
basic study, more important than any similar study in the Middle 
East. Evans-Pritchard distinguished between two kinds of social 
time: 
a) Oecological time, which reflect the relations between the people and 
their environment. 
b) Structural time, which reflects the relations of people to one 
another in the social structure. 
Both refer to successions of events which are of sufficient 
interest to the community for them to be noted and related to each 
other conceptually(1 ). He explains the dichotomies as follows: 
The larger periods of time are almost entirely structural, 
because the events to which they are related are changes 
in the relationship of social groups. Moreover, time- 
reckoning based on changes in nature and man's 
response to them is limited to an annual cycle and 
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therefore can not be used to differentiate longer periods 
than seasons. 
(111) 
Nevertheless, he argued that structural time appears to an 
individual passing through the social system to be entirely 
progressive, while oecological time appears to be and is cyclical. 
(h12) 
Despite its early date, this study made a significant 
contribution in its field. Although rapid changes occurred in both 
rural and urban settings since date of the study, a number of traits 
in rural and urban milieu of the Middle East societies are still as 
Evans-Pritchard described them in "the Nuer". Similarly, A. Toffler 
(1970) discussed the collision between two different pacing systems in 
the Middle East, when German engineers in the pre-second World War 
period were helping to construct a railroad in Iran. Toffler stated: 
Iranians and Middle Easterners generally take a far more 
relaxed attitude toward time than Americans or Western 
Europeans. When Iranian work crews consistently showed 
up for work ten minutes late, the Germans themselves 
super-punctual and always in a hurry, fired them in 
droves. Iranian engineers had a difficult time persuading 
them that by Middle Eastern standards the workers were 
being heroically punctual, and that if the firing 
continued there would soon be no one left to do the 
work (l. 13). 
In the same context, the present researcher found in a 
previous study (1.981) that the rhythm of rural activities is more 
slower than that in the urban areas, so the widespread rural origin 
of the urban dwellers, had a large impact on the use of time in work 
and social contact('14). 
Because most Middle Eastern urban dwellers have a rural 
background, they exhibit "dualism" or as J Gulick explains it: 
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the man is not at all unusual who is equally at home in 
his modern city apartment and in the old stone house in 
the village of his father. This man partakes of two ways 
of life at the same time"15). 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
Most of the Middle Eastern countries are located in Asia, and 
like other Asian countries, experienced explosion of the urban 
population after the first world war. 
Although the degree of urbanization has not been identical in 
all these, countries, they share common characteristics as regards the 
pace and causes of urban growth. The rapid urban growth in Asia 
and the Middle Fast , occurred to a large extent mainly because of 
rural to urban migration, and created a kind of rurality in the city. 
In other words, the proportion of rural migrants in the city has been 
so great that the indigenous feel themselves to he in a minority, 
while the migrants who re-established their traditions in the city felt 
themselves to be a majority. Thus rural traditions flourish in the 
city. One can easily observe in the principal cities such as Cairo, 
Amman, Baghdad, Allepo, Tehran, Ankara. etc, these active traditions 
which were transferred with the huge rural migration, and 
predominate in the social atmosphere of these cities. Such features 
include the family ties, kinship system, the close relationships with 
neighbours and the slow rhythm of social activities and other aspects 
of life, reflecting the effectiveness of the rural background, in 
maintaining the former traditions. Therefore, no outstanding 
differences have been observed between the rural and urban milieu 
in social aspects; the difference appears to be only morphological. In 
other words, while there has been a process of urbanization, it is not 
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true to say that this has been accompanied by "urbanism" as a way 
of life, a point which Ralph Beals noted about forty years ago. 
£8 
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CHAPTER THREE 
URBAN GROWTH IN IRAQ 
3.1 INTROI)UCTTON 
Iraq was the cradle of human culture. Urbanization occurred 
quite early in the third millenium B. C, in southern cities there, 
particularly between the two rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris. 
Many city-states emerged, such as Babylon, Nineveh, Uruk and Assur. 
Among all of these cities, Babylon was the largest, covering 2,500 
acres by the middle of the first millenium B. C. Next in size was 
Nineveh, with 1,850 acres. Openheim makes an interesting comparison 
with Athens, which at the time of Themistocles encompassed 550 acres 
and was considered unusually large and populous. Thus, Babylon and 
Nineveh were well-known as large urban agglomerations(1). 
In the Islamic epoch there were many well-known cities, such 
as Baghdad, Basra, Kufa, and Sammera. The most renowned of all 
these cities was Baghdad, which grew up about 762 A. D., to be the 
capital of the Abbasid Empire. As Lapidus states: 
Baghdad was the largest city in the Near East, one of 
the largest cities in the World, and a city with a 
heterogeneous and cosmopolitan population. The people of 
Baghdad included Arab and non-Arab migrants from Basra 
and other Iraqi towns, a local Nestorian community, 
merchants from all over Iran, administrators from eastern 
Iran, khurasanian-Arabs, central Asians, Turkish soldiers, 
workers from Syria and Egypt, and others. Baghdad was 
a microcosm of Near Eastern peoples"(2). 
After the fall of Baghdad, and the end of the Abbasid epoch in 
1258 A. D, Iraq's towns and cities declined gradually to became mere 
hamlets, or at best, small towns. Even Baghdad, which remained the 
capital of Iraq, lost its grandees. Nevertheless, the Iraqi towns and 
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cities arose again as modern cities during and after the British 
mandate, particularly after the First World War, as we shall see. 
These cities were, however, comparatively small and seem to have 
been "enclaves" surrounded by a "flood" of peasantry in McGee's 
terms(3). The attraction of the city, together with other factors 
caused a wave of migrations towards the city. Now Iraq is one of the 
most highly urbanized countries in the Middle East and the Third 
World. 
3-2 IJRRANTZATTON PROCESS 
In Iraq there has been no clear definition of urban and rural 
populations. The term "urban" is used in respect of any settlement 
which has been declared as a municipal area, regardless of size, 
density, type of economic activity and available services; all of these 
are administrative units(4) 
Thus, although a poor measurement, the administrative unit is 
the sole criterion by which to discriminate between the rural and 
urban milieu. Nevertheless, the vast and rapid growth of urban areas 
is deeply rooted in the circumstances of rural areas, as well as the 
natural increase. 
Over the period 1867-1987 the urban population in Iraq 
increased from 24% to 70.2%, representing an increase of more than 45 
times(5) (see table 3.1). 
The table shows also that the rate of urban population growth 
increased remarkably over the period, reaching a peak 8.7% in 1965. 
Despite of the continuation of waves of migrants after 1965, the rate 
of growth declined to become 8.5% in 1977, and only 5.0% in 1987, 
compared with the national rate growth, where the highest rate of 
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growth was 5.0% in 1977, and had declined again by the 1987 census. 
This might be explained in the light of the impact of the war on the 
number of marriages, the birth rate and the direct victims of the 
bombardment, both in the battle field and the population areas. 
Table 3-1 Urban pop. ooo In Iraq 1867-1987 
Years Total pop 
per 000 
Rate of 
growth 
Urban 
pop 000 
Rate of 
growth 
Urban 
pop% 
1867(1) 1280 -- 510 -- 24 
1890(1) 1826 4.2 430 1.5 24 
1905(1) 2250 2.3 533 2.4 24 
1,930(1-) 3288 4.6 808 5.1 25 
1947(2) 4826 4.6 1333 6.4 27.6 
1957(2) 6299 3.0 2192 6.4 34.7 
1965(2) 8047 2.7 4112 8.7 51.0 
1977(2) 1200 5.0 7646 8.5 63.7 
1988(2) 16335 3.6 11468 5.0 70.2 
Sonnrces: 
1. M. S. Hassan, Economic Development In Iraq 1958-1964. Asarya 
Press, Beirut, 1965, P. 54.. 
2. Ministry of Planning, Annual abstract of statistics for years, 1947, 
1957,1965,1977,1987 
The increase of urban population was gradual up to 1957, but 
then accelerated. This continued until 1975, table (3-2). According to 
the table, it is appears that the peak of urbanization was toward the 
end of the 1977. The recent upward trend in urban population has 
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been accompanied by a gradual shift towards the concentration of 
urban population in the major cities(') between 1965-1987. In 
contrast, the rural population dropped dramatically. From the base 
year of 1947 when it was 72.4%, to 29.8% in 1987. One can anticipate 
that the decline will continue under the unstable conditions in Iraq. 
Table 3-2 Distribution of urban and rural population from 1947-1987 
Years Urban % Rural % 
1947 27.6 72.4 
1957 34.7 65.3 
1965 51.0 49.0 
1.977 63.7 36.3 
1987 70.2 29.8 
Source: calculated from general census figures 
The percentage of the urban population living in cities with 
more than 100,000 inhabitants rose from 16.6% in 1947 to 33.1% in 
1957. In 1947, Baghdad was the only city with a population of more 
than half a million, housing 32% of Iraq's total urban population and 
this had increased to 43% by 1977 (table 3-3). However, by 1987 the 
number of such cities increased to six. The increase in urban 
population between 1947 and 1957 represented 47.9 percent of the 
total increase during this period, but during 1957-1965 it reached 
95.4 percent. Thus between 1947 and 1987 the urban population 
increased more than ten times from 1,635,000 in 1947 to 11,468,000 in 
1987; a huge urban explosion in four decades. 
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Sable (2-3) Mubafadab Urban Population for period 1947-1987 
buhafadah 1947 urbar 
to 
total% 
1957 urban 
to 
total% 
1965 urban 
to 
total 
1977 urban 
to 
total 
1987 urban 
to 
total% 
Nineveh 182392 32.8 239078 35.9 365669 46.2 598812 54.1 999983 67.6 
Salahadeen ---- - 1 43.3 291882 40.2 
1a'teea 74130 32.8 3515 9.3 10159 49. 47437 70.1 453285 75.4 
Diala 30100 18.8 56431 23.1 116882 34.0 242054 41.2 443577 46. 
Baghdad 508093 62.2 841739 64.1 577591 77.1 920072 91.5 3841268 100, 
Anbar 32011 19.5 55697 24.9 114405 40.1 255654 54.9 472463 57.6 
Babylon 57169 27.6 79281 29.5 149751 36.7 288182 48.7 516489 46.5 
lerbela 92638 42.4 171427 79.8 246097 73.7 170210 65.8 333397 71.0 
Najaf ---- 264033 67.7 429304 72.8 
Qadislya 41598 20.9 9529 24.8 53108 33.5 195619 44.4 315944 56.2 
Eutbana - 87814 40.7 155547 49.2 
? bi-Qar 41274 14.7 6857 18.7 15695 6.7 247403 39.7 491264 53.3 
liasit 35959 22.0 54517 29.6 86694 30.9 189672 44.2 298084 52.3 
8arsan 41668 20.0 60324 25.3 79351 30.1 165782 44.5 300124 61.6 
Basra 127864 39.4 228081 46.3 400273 62.1 800453 79.4 630673 72.3 
Dhok - ---- 107404 107404 42.9 218710 74.6 
Arbil 
- 
340 32.0 288064 47.2 596118 77.4 
Sulaimanla 420 32.0 325602 47 2 680857 71.5 
Source: 11nlstry of Planning, General Census Data, 1947.1987 
3.3 SOURCES OF URBAN GROWTH 
The main factors which contributed to the increase of urban 
population growth were : 
A) the rate of natural increase, which reflects the excess of births 
over deaths; 
B) the influx of migrants from rural to urban areas; 
C) incorporation of pre-existing villages into the cities or 
reclassification of some village groups as urban areas(7) 
A. NATURAL. GROWTH 
The rate of natural increase of urban population growth was 
high; 6.2% for the period 1960-1970, declining to 5.4% for the period 
1970-1980(8). This suggests that the rapid growth of the urban 
population was the result not only of natural increase but also of 
large-scale internal migration from rural to urban areas. 
The Census data reveal that a high fertility rate is 
characteristic of the rural population. Hilmi attributed the high rural 
fertility rate to illiteracy, social tradition and religious attitude. He 
stated: 
The rural component of the nation's population has 
always shown a much higher fertility rate than the urban 
component. This is mainly due to the high illiteracy level 
and social traditions and religious beliefs in the rural 
population which are very strong in the tribal rural 
society in Traq. (9) 
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Doubtless the high fertility rate is characteristic of the rural 
population and since it predates migration, people have preserved 
this characteristic of rural population, which has been transferred in 
the process of their physical transfer. The table(3-4) reveals the 
natura] increase of the urban population in Iraq. 
Table 3-4 Crude birth and death and natural increase rates of rural 
and urban population 1973-1975 
Rate Urban Rural total 
Crude birth rate 41.0 47.5 43.6 
Crude death rate 9.4 13.3 11.1 
Natural increase 
rate 
31.6 34.2 32.5 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1975. P. 
56. 
The absolute size of the natural increase in urban population 
seems, from the table (3-4) above, so high, that we believe the extent 
of migration to urban areas has blurred the distinction between rural 
and urban populations. Moreover, with regard to fertility , it can be 
seen that there was no great difference in increase rate between 
rural and urban growth; 31.6 in urban areas versus 34.2 in rural 
areas (table 3-4). 
Thus the rapid increase in urban population was largely due to 
rural-urban migration which, as shown in table (3-5), seems to be 
somewhat high. despite the differentiation between the two sets, the 
higher rate of urban natural increase is mainly attributable to the 
great number of migrants in the city. During the years 1947-1987, the 
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Iraqi population trend has been characterized by a continuously high 
birth rate and declining death rate;, for instance, between the years 
1957 and 1968 the crude birth per thousand declined from 48.6 to 
48.0, while the crude death rate per thousand declined from 21.0 to 
16.2, for the same period. Thus the natural increase per thousand 
roses from 27.6 in 1957 to 31.8 in 1968. ( table 3-6) 
Table(3-5) The Natural increase of urban population in Iraq selected 
years from 1970 to 1987 
Years Urban population 
Natural Increase Migration 
1970 56.0 44.0 
1977 68.8 31.2 
1980 71.4 28.6 
1987 75.1 24.0 
Source: Ministry of Planning: Annual Abstract of Statistics. 1970-] 987 
Table 3-6 Crude birth and death and natural Increase rate of 
rural and urban pop in Iraq 1973-1975 
Rates Rural Urban 
Years 1957 1968 
Crude birth rate 48.6 48.0 
Crude death rate 21.0 16.2 
Natural increase 
rate 27.6 31.8 
Source : Ministry of Planing, Annual Abstract of statistics, 1974, 
Baghdad, 1975, P. 56 
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B. NET MTGRATTON TO URBAN AREAS 
Many writers have discussed the phenomenon of rural to urban 
migration in Iraq. Most of these have dealt with it as a demographic 
phenomenon, though others have studied its economic, social and 
political effects. Some official estimates used population data for this 
purpose, calculating the differences in population growth rates by 
region, other scholars used sample surveys. However, overall, 
scholars and researchers have made little attempt to investigate 
socio-economic problems or adjustment to city life, nor have they 
considered the existence of traditional values, attitudes, or behaviour 
in the city. The present study aims to redress the balance. 
Migration from rural areas was extensive and rapid, particularly 
after the second World War, and more specifically, between 1957 and 
1975. The migration factor might be primarily responsible for the 
urban growth(10). Migration in Iraq can be viewed in terms of "pull" 
and "push" factors. In 1957 D. Phillips in his survey conducted in 
four sections of Baghdad city where migrants were living, found that 
the rural "push" factors in the migrant's decisions were clearly 
revealed. When migrants asked why they had left their place of birth, 
the common answers were, " We did not have enough to eat"; 
"Hunger"; "Oppression by the landlords"; " Dispute with the landlord 
over the size of our share"(11). The result also reflected the 
insignificance of the job opportunities and the wage rate in the 
modern sector on the decision to migrate(12). 
M. V. George and R. Alsaadi used data available from the 
censuses of 1947,1957,1965, to measure and describe the volume, 
trends, stream and pattern of internal migration in Iraq in terms of 
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"pull" and "push" factors. They deduced that the chief migration 
influx, and the available evidence indicate that depressed conditions 
in rural areas and the better opportunities in the relatively 
industrialized Baghdad and Basra provinces contributed to the 
increasing mobility( 13) " 
Table 3-7 Population movement from inside to out side Iraqi province 
Province 1.947 % 1957 % 1965 % 
Dahuk 4119 0.5 8106 0.62 18008 0.9 
Nineveh 1.2163 0.49 22716 0.73 49481 2.4 
Sulimany 2665 0.33 4098 0.31 7615 0.4 
Arbil 1838 0.22 3233 0.25 7448 0.4 
Karkuk 5321 0.65 7997 0.61 15389 0.7 
Diala 17696 0.17 34396 0.62 54145 2.6 
Anbar 12702 1.68 20621 0.57 87003 4.2 
Wasit 1471.9 1.8 41340 3.15 60704 2.9 
Babil 14679 1.8 23758 1.81 33616 1.6 
Karbala 7097 0.93 18109 1.38 30823 1.5 
Qadisya 3932 0.48 11283 0.86 30764 1.5 
Muthana 1238 0.15 41.31 0.31 5310 0.3 
Thigar 4723 0.58 12319 0.94 30472 1.5 
Maysan 53976 6.6 114708 8.74 132232 6.3 
Basra 6603 0.75 86409 0.66 14382 0.7 
Source: Ministry of Municipalities: Internal Migration in Iraq: Trend 
and Value, 1947-1965,1973, PP. 91-102 
The population movement inside and outside the Iraqi province 
(muhafdah) indicated that the main push places were the Southern 
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province; mainly Maysan, Wasit and Quadisya. Maysan represented the 
main push province according to the figures of table 3-7 . In 1959, 
for instance, there were about 190,000 persons living in Baghdad and 
born in the five southern provinces of Iraq. About 60% of them were 
born in Maysan. The main pull areas were Baghdad, Basra, Tammim 
and Kerbala. Baghdad attracted the highest level of migration because 
of the concentration of most social and economic development 
projects. Basra followed Baghdad, because it the only sea port and 
also is important for oil production and industry. Tammim attracted 
migrants as the main oil production centre and Kerbala as the main 
religious centre(14). 
Many other researchers have studied rural to urban migration, 
among them M. Aziz (1968)(15) A. Al-Jomard (1978)(16) H. Al-Dulaimy 
(1981)(17) A. Ali (1988)(18) A. Al-Nassar (1990). (19) In their results, 
the rapid growth of the urban population is due primarily to the 
volume of migration from rural to urban areas; even the high fertility 
in the city was viewed as a result of the high level of migration. 
C. THE PACE OF MTGRATTON 
The migration from rural to urban areas began after the First 
World War, during the British mandate period (1917-1932) and 
accompanied the large scale economic activities which took place in 
the administrative centres of the primate cities. Electric power, water 
supply, telephone and postal systems, in addition to the improvement 
of transport facilities, created more employment opportunities and 
encouraged the movement of large numbers of rural dwellers to the 
urban centres(20). Moreover, in that period the local armies were 
established and reformed, mainly from the tribesmen and villagers. 
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Thus they tended to settle in Baghdad or in the primate cities with 
their families. After the Second World War, the national army was 
founded, resulting in an influx of hundreds of rural inhabitants to 
urban centres(21). 
By the Second World War, the growth of primate cities in Iraq, 
particularly the capital, Baghdad, had stimulated the rural dwellers to 
move to the city. The landlords themselves had become increasingly 
involved in economic activities in urban centres and this had 
weakened their relationships with the peasants. The landlords 
(sheikhs) allocated agents (sirkals) to supervise the work on the 
land, but these agents misused their authority in order to maximise 
their profits, so that the peasants had to pay the agents as well as 
, 
(22). the landlord., 
After the 1930's, industrial development was the important 
reason for migration, where the majority of the migrants were 
involved in industrial activities in urban centres. Accordingly, by the 
1950's, about 57 % of industrial employees were thought to be 
migrants'(23). Between 1940 and 1950 the stream of migration 
increased remarkably due to the capital investment in oil and the 
industrial sector. This movement affected the annual increase rate of 
the urban population. During 1935-1947, the rate was 3.7 % in the 
central region, as compared to 1.1 % and 2.2 % in the southern and 
northern regions respectively 
(24). 
During the 1950's the exodus from the rural areas increased, 
due to the failure of 1952 and 1955 measures to deal with the land 
tenure system, and to the Tigris flood in 1954 which damaged all 
winter crops. Thus during 1957-1958, the migration continued on a 
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large scale and reached a level of more than five times that of 
1955(25). 
The modern era of 1957-1975 showed a continuous rise of rural-urban 
migration to an alarming scale of unprecedented dimensions. The rural 
population rate of annual growth declined to minus 0,5 % per annum 
in the 1957-1965 period, then to 0% in the 1965-1977 period, while, 
the annual increase of the urban sector of the nation's population 
jumped from 4.1 % in the 1947-1957 period to 6.3 % in the 1957-1965 
. (table 3.8). As a result the urban growth rate was about 9% higher 
than the total national growth rate in 1957-1975.. 
Table 3.8 Annual increase of urban population and annual decrease of 
rural population 
Years Total 
pop 
rural 
pop 
% Rate 
growth 
urban 
pop 
% Rate. 
growth 
1947 4826 3493 72.3 --- 1333 27.6 -- 
1957 6299 4107 65.2 2.4 2192 34.8 4.1 
1965 8047 3935 48.9 0.5 4112 51.1 6.3 
1977 12000 4354 36.2 0.0 7646 63.7 5.0 
1987 16335 4867 29.8 0.5 11468 70.2 2.0 
Source: Ministry of Planing, general census of the 1947,1957,1965, 
1977, and 1987. 
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From statistical evidence regarding the volume of migration, it 
might be deduced that migration from rural to urban areas, took 
, 
(26). place in four stage., 
In the first stage from 1930 to 1947, there was a slow and 
gradual development in urban and rural populations alike; migrant 
pioneers began to arrive in the major cities but in small number and 
at a very slow rate. During this period, the annual rate of population 
growth was 2.2% for the northern region, while it was 3.7% in the 
centre and 1.1% in the south(27) 
The second stage, from 1947 to 1957, showed a more radical 
change in Iraq's population. City growth accelerated rapidly; 
Baghdad, for instance, more than trebled its population in less than 
three decades, from about 286,000 in 1930 to 793,000 in 1957. In this 
period the annual growth rate of rural population reflected the 
impact of the internal migration toward towns and cities which scored 
2.4%, compared with 5.1% for urban centres and 2.7% for the nation as 
a whole. Many factors played a part in increasing rural influx to the 
cities; the Tigris flood of 1954 and oppression by feudal lords were 
among the major factors impelling the villagers to leave their lands, 
causing the dramatic change in the pattern of rural-urban 
migration(28) 
However the most dramatic change occurred in the third stage, 
1957-1977, which experienced a much higher rate of migration despite 
the agrarian reform of 1970, which improved rural conditions 
somewhat. For example, the region of Diala lost 1870 inhabitants 
between the two Census years 1947 and 1957, as shown in 
A. Shallesh's study'(29) The 1977 Census revealed that out of 703.543 
inhabitants still alive by 1977, at least 115.789 had left their birth 
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place"(30) The figure for the loss in population was even higher for a 
region like Mysan, and the gain also much higher for the capital, 
Baghdad. 
The fourth stage, from 1977 to the present, has shown a 
continued but more modest increase in urban population combined 
with a decrease in the rural population; the rural population 
decreased in 1987 to 29.8 %, from 36.2% in 1977(31). 
The long and bloody war with Iran, and then the American 
bombardment might have contributed to more recent migration waves . 
3.4 URBAN GROWTH TN BAGHDAD 
Like those of many other large cities in the Third World, 
particularly in the Middle East, Baghdad's population and area have 
expended enormously during the last three decades due to three 
major factors: 
A) The natural increase ( excess birth over death) which reflects the 
improvement of health services, economic and educational 
conditions rose from 48.6 to 48.0 per thousand, while the crude 
death rate per thousand declined from 21.0 to 16,2, for the 
same period compared with those of other towns and rural 
areas of the country. 
B) The rural exodus to the city during the period 1955-1975, in an 
attempt to escape from poor conditions(32). Thus the population 
of the capital continued to grow at a much faster rate than 
that of the rest of the nati. on(33). 
C) The influx of refugees from many boundary towns and cities and 
hundreds of villages exposed to direct danger in the Iraq- Iran 
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War (1980-1988), and more recently, as a result of the American 
bombardment. 
Precise population figures for Baghdad from 1947 to 1987 (table 
3-9) show that the growth of Baghdad in the last four decades has 
increased more rapidly than in any former period, and more so than 
the population of the nation as a whole. Although the country's 
population increased by less than four times over the 1947-1987 
period, the country's urban population increased by more than six 
times, while the capital expanded nearly tenfold, from 535,000 in 1947 
to 3,348,000 in the 1987. The population for 1988 has been estimated 
at 5,348,000(34). 
Table 3-9 Baghdad's urban population for the period 1947-1988 
years Iraq's 
Total 
pop. ooo 
Baghdad 
pop in 
000 
Iraq's 
urban. 
pop% 
Baghdad% 
of Iraq 
urban pop 
Baghdad 
%of total 
Iraq pop 
1947 4826 535 1635 33 11 
1957 6299 793 2455 32 13 
1965 8047 1631. 4112 40 20.3 
1977 12000 3189 7086 43 26.6 
1987 16335 3841 11468 33.5 23 
1988 * 17250 5348 12589 42.5 31 
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Sources: 1947- 1987 Census data. 
* Annual abstract estimated 1988. PP. 43-44. 
Although the region's population enumerated in the 1977-1987 
Census probably included those seen elsewhere (e. g. those born in 
other regions), the 1947 and 1957 Census give relevant data which 
show that the percentage of non-local people in Baghdad increased 
from 21 % in 1.947 to 35 % in 1957. So in the 1977 Census the total 
number of people who were born in Baghdad was 2,398,173, while the 
number of those living in Baghdad in the same period was 3,189,700. 
This means that about 24.8 % of the total population of Baghdad was 
born outside the city. In the 1987 Census, the number of inhabitants 
born in Baghdad was 2,649,307, out of 3,841,387, (table 3-10), meaning 
that about 31% of Baghdad's population were born outside the city. 
Table (3-10) Local and non-local population of Baghdad 
Years Baghdad 
total ooo 
Born in 
Baghdad 
Born out 
Baghdad 
1977 3189 2398 0791 
1987 3841 2669 1192 
Source: General census 1977-1.987 
The most important deduction here, is that Baghdad has 
derived most of its population from the frequent waves of migration 
from rural areas during the last four decades. A survey conducted in 
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1972 on the migrants in Baghdad, found that the ratio of the 
migrants to the total of Baghdad population was, 1920-1939 = 16%, 
while it became 65.6% for the period 1940-1959(35) 
Although there are no accurate figures about the refugee 
component of the population, it is reasonable to surmise that refugees 
from most cities and villages tended to move to the principal cities 
especially the capital Baghdad. The population of Basra, for instance, 
was 800,453 in the 1977 Census, three years before the War started, 
but according to the last census in 1987, had declined to only 
630,673. This means that a large number of its inhabitants moved to 
other areas. It is expected that refugees from three provinces (more 
than ten towns and hundreds of villages) are distributed among Iraqi 
cities, including Baghdad. Some of these will have settled in these 
cities, either continuing their former jobs or obtaining new jobs, 
and will not seek to return to their place of origin. Thus, they will 
have increased the population of these cities, particularly Baghdad 
and we can regard economic activities as the "pull" factors. 
The bombardment by America and its allies of Iraqi cities and 
villages, devastated most of the infrastructure, including amenities, 
electric power stations, water supply, sewage, oil refineries and most 
firms and factories. This massive bombardment, which lasted about six 
weeks during which more bombs were dropped than in the four and a 
half years of the Second World War, might have affected not only the 
rate of population growth, but also age and sex structure and 
distribution of the population over the Iraqi provinces. This might 
have been continued during the secession period and the uprising in 
the south and the north which completed the destruction of such 
vital institutions as the Americans left behind. Thus one can expect 
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that the movement toward Baghdad will rapidly increase for the 
following reasons: 
1. Baghdad quickly regained its amenities and the food supply, to 
become not merely a main agglomeration centre, but in fact also 
the only one, which would have a pull effect in the short term. 
2. the devastation of infrastructure has led to a lake of work 
opportunities in those cities that were severely damaged, their 
people may look to Baghdad as the only haven to live in. 
3, in the long run, Baghdad might become not merely overcrowded, 
but the only centre of manpower in the country, unless the 
government takes this matter seriously and takes immediate 
action. 
Thus even if the migration did not take place immediately after 
the war, it can be anticipated that huge numbers of migrants will 
move in, in the long run. 
Table 3-9 Populations of some selected capital cities in the Middle 
East 
Country Years Pop 
000 
Ann Growth 
rate 
Capital Pop % 
Rural Urban 
Iraq 1965 1626 8.3 (1957-65) 20.2 39.7 
Jordan 1966 323 6.1 (1961-66) 15.4 35.6 
Syria 1970 835 4.6 (1960-70) 13.3 32.0 
S. Arabia 1968 300 10.0 (1962-68) 6.2 20.3 
Sources: UN, Studies of Selected Development Problems in Various 
Countries in the Middle East, UN Publication, 1971, P. 70. 
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Baghdad's population represents a higher proportion of the 
national population than that of many other capitals in the Middle 
East, as shown in table (3-9), where the urban population of Baghdad 
represents about twice that of Riyadh in Saudi Arabia and one and a 
half times that of Damascus in Syria. 
3.8 CHARACTERTSTTCS OF URBAN POPULATTON 
The city in Iraq is not a pure urban population as one might 
assume, nor as might be the case in a similar metropolis in Europe or 
the United States of America. The population of Iraqi cities contains 
two different social systems, urban and rural, which have grown 
and flourished side by side. The reason, as we have already 
suggested, and as will be shown empirically, is that rural migrants 
to the city have continued the rural traditions, of their places of 
origin . George points out that "Urbanization generally takes place 
as a result of rural-urban migration , 
(36). Bear calls attention to the 
fact that the inhabitants of Baghdad are frequently grouped by 
, 
(38). that there tribes(37). If one accepts the view of some sociologists 
are no great differences in the rate of natural increase between 
urban and rural communities, from which it is inferred that the 
increase in urban population is mostly attributable to migration into 
cities from rural areas, it seems that there are no obvious criteria to 
discriminate socially between rural and urban populations. Abu- 
Lughod found that more than 70% of people in Cairo lived a style of 
life which was neither "modern" nor supported by rural-model 
buffers(39). This may equally be true of Baghdad and other primate 
cities in Iraq. 
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J. Gulick notes that, in Baghdad in the sixties, three- quarters 
of the population of "Russafa", the old part of greater Baghdad on 
the east bank of the Tigris River, had distinctly tribal names. He 
states: 
... As far as I could tell, they are no longer primarily 
inhabited by members of the tribes in question. They are 
located in what is now the midst of "downtown" Baghdad, 
which is gradually changing from an old-style Arab city 
of narrow, twisting alleys and covered "suý} s" [markets] 
to a modern business and industrial district., 
40 
These particular quarters, and some others in "AI-Karkh , on 
the opposite bank of the Tigris, are still primarily residential, but 
have been surrounded by cultural transformation. " One hundred 
years ago, these same quarters were on the outskirts of what was 
then the whole city of Baghdad, and they were inhabited by newly 
arrived tribal groups from rural areas"(41). The names may change in 
time, but the tribes have contributed to the character of the city. 
The same pattern was evident in the internal structure of the 
"saraif" ( squatter settlements) which by 1960 had grown to massive 
proportions on the outskirts of Baghdad(42). 
The population of the shanty towns (saraif) comprised eleven 
tribal groups, established as they had been in the villages they left 
behind, so that the members of each group were clustered together, 
and their "shaykhs" [tribal leaders] continued to exercise their 
authority by adjudicating disputes and maintaining guest houses. 
While tribal codes of conduct and indemnification were maintained, 
they were adapted somewhat to city conditions and problems(43). 
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Although urban and rural communities are by tradition mutually 
exclusive, hostile and contemptuous, there has, nevertheless, been 
continuous economic contact between the two sets. Most of the towns, 
indeed, contain what clearly were once tribal quarters. 
Professor A. Alwardi insisted that nomad-urban conflict plays a 
key role in interpreting the nature of the Iraqi urban community(44). 
In his hypothesis about the Iraqi social personality, Alwardi admitted 
that he had been considerably influenced by the Arab philosopher, 
Ibn Khaldon(45) who said a long time ago that there was always a 
conflict between the nomadic tribes and urban inhabitants; he 
presumed this was because the desert ecology needs strong men and 
brave knights, but the easy life in the city does not need such 
traits. Consequently, towns and cities were always in a position to be 
invaded by strong nomadic people who seized power. Gradually these 
nomadic people become urbanized and themselves become an easy 
target for other nomadic tribes, or in Ihn Khaldon's terms, 
"Urbanization is found to be a goal of the Bedouin"(46). In this way 
civilization declines, and the cycle begins again 
Nowadays, the nomad population is on the decline, so Alwardi 
suggested a modification of the concepts of Ibn Khaldon to suit 
present conditions. Thus he assumed that the main traits of the Iraqi 
personality are derived from its nomad-urban composition. The recent 
transformation of the rural population from nomadic tribesmen to 
settled peasants and then to urban dwellers, or the desire to adopt a 
western way of life, are responsible for the dichotomy of the 
personality, or in Alwardi's terms the "double personality" or 
"dualism" (47) in urban life. Therefore an individual appears urbanized 
and well adjusted, but in most social situations might soon show 
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tribal values and rural-nomadic behaviour; similarly one might be 
westernized in clothes, but easily angered, sensitive in matters of 
honour, courageous before his enemies and generous to his 
friends(48)" As Alwardi puts it, "He is Mr John on the outside, but 
pilgrim (hajji) Hasson on the inside"(` 
9). This means that one may 
appear like any western citizen, but at heart retain the characteristic 
of a tribesman. Moreover, the widespread existence of the extended 
family, the customs of generosity and hospitality, and the sexual 
behaviour among urban dwellers, including male superiority, are all 
seen as indications of "ruralism" among the urban people(50). This 
image seems to apply not only to Iraqi cities, but also to inhabitants 
of most Arab cities. In this context M. Berger states: 
The Arab city has also been a conglomeration of enclaves 
whose inhabitants have felt themselves to be a part not 
of some great urban centre but only of the particular 
quarter they belonged to on the basis of occupation, 
religion, nationality, village of origin or family(51) 
Moreover the pattern of local authority in the former epoch 
encouraged traditional values, norms and behaviour. In Longrigg's 
words: " The administration had established itself in tribal eyes as a 
thing to he placated and cajoled; the chiefs began to frequent the 
centres of administration and government"(52). 
3.6 THE PROBLEMS OF RAPTT) URBAN GROWTH 
Many problems have appeared as a result of rapid urban 
growth in Iraq; some of these have shown obvious problematic 
phases, and others pathological. 
It may be useful to postulate some of these problems thus: 
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A) The persistence of rurality, which reflects the predominance of 
rural traditions and behaviour over all the social atmosphere of 
the city, by virtue of an influx of rural migration. 
B) Dualism, or the "double personality"(53)of urban dwellers, who 
adhere simultaneously to two kinds of social order, modern and 
traditional, which live and flourish side by side in the city and 
have both been assimilated by the people. 
C) Material problems, related to the housing crisis, population density 
and lack of general amenities in most areas of urban social life; 
for example, the expansion of the shanty-towns, ghettos and 
slum areas, which have been and are regarded as centres of 
delinquent and criminal behaviour. Al-Jumaily, for instance, 
wrote: 
Migrants originally had moved to Baghdad in the hope of 
better conditions, but they were confronted with lack of 
jobs and opportunities, inadequate educational and 
vocational programs, and were forced into slum-type of 
living. Under such circumstances it was to be expected 
that deviancy and delinquent behaviour would develop in 
their new urban environment. People from outside " 
Medenat Al-Thowrah" hesitate to go there after sunset, 
because they are afraid of being attacked, robbed or may 
be injured(54) 
Even now, most of the urban population, as we noted in the 
previous section, is concentrated in four or five large cities in Iraq, 
while other towns lack basic urban services and amenities. 
Accordingly, the rural-urban migration in Iraq has created 
depressed conditions in rural areas, retarded the growth of 
subsidiary urban centres and rendered inadequate all major public 
102 
utilities of the exploding cities, as well as causing over-crowding, 
traffic jams, slum areas, unorganized and unplanned shanty towns, 
ghettos and squatter areas. Moreover, the rapid and vast migration 
to the city has had many dramatic effects on its social order and 
economy, as well as the work market, consumption goods, housing and 
wages(55). 
The most striking feature of Iraq's major cities, particularly 
Baghdad, is the separation into quarters, most of which have tribal 
names. Until recently one could observe tribal loyalty and related 
behaviour in the social interaction in these districts. Most of 
Baghdad's population have rural roots and show the same order and 
social organization which they had in the villages. 
Thus one of the main challenges confronting the local 
authorities in Baghdad and major cities in Iraq, is to maintain the 
social order in the face of social problems related to the difficulties 
of adjustment of rural migrants and other population groups during 
the period of transition. These are particularly great when there is a 
wide cultural gap influencing such features of urban living, e. g, 
employment patterns, housing, food consumption and nutrition, family 
structure and stability, informal social control, kinship ties and forms 
of social interaction. They are, thus, linked with what we can be 
describe as a negative side of the atmosphere of change and ferment 
created by the modern environment(56). 
Similarly, Al-Adhami found that Baghdad's municipal boundary 
has been extended three times during the last twenty years to 
accommodate additional people, most of whom are rural migrants(57)9 
who maintain village ties inside the city and also maintain ties with 
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their home villages, by means of frequent communication. This 
involves, as J. Gulick mentioned: 
a) regular returns to the home village for weddings, funerals and 
other ceremonies; 
b) regular exchanges of gifts ( such as home produced food from the 
village) and of visits; 
c) commuting on a monthly, weekly or even daily basist58 . 
This persistent contact might weaken the urban tendency(59). 
In recent years, much attention has been directed to the 
difficulties attending rapid urban growth and the planners who were 
invited to study this problem have often wistfully believed that if 
only the size and growth of cities could in some way be limited, the 
backlog of demands piling up so visibly in the large cities, 
particularly Baghdad, could be dealt with(60). 
According to this diagnosis and because of problems 
encountered with the squatters of the city, the main source of crime, 
the local authority of Baghdad attempted to limit, or in precise terms, 
to prevent the conflation of the capital's population by the influx of 
rural and small-town migrants. In 1984 it was decreed that anyone 
who had moved to Baghdad since the 1977 Census, could not buy a 
house there, but could only rent. There has also been a concentration 
of economic and political activities and general amenities. 
As a result, Baghdad is surrounded by large scattered shanty 
towns such as; "Al-Karrkh" on the right bank of the Tigris River and 
Al-Russafa" on the left. According to Asis, " AI-Asima" was the 
largest and most over-crowded slum in Baghdad(61). However there 
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are others which he omitted to mention: "AI-Thaowrah City" which 
recently had its name changed to "Saddam City" on the left bank of 
the Tigris, and "Ai-Shuala city", which together contain more than 
third of Baghdad's population, all of rural background, the majority 
of the migrants retaining various social characteristics associated 
with rural communities, e. g, high fertility rates, pattern of dwellings, 
family coherence, kinship solidarity and so on. Thus, they re-create 
their villages in the city milieu. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
One of the most striking aspects of the city in Iraq today is 
the remarkable proportion of rural migrants, who continue the 
traditions of the villages they left behind. Therefore, the city is 
divided into many quarters, each with a specific name and forming in 
effect an autonomous sub-city. Most of these quarters, however, are 
slums. 
Baghdad in particular, grew up vastly and rapidly, increasing tenfold 
in less than four decades, mainly as a result of rural to urban 
migration, but also because of natural increase and the influx of war 
refugees. Thus Iraqi citizens, especially in the capital, Baghdad, show 
two patterns of living: Firstly, the modern style which is closely 
modelled on Western culture, as reflected in style of buildings, 
technology, and some social interaction. Secondly, the traditional 
style, which dominant the social atmosphere of the city, as a result of 
frequent waves of rural migrants, who have retained customs such as 
family coherence, kinship solidarity, tribal loyalty, religious beliefs 
etc. 
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Doubtless, the migrants have adjusted to city life and in some 
respects behave like those indigenous to the city, but usually they 
maintain traditions and customs of their place of origin In 1968, M. 
Asis, for instance, noted that " The men... started to use different 
types of clothes at work, but kept their rural type of clothes in the 
shanty towns" 
(82). This is true and [in the researcher's experience] 
it is true too for the natives, especially when on holiday, after work 
, on picnics, or while visiting with relatives and friends, when they 
wear the common rural dress or "Dishdasha". 
It seems that the common rural features of urban life in Iraq 
are attributable to social ties, which connect the rural and urban 
milieu not economically or politically, but socially and culturally . For 
instance, both rural and urban communities, believe that a man 
should look after his parents as long as they live and it seems 
shameful to place an elderly parent in an institution. Similarly the 
members of the family give each other material and moral support, as 
a right of the blood tie. Thus, it appears that "dualism" flourishes in 
the city. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
SAMPLE 
4. l TNTRODUCTTON 
This chapter is devoted to an investigation of the socio- 
economic characteristics of the sample. It deals with the similarities 
and differences among the three groups of the sample; peasants, 
migrants and natives. The main aim of this chapter is to display the 
social background of the sample groups which will be important in 
interpreting the responses to the study. Variables such as sex, Age, 
education, Occupation and Family composition, are expected to 
influence aspects of lifestyle, social activities and behaviour, 
distinguishing rural and urban life and illustrating the perceptions of 
these people toward what we have presumed are traditional values. 
The researcher thinks that education, for instance, has a great 
impact on one's general outlook on life: values, norms and pattern of 
behaviour. However this impact may not be sufficient to counteract 
strong cultural orientation. Tn a country where the cultural context 
has been largely unchanged four thousands of years, people might 
act in the same way, despite differences in education, age, sex or 
occupation. The variables in the background of the sample are 
regarded in social research as fundamental to every study in this 
field, not only to distinguish the differences between the components 
of the different groups, but also to control the results. Each variable 
might play a role in determining the result, but this remains to be 
seen in the context of the actual responses received. 
We shall therefore proceed to examine details of respondents' 
backgrounds as an introduction to the empirical study which will help 
later in interpreting significant or non-significant elements in the 
results. 
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4.2 SEX AND AGE STRUCTURE. 
From the table (4-1) below, it can be seen that there is a high 
concentration of ages in the group 35-44 years, which forms about 31 
% of the total and a low concentration in the group less than 25 
years, which is only about 3.6 %. There are no significant differences 
among the three groups of the sample in most age ranges . By using 
the mean, the average age of the sample was 42 years. 
Table (4-1) distribution of the Sample by Sex and Age. 
Age group Rural% Urban% Total% 
M* F* 
Migrants 
MF 
Natives 
MF 
25 < 4 5 -- 2 -- 3.6 
25-34 21 -- 19 -- 24 -- 21.3 
35-44 34 -- 31 -- 28 - 31.0 
45-54 28 2 25 3 29 1 29.8 
55 > 9 2 13 4 15 1 14.7 
Total 96 4 93 7 98 2 100 
Average age of rural = 41 M*= Male 
Average age of migrant = 42 F*= Female 
Average age of urban = 43 
Classifying the sample according to sex, we find a majority of 
males, of all the 300 respondents, only 13 females were interviewed, 4 
from the rural group, 7 from the migrants and 2 from the urban. The 
main reason for the low participation of females in the sample is that 
it was a random sample focusing on heads of households. In a 
traditional society women are not normally heads of household. Even 
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if a woman lives independently with tier children, her oldest son, 
even if he is not adult, may be considered the household head, or 
one of her extended family may be, such as her father, uncle or any 
adult male of her absent husband's family. From the researcher's 
experience, a large number of women widowed during the Iraq- Iran 
war returned to their original family with their children to be under 
male authority protection and to avoid social censure. Therefore the 
13 women who submitted to the investigation were either old women 
or from the households where the male was absent for one reason or 
another. 
4.3 EDUCATTONAT. BACKGROUND 
About one quarter of the entire total of the sample were 
illiterate. Most of these were from the rural group or were migrants 
with a rural background. More than one fifth of the sample had 
completed university education. Most of these as table (4-2) shows, 
were urban natives, and only one individual from the rural group has 
had this level of education. The differences between the two groups 
can be explained by the lack of education facilities in Iraqi rural 
communities twenty years ago, in addition to the fact that peasants 
did not recognise the importance of school 
(1). To decrease the 
education gap between rural and urban communities a large number 
of primary and secondary school have been establi. shed(2), and a 
comprehensive campaign for the eradication of illiteracy was initiated 
in December 1978, reaching more than two million peopie(). Between 
1985 and 1988 there was an increase in the number of nurseries and 
schools of about 7.5%(4). 
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Table (4-2) Educational background of the sample 
Education rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Illiterate 40 30 4 24.7 
Can read and Write 29 17 7 17.7 
Elementary 21 14 5 13.3 
Intermediate 8 14 23 15.0 
Secondary 1 10 12 7.7 
University> 1 15 49 21.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
4.4 MATN OCCIIPATTON 
Although occupation in Iraq depends primarily upon level of 
education, it reflects to some extent the social hierarchy and is 
associated with different standards of living and obligations. Table 
(4-3) shows five sorts of occupation which differ markedly in the 
three groups. In the rural group, about 95% are engaged in 
agriculture, the largest group of natives, 44% held official positions, 
while the overwhelming majority of the migrants, 65%, were engaged 
as labourers, so the sample shows priority in occupation mainly 
according to the education level. Type of occupation is very 
important in examining attitude towards social activities, and will help 
the researcher to identify the incorporation of what he has termed 
traditional values among the urban dwellers. The urban group are 
engaged in a variety of occupations, by nature of the city 
environment, but among the native city- 
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Table (4-3) distribution of the sample according to main occupation 
Occupation Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Official 1 27 44 24 
Peasant 95 -- -- 31.7 
Worker -- 65 23 29.3 
Set f-employed 1 2 31 11.3 
House-keeper 3 6 2 3.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
dwellers, the main types of career are official and self-employment- 
occupation which rely upon either education or capital investment, 
while the migrants and peasants lack both these advantages and tend 
to be engaged either in agriculture or as labourers. Thus, occupation 
reflects the environment or background of the respondents. 
4.5 FORMER OCCUPATION 
Table (4-4) reflects changes in the pattern of occupation for 
the three groups, especially among the urban dwellers. By comparing 
this table with the previous one it can be seen that almost half the 
migrants had entered the urban labour force from a peasant 
background. This is likely to influence their acts, behaviour and 
attitudes toward life. The rural group have not changed at all, 
because of the limited scope of their environment. In principle, the 
city allows movement vertically , while such movement is unlikely to 
occur in the country. The native urban group shows a small change 
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in the balance of occupations: about 5% had left official positions, to 
became self-employed 
Table (4-4) Distribution of the sample according to the former 
occupation. 
Former. 
occupation 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Official 1 27 49 25.7 
Peasant 95 30 -- 41.7 
Worker -- 35 24 19.6 
Self-employed -- 2 25 9.0 
house-wife 4 6 2 4.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
These result are consistent with Chicago School Theory and the 
literature about the city which we have previously discussed, but 
this does not undermine our expectation regarding social life, as one 
cannot ignore the function of the city as explained by Wirth and his 
colleagues. 
4.6 FATHER'S OCCUPATION 
The rural background of the migrants is revealed in table (4-5) 
which shows that the overwhelming majority of migrants originated 
from peasant families, as did 9% of the natives. While the natives 
come from a variety of occupational backgrounds, the migrants who 
were born in the city, and are regarded as urban dwellers did not 
show the same variety. Father's occupation provides a good indication 
of diffusion of traditional values , because more than half the city- 
117 
dwellers (migrants and natives together) share rural roots. They of 
course would have been influenced by their parents throughout the 
socialization process, especially among those who lived a traditional 
way of life. Thus rural traditions might permeate many areas of life . 
One cannot ignore the occupational variety among the natives, but 
this variety could nevertheless be infused with a traditional outlook. 
table (4-5) distribution of the sample according to the father 
occupation. 
Father 
occupation 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Official 1 -- 33 11.3 
Peasant 99 93 9 67.0 
Worker -- 7 28 13.0 
Self-employed -- -- 30 10.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
4.7 PLACE OF BTRThT 
Table (4-6) shows that about one quarter of the total urban 
group sample were born outside the city, which is consistent with 
studies opposed to the Chicago school, which we have already 
described in the literature (see chapter one). Even those who were 
born inside the urban centre and formed three-quarter of the total 
urban sample, live and interact with those who until very recently 
lived a more traditional life, and consequently are touched by 
conventional values. However, in spite, of the significance of the place 
of birth in distinguishing people as urban or non-urban, this feature 
is inadequate to explain behaviour, because as we shall see, many of 
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them had rural roots through their parents place of birth and their 
socialization. Similarly, Al-Nassar 
(5) found that 91.2% of 260 workers 
in Baghdad city come directly from rural areas. 
4.8 FATHER'S PLACE OF RTRTH 
The previous expectation is reinforced by the content of table 
(4-7) which illustrates the respondents' fathers' places of birth. The 
figures show that 54% of the urban sample group had fathers born 
outside the urban centre. Even those whose fathers were born in 
Baghdad still have to some extent rural roots. If we asked them about 
the origins of their grandparents (which we did not cover in the 
interview) we might; find that most come from rural areas, because 
Baghdad's population in 1947 was only about 535000, while it is now 
about 5 million. 
Table (4-6) Distribution of the sample according to place of 
birth. 
Place of Birth Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Village 100-- 47 -- 49.0 
Town -- 2 1 1.0 
Province -- 1 1 0.7 
Baghdad -- 50 98 49.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
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Table (4-7) Distribution of the sample according to father's 
place of birth. 
Father's 
place of birth 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Village 100 95 14 69.7 
Town -- 3 -- 1.0 
Province -- 1 1 0.7 
Baghdad -- 1- 85 28.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
4.9 MOTHER'S PLACE OF BTRTF! 
The figures here are very similar to those concerning father's 
origins, table (4-8) shows that about . 56% of the total urban sample 
group (both migrants and natives) had mothers born outside the city; 
7.5% of those were from the native group. These figures again 
indicate that place of birth alone is inadequate to determine attitudes 
toward social life, because many of the "natives" have one or both 
parents holding traditional values by birth and would be in contact 
(through residence or work) with many other of a rural background. 
Table (4-8) Distribution of the sample according to the mother's 
place of birth. 
Mother's 
place of birth 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Village 1.00 98 15 71.0 
Town -- 1 -- 0.3 
Province -- -- 1 0.3 
Baghdad -- 1- 84 28.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
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Nevertheless, the relative lack of variety of the place of birth 
seems to he important to explain the degree of concordance with the 
common values. 
4.10 MARTTAT, STATUS 
The marital status of the respondents is shown in table (4-9). 
From the table it appears that the overwhelming majority of the three 
groups were married; 87% of the rural group, compared with 85% of 
the migrants and 91% of the natives. 5% of each of the rural and 
migrant groups were single, compared with 3% of the native group. 
The figure also shows the rarity of divorce of none in the rural 
group, and only 1% for each of migrants and natives. These figures 
are consistent with Islamic and Arabic traditions. In the Islamic 
tradition , the lawful that God dislike is divorce" That means 
that 
divorce in Islam is allowed but undesirable. Since marriage is a 
matter of relationships between families and tribes not only 
individuals, divorce would undermine these relationships and fragment 
society. Thus the maintenance of marriage ties ensures good 
relationships with one's extended family and community. Any one who 
defies the family tradition and obtains a divorce, would be likely to 
face difficulties in remarrying. This applies to both males and 
females. The table also shows that 8% of the rural group were 
widowed, as were 9% of the migrants and 5% of the natives group. 
The relatively high rate of widows in the three groups might be 
result of the eight years war with Iran. 
The figures shown in table (4-9) reveal the very high status of 
marriage reflecting, once again, the nature of the traditional society, 
which does not allow sexual relationships outside marriage. Moreover, 
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on marriage one acquires a new social status. The age at marriage 
shown in next table, might reinforce this notion. 
Table (4-9) Distribution of the sample according to marital status. 
Marital status Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Single 5 5 3 4.3 
Married 87 85 91 87.7 
Divorce -- 1 1 0.7 
Widow 8 9 5 7.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
4.11 AGE AT MARRTAGE 
From the results in table (4-10), it can be seen that more than 
half of the rural group got married at under 25 years, in contrast 
with 46% of the migrants and only 30% of the natives. Although in 
general the proportion of marriage at this early age is high, there 
are significant differences among the three groups. However, if we 
expand the range of inquiry to 34 years, we find the overwhelming 
majority of the entire sample, rural and urban alike were married by 
that age; only 5 out of 300 respondents or 1.7% got married over 34 
years old; one rural respondent one migrant, and three of the native 
group. Because of the traditional taboo on outside marriage the early 
marriage is to he expected, because men and women alike have no 
other chance to fulfil their biological needs. Religion, which is a very 
strong influence on the social system, also encourages young people 
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to meet "half their religious obligation" by getting married, otherwise 
it. is feared they might come under Satan's influence. Thus the 
interaction of religious and social tradition would enforce the process 
of social commitment. 
Table (4-10) Distribution of the sample according to age at marriage 
Age at marriage Rura1% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
25 < 54.7 48.4 30.9 44.7 
25-34 44.2 50.5 66.0 53.6 
35-44 1.1 1.1 3.1 1.7 
45 > -- -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100 
In this context, the social system in Iraq provides a kind of 
social solidarity to encourage young poor people to get married. This 
takes such forms as "mutual gifts"; when someone gets married, all 
his relatives and friends collect money (usually) or other aid to help 
him to build up a new household. This operation is named in the 
rural communities, "shobash", and in the urban community "marriage 
gift". 
4.12 NUMBER OF CHHTI, DRFN. 
Obviously, the number of children is very important in 
revealing attitudes towards fertility. 
Generally, Iraqi fertility seems to be very high as table (4-11) 
shows. In consequence families are relatively large. The 13 single 
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people obviously do not have children, but of the married individuals 
only four have no children. Childlessnesss in Iraqi tradition is a 
source of shame and distress. Under this pressure, marriage become 
unstable, and each of the couple has the legal right to seek a 
divorce. In this context Chinoy (1965) pointed out that among, 
Moslems, childlessness is a legitimate reason for divorce. In 1959 the 
Shah of Iran divorced his wife, whom he claimed he loved, because 
she had not borne him children(6. The number of children is very 
important, not merely to stabilize the family life and strengthen the 
marriage, but also to give status to the family as we shall see in the 
next chapter. The information in table 4-10 shows a significant 
concentration of respondents in the category (4-6) children. By using 
the mean, the average number of children in the rural group was 
5.02 compared with 5.04 for the migrants group and 4.57 for the 
natives. In combining the two groups of urban respondents and 
comparing with the rural group, we found a slight difference in the 
average number of children between the two groups (5.02 versus 
4.79). 
Table (4-l1. ) distribution of the sample according to the number of 
children. 
Number of children Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
None 5 7 5 5.7 
1-3 20 23 35 26.0 
4-6 46 34 31 37.0 
7-> 29 36 29 31.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
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4.13 FAMILY MEMBERS 
One of the most important indicators of the rural influence on 
the city life is the structure of the family. Most urban sociologists 
and anthropologists believe that urbanization could lead to shift from 
extended and compound family to the conjugal or nuclear family as 
result of economic changes 
(7). On the contrary, there is now a great 
deal of evidence of close social ties in cities of most underdeveloped 
countries, most important being family ties(8), in other words the 
family role is still strong, even alongside urbanization. The content of 
table (4-12) might illustrate this point. From this table, it can be 
seen that no family in the sample has less than 3 members. Indeed we 
found that 44% of the rural group had families of nine or more 
members, as did 50% of the migrant group and 31% of the native 
group. The average number of the family in the rural area is (8) 
persons while it is (8.1) persons among the migrants and (6.9) 
persons among the natives. The high average of the family members 
in both rural and urban groups might be attributed to the following 
reasons: 
1) The high average in rural area might be a result of the diffusion 
of the joint and extended family as well as high fertility, 
especially after the improvement in health, education and 
communication in contemporary Iraqi rural communities. 
2) In the city it might be attributed to the housing crisis, which 
impels young couples to live in their parents' households with 
their wives and children. 
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3) Some of the respondents may have counted their sons and 
daughters who were married and lived independently from 
them, still regarding them as their responsibility. 
Table (4-12) Distribution of the sample according to 
number of family members. 
Number of Family 
members 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
3-< -- -- -- -- 
3-5 13 15 33 20.3 
6-8 43 35 36 38.0 
9-> 44 50 31 41.7 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
Average rural 8.02 
Average migrant 8.05 
Average native 6.9 
This is suggested by the contents of table (4-12,4-13) which 
shows the composition of the family 
4.14 FAMILY COMPOSITION. 
From the table (4-13) it can be observed that a high proportion 
of all the three groups of the sample had one or both parents living 
with them. 40% of the rural group claimed that one or both of their 
parents lived with them compared with 52% and 49% of the two urban 
groups (migrants and natives) respectively. 35% of the rural group 
claimed that one or more of their brothers or sisters lived 
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Table (4-13) Distribution of the sample according to 
family composition (paternal relatives)*. 
Family Composition Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Father/Mother 40 62 49 44.7 
Brother/Sister 35 22 7 20.3 
Grand-child 42 25 29 30.5 
Others 1 10 3 4.5 
Total 118 109 87 100.0 
* Respondents were allow to tick more than one choice 
with them in the same residence, as opposed to 22% of the migrant 
group and 7% of the natives. 42% of the rural group replied that 
they had Grandchilds living, as did 25% of the migrants and 29% of 
the natives. Only one percent of the rural group replied that they 
had some other relative living with them, but the proportion 
increased remarkably to 10% in the migrant group and 3% of the 
natives. 
This difference may be attributed to the concentration of high 
schools, economic and scientific institutions in the city which often 
draws the villagers to carry on their studies or to look for work. 
They often stay with their relatives in the cities, not as guests, but 
as a part of the family, due to blood ties or affinity. 
From tahle(4-14), it appears that no maternal relatives lived 
with the rural group, who conformed to the tradition which does not 
permit maternal relatives to live alongside paternal relatives. For 
example it is shameful for the mother-in-law to live with other 
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paternal relatives. She would prefer to live alone rather than join 
her son- or brother-in-law. However under certain circumstances this 
might occur, e. g. if she has no patrilineal relative or there is a 
conflict between them. Thus we find some cases among the migrants 
and natives, because they are relatively less committed toward the 
traditions. Therefore, we found 7 urban respondents claimed that 
they have a father or mother-in-law in their household residence and 
8 informants said they have a brother or sister-in-law living with 
them. 
In discussing family composition we found a large proportion of 
all the sample, both rural and urban groups, had two types of family; 
the compound or joint family which includes brothers and sisters and 
other relatives in addition to the main members of the family and the 
extended family which consists of three generations or more (parents, 
sons, offsprings), 
Table (4-14) Distribution of the sample according to 
residence with maternal relatives. 
Maternal relatives Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Father/Mother 
in law -- 3 4 46.7 
Brother/Sister 
in law -- 6 2 53.3 
Others -- -- -- -- 
Total -- 9 6 100.0 
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these two types of family (compound and extended) represent ideal- 
types in the rural area. Although some studies 
(9) have referred to 
the nuclear family as the ideal-type in urban area, our own data 
shows that the three types live and flourish side by side in urban 
areas. This might he attributed to pressure of the housing crisis, 
many other complex reasons, such as religious and cultural pressures 
and local authority encouragement. 
4.15 FAMTT, Y TNCOMF.. 
Table (4-15) illustrates monthly family income. It shows that 
about three quarters of the rural group received between 150-250 
Iraqi Dinars, while more than half the migrants and less than half of 
the natives received the same amount. 
Table (4-15) Distribution of the sample according to 
the family income. 
Monthly income ID Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
150 < 9 12 1.7 12.7 
150-199 47 37 27 37 
200-249 30 20 17 22.3 
250-299 11 19 16 15.3 
300 > 3 1.2 23 12.7 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
Average rural family income 201 ID 
Average migrant family income 216 ID 
Average native family income 225 ID 
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The result shows slight differences in the average income of 
the three groups. To be exact, 201 Iraqi Dinars is the average for 
the rural family, against 216 for the migrants and 225.5 of the 
natives. 
The non-significant differences might indicate the gap in the 
standard of living between the rural and urban communities. The 
researcher believes that in recent years, Iraqi peasants have had 
good opportunity to improve their life style, because of the available 
facilities; paved roads, cars, tractors water-carriages and so forth, 
which diminish the difficulties of rural life and the gap with the 
cities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE URBAN FAMILY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Contrary to the ideas expressed by Wirth and numerous other 
sociologists, who assumed that family ties would lose significance in 
an urban setting, there is now much evidence of the strength of 
family ties in the city. Although there have been many studies 
discussing the rural influx to urban areas, most of these studies 
have concerned either the pathological effect of the huge number of 
people in slum areas and shanty-towns, or the phenomenon of the 
rural belt surrounding the outskirts of the city. Only a few studies 
have attempted to investigate the penetration of traditional values 
into the urban social structure. No adequate attempt has been made 
to deal independently with the impact of traditional values on urban 
life. In this and the coming chapters, the researcher will deal with 
the nature of social relationships in an urban setting. 
In this chapter a number of hypotheses about the family 
structure and role will be tested: 
1) The power structure in the urban family is still patriarchal, 
patrilineal, patrilocal, and the father has complete authority 
over all members of his family. 
2) Although the family has to some extent lost its traditional extended 
structure, and divided into separate nuclear families, it has 
maintained its traditional function. 
3) The urban family has clung to constraining traditions that are 
major obstacles to the practice of contraception and family 
budget management. 
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4) The role of women is traditionally determined and they still are 
subordinate to men's authority, despite large-scale urbanization. 
5) Traditional marriage is still much practiced. In the city, as in the 
rural areas marriage is deemed a familial and even societal 
matter rather than one of individual desire. 
Although the family in Iraqi urban communities has changed 
along the Western model in some respects, the traditional family 
patterns are maintained rather than discarded by urban dwellers, not 
only because of the penetration of the traditional values to the 
essential urban system, by virtue of the huge number of migrants, 
but also because of the encouragement by the local authority of 
traditional values. 
5.2 THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE URBAN FAMILY: 
Recent literature has reflected two themes which seem 
contradictory: The most common, is that which identifies stress, 
anomie, frustration, misery, secularism, superficiality, formal control 
and weakness of primary social ties. The other, which is less often 
heard, emphasizes family continuity, cooperation, and community 
organizations. The first image is common in Western cities, the second 
is often found in those of the Third World. In Africa, for instance, 
the family function still plays an essential role in maintaining old 
traditions, in both urban and rural communities. In this context Piel 
and Sada (1984) emphasised that the African family tends to be very 
authoritarian and male elders expect that their decisions will be 
accepted without discussion (1). Accordingly, when urban and rural 
families are compared, it is found that the stereotypical images of the 
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extended rural family, contrasted with the nuclear urban family, do 
not conform to the reality. 
In the Arab World, the urban family is considered to be the 
primary social unit and the cornerstone of social organization. It is 
the focal point for religious training and practices, it provides 
security and protection for its members and it is the focus for their 
recreational and affectional life. The success or failure of an 
individual member becomes, at least morally , that of the family as a 
whole; every member is held responsible for the acts and behaviour 
of every other member. The sexual misbehaviour of a girl, for 
example, reflects not only upon herself but upon her father, her 
brothers, her close relatives, her extended family as a whole. Thus 
the "crime of honour" which still occurs in tightly related 
communities, is an attempt to restore the family's honour and prestige 
in the community(2). 
The mutual responsibility of family members requires 
considerable self-denial, so every one needs to be totally committed 
to the family itself. Family loyalty is one reason why many parents 
still desire a large number of children. An extra child is seen, not as 
another mouth to feed or another person to educate, but as an 
extension of family power and prestige(3). 
This image is not confined to the Arab World. It appears in 
many Third World communities. In India, for example, Gore (1968) 
studied empirically the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation on 
the organization of the joint family in and around Delhi, which is 
considered as characteristic of Indian life. He found that his sample 
as a whole still largely conformed to the pattern of joint family living 
in behaviour, role perception and attitudes. All the members of these 
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families were subordinate to the head of the family, usually the 
father. The study found also that everybody in the family shared the 
family property. Even when the family was divided, it continued to 
serve as a group to which family members could turn for help. Giving 
and receiving among brothers whose families have separated is not 
only approved but encouraged. An agnatic relation of one's father 
generation is always a person to be consulted in all major, 
decisions(4). 
In Iraq, in the researcher's own experience, the eldest brother, 
even if he lives independently in the same city or in another city, 
influences the family strongly, being a person to whom all major 
decisions are referred. He is very influential in his sister's marriage 
and even in the choice of bride for others of his family, and in 
family disputes, his advice is always treated with respect. The 
brothers, father's brother and father's brother's son, therefore, are 
special categories of relation, exactly similar to what Gore found in 
India. 
On this basis, the power structure in- traditional cities is 
centralized upon the head of the household, who is usually the 
father, especially in the Arab World; the wife/wives join his kinship 
group (patrilocal) and the children hold his surname (patrilineal). The 
father expects respect and for his instructions to go without 
question(5). Such a father is known as (Raab Al-Ausra), the master of 
the family (6). 
In every patrilineal society, the authority of the old man was 
respected, but each member of the family occupied a clearly defined 
rank in the socio-economic and political order. The bonds which held 
members of the family together were their strictly allocated duties, 
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reciprocity of mutual aid and support, responsibilities and reward, 
which gave each individual the satisfaction he sought and the 
knowledge that should dependency overtake him, he would not be 
cast out. 
(7) 
While the Arab family is described as patriarchal, patrilineal, 
patrilocal, extended and endogenous, the oldest man, however, 
exercises greater authority. The absolute authority of the father has 
its roots in religion. Obedience of children (even when they are 
adult) to their parents is second only to the Muslim's primary 
obligation to God. Disobedience to parents might bring (khathab Raab 
Al-Alalamin) the anger of God, and is reckoned as a great sin which 
is harshly punished in the next world(8). Thus Muslim throughout the 
World, irrespective of class or location, believe implicitly that 
obedience to one's parents is a duty no less sacred than observance 
of the teachings of the Qur'an , and that all success in life depends 
upon this obedience and the degree of satisfaction which one gives 
one's parents by fulfilling one's obligations towards them(9). 
Although, the mother has an important position in the family, 
its undisputed head is the father. He is treated with respect and 
deference, and even grown-up and married sons have to defer to his 
authority. The father has full responsibility for the well-being of his 
family and absolute right to make important decisions, but when the 
oldest son becomes mature and develops the qualities required for 
authority, he might delegate to him some of his authority. Thus the 
oldest son might be entrusted with the supervision of some family 
affairs and interests. Gradually the son too, will acquire a position of 
honour and influence in the family and in the community(10). In this 
context, the growing child, the adolescent boy, has to learn to submit 
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his wishes to those of his father and possibly to those of his elder 
brothers, He has to recognize that the interests of the family should 
come first and that he should govern his actions with the family 
viewpoint in mind 
(11). The entire family, which may comprise several 
dozen members, resides together in the same household or clusters 
around a common district in the villages and towns, all under the 
male elder's authority('2). 
Generally speaking, the Arab family is stratified on the basis of 
sex and age. The young submit to the old, and female to male, in 
both rural and urban areas. As Ammar described, the family structure 
in Egypt deliberately spells out that the husband is the superior 
partner and enjoys the highest position in the family. The wife 
should tell her husband of the major events in the household. The 
husband is socially responsible for the acts and undertakings of his 
wife. He usually plans the work of his sons, while the wife does the 
same with the daughters; in this, the father is not expected to be 
involved. On the other hand the wife is supposed to be subordinate, 
devoted, and respectful to her husband. Sexual fidelity is the 
hallmark of a sustained marital relationship; infidelity will result at 
least in divorce, if not an attempt to kill the wife and her lover(13). 
Although the wife seems to be absolutely subordinate to her 
husband, she is almost the absolute manager of the house. 
Nevertheless, the power structure in the Arab World family is 
centralized upon the elder man and the father in particular. When he 
dies or is absent for any reason, the oldest son replaces him and 
acquires his status, including the absolute authority to deal with 
family affairs. 
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5.3 FATHER AUTHORITY AND FAMILY DECISION-MAKING 
As we have already seen, the power structure of the Arab 
family is centralized on the father. The researcher's own recent data 
presented in table 5-1 below, show that the vast majority of 
informants both in the rural (control) group and the urban group are 
subordinate to the father's authority, both inside and outside the 
home. 
More precisely, 92% of the rural group rely on the importance 
of the father's authority inside and outside the home, while 82% of 
the migrants ( or those who have a rural background in the urban 
sample) and 77% of the natives, do so. The data show also slight 
differences between the control group (rural group) and the urban 
group, where 17% of the urban informants replied that the father's 
authority is important only inside the home, in contrast with 4% of 
the control group. 
Table 5-1 The Father's Authority 
Scope of Father 
authority 
Rural% Urban% Total% 
Migrants Natives 
Inside home 4 14 20 12.7 
Outside home 4 4 3 3.7 
Both 92 82 77 83,6 
Not important -- -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 11.9 D. F 4 
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This difference might be explained by the different nature of 
their socio-economic activities; in the city often there was no father- 
son work association, such as existed in the rural community. The 
data, however, clearly illustrate the importance of the father's 
authority, both inside and outside the home. This result reflects the 
fact that the Arab family traditionally required the younger ones to 
obey their elders and live up to, their expectations. Thus 
relationships between the young and the old in the Arab family tend 
to be vertical rather than horizontal. In such relationships, downward 
communication often takes the form of orders, instructions, warnings, 
threats, shaming and so forth. Upward communication, on the other 
hand, often takes the form of silence, pleas, appeals, apologies, 
explanation, inquiries and so on. Furthermore, it may be accompanied 
by crying, self-censorship, covering up, deception and 
depression(14). 
The father's authority is demonstrated in daily life either 
directly toward the whole family members or indirectly through the 
mother, who sometimes acts as mediator. However, the real power of 
the father is manifested in the major life occasions which require 
firm decisions, e. g., marriage, work, whether to rent or buy a new 
house, spend money and so forth. The women ( mother/wife ) may 
play some part, but the final word rests with the father. 
The data presented in tables 5-2,5-3 and 5-4, show responses to 
questions as to : who mainly decides on spending the family income; 
who has the final word about whether to rent or buy a new house 
and who decides on the daughter's marriage?. Regarding spending 
family income table 5-2, the informants rejected all possibilities except 
the father and the oldest son. Two-thirds of the whole sample said 
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that the father is the proper person to decide how to spend the 
family income, while less than one-third assumed that the oldest son 
should do that. There was a slight difference between the control 
group (rural group) and the experimental group (urban group, in 
both divisions). 75% of the control group chose the father, against 
67% of the migrants and 76% of the natives. On the other hand 25% of 
the control group chose the oldest son, compared with 33% of the 
migrants and 24% of the natives. 
This result might not reflect the reality, as by nature some women 
are capable of wielding authority and may be able to manipulate or 
pressurise the men. 
Table 5-2 Decision-making about Spending Family Income 
Who decides 
how to spend 
income 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Father 75 67 76 72.7 
Mother -- -- -- -- 
Oldest son 25 33 24 27 3 
Other -- -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2 2.4 D. F= 2 N. S L= 
I 
However, such women should publicly pretend to be subordinate 
to their husbands. Even men who are less dominant in family affairs 
pretend publicly that they have full authority. This may be 
illustrated by an incident in the researcher's experience: On an 
evening in summer 1985, many people in the same residential block as 
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the researcher saw a proud self-employed man running out into the 
street pursued by his wife, who was beating him over the head. The 
researcher who was an eyewitness, intervened to end the fighting. A 
week later, the researcher discovered that the man used to give all 
his income to his wife day by day, but she did not trust him, and 
often searched his clothes. That evening she had found one Dinar 
hidden in a secret place in his , 
lacket. 
This case is one of many similar cases which might be unknown 
publicly. Behind locked doors, thousands of such cases are hidden, 
but outside the home, the men have to restore their status; they act 
and behave like any other superordinates. This might be the invisible 
side of patriarchal culture. 
However, both men and women act conventionally to maintain 
the tradition of the society which confirms the male supremacy. Thus 
the result, even if it does not accurately portray reality, reflects the 
informants' general beliefs and the expectations of society as a whole. 
Table 5-3 Decision-making on whether to buy or rent a new 
house 
Who decides 
Buy or rent 
a new house 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Father 76 71 53 66.7 
Mother 1 2 -- 1.0 
Both 22 22 44 29.3 
Other 1 5 3 3.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 20 DF=6 
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When asked who has the final word about whether to buy or 
rent a new house, the data in table 5-3 show that the vast majority 
(76%) of the control group (rural group), replied that the father is 
the proper person to decide whether or not to buy or rent a new 
house. The proportion decreased to 71% among the migrants and 53% 
among the urban natives. On the other hand about half of the native 
group claimed that women (mother/wife) participate in such decisions 
compared with only 22% for the rural and migrant groups. By 
merging the two divisions of the urban group, we found that, the 
urban group reflected twice as much participation as the rural and 
migrant groups respectively. This can be explained by the high level 
of education among the natives compared with the rural and migrant 
informants. As a consequence, the natives might better appreciate the 
woman's view point and respect her role. However, these were less 
than half of the native informants. The rest might have the 
traditional viewpoint against the effective participation of women. 
In a similar investigation in Lebanon, Prothero and Diab (1974) 
found that the husband in villages and in the city of Tripoli, usually, 
had sole authority to decide such issues, but among informants from 
Amman, Damascus and Beirut, the researchers found some variety 
according to class differences; most of the upper class informants 
claimed that they allowed their wives to participate in certain 
decisions. In Mosul city (northern Iraq) Mustafa (1990) found that 
most migrants (even long-term migrants) agreed that the 
husband/father has full authority whether to buy or rent a new 
house and how the housing is to be managed(16). 
The question on who decides the daughter's marriage might 
shed more light on family decision-making. The data available in table 
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5-4 shows that none of the respondents believed that the daughter 
can choose her groom by herself. In Islam the girl has the full right 
to choose her mate by herself as long as she makes a good choice, 
but if she errs in her choice and attempts to marry a person who is 
not of her status, then the father has the right of objection, because 
of the effect on the family and the future of the girl, who may be 
unaware, due to the immaturity of youth(17). 
Table 5-4 Decision- making about 
daughter marriage. 
Who decides on 
daughter's 
marriage? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Herself - - - 
Father 80 72 75 75.7 
Mother & father 15 19 20 18.0 
Brothers 5 7 5 5.7 
Others -- 2 -- 0.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 5.6 DF=6 N. S 
Culturally, the father seeks the agreement of his daughter 
before involving her in marriage, but socially (traditionally) that does 
not means he will abide by her expressed wishes(18). The data 
available in table 5-4 emphasised this view, showing that more than 
three-quarters of all respondents from the three groups said that the 
father alone is the proper person to decide the daughter's marriage, 
while the proportion of those who chose joint parental decision- 
making increased gradually from the rural to native groups. 15%, 19%, 
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20% for the three group respectively. Brothers and other male 
relatives have some scope to influence the daughter's marriage. They 
might be consulted before the engagement, but would usually be 
expected to give their consent. In the researcher's experience, the 
father's brother and the father's brother's sons should be consulted 
before a marriage is arranged. 
These findings provide a clear indication of the power 
structure and decision-making authority in the family. The control 
group ( the rural group) are more patriarchal than the migrants and 
the latter are more patriarchal than the nätives, but the differences 
are not highly significant, as one might anticipate from the Chicago 
school viewpoint. 
This finding is confirmed by Alvirez and Bean (1976) who 
pointed out that the father/husband is seen as the absolute head of 
the family with full authority over all family members and all major 
decisions are his responsibility(19 . 
Thus, it can be seen that the patriarchal system is strongly 
upheld by the males, whatever their abilities or their qualifications, 
and places all the major decisions in their hands. 
5.4 STATUS OF MALE SIBLINGS 
Once again, in a patriarchal society such as the one under 
study, it is quite clear that the social position of the male is 
expected to be superior to that of the female. Preference for males 
and discrimination against females starts even before birth. The best 
blessing one can give, is to wish for another that God fill his home 
with boys. When the newly-wed couple are congratulated by friends 
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and relatives, they commonly say: "God bless you and fill your life 
with happiness and male children". To wish that anyone have a baby 
girl, even if he already has a number of sons, is interpreted as an 
insult(20). A woman considers her life a complete failure if she does 
not succeed in bearing a male child for her husband; women who find 
themselves unable to give their husbands a son spend tremendous 
amounts of money on doctors and sorcery and become very sensitive. 
The husband, in such a case, has the right to divorce his wife and 
marry another. Some wives in this position even encourage their 
husband to take a second wife, if only they will keep silence and do 
not seek divorce. 
Boys receive greater attention in childhood than girls. 
Circumcision, for instance, is always a festive occasion celebrated by 
all relatives and friends. In many cases such celebrations are as 
elaborate and expensive as weddings. Such festivity is never 
(21) 
. bestowed on girls 
Table 5-5 Numbers of males and family status 
Does the number 
of males affect 
family status? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Agree 89 91 82 87.3 
To some extent 11 9 9 9.7 
Disagree -- -- 9 3.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 18.8 DF=4 
Accordingly, the data available in table 5-5 show that most of 
the informants agreed that the family which has many males has high 
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status. It is quite clear, as the figures illustrate, that there were no 
significant differences between the three groups toward this item; 
89%, 91%, and 82% for rural, migrants and natives respectively. 
The difference can only be seen in the disagreement option, 
which only natives chose; 9% of this group disagreed with the 
proposition. However, 9% does not represent a common attribute of 
the society; the majority of the urban informants held the traditional 
view. Meanwhile, the remarkable result in this table is that 11% of the 
rural group thought that a large number of males can, to some 
extent, give the family high status. This figure is 2% higher than 
that of the urban counterpart. This might be because the economic, 
political and social challenge of the city impel them to endorse fully 
the importance of many males rather than "to some extent". 
The complete agreement on the status of the males, is revealed 
through the question: "If you have a son who gets married and lives 
independently, will you support him? ". As table 5-6 shows, the 
unanimous response, for all groups, was "Yes". 
Table 5-6 Family support for its sons 
Should family 
support its sons? 
Rural% Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Yes 100 100 100 100 
No -- -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100 
This consensus might be an exaggeration of the reality, but 
informants responded conventionally. In the ideal-type of the 
patriarchal society, the son carries the patriarchal family name and 
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inheritance. He is a source of family pride, and regarded as a chain 
in the patrilineal descent. 
In Iraq, as in the Arab World as a whole, one who get married 
and has a child is given a nickname, for example "Abu All"' [the 
father of All] or "umm Ali' [the mother of Ali]. The nickname is 
derived from the name of the first child. Such is the case even if the 
first child is a female, but many people ignore the daughter's name, 
and substitute a male name for the nickname. Even those who are 
unmarried or have no children are often given such a nickname as a 
mark of respect, using some well-known name, such as Abu-jasim for 
muhammad or Abu-Hussain for All. Those who are married and have 
no children, are often nicknamed Abu-khib (the father of the absent). 
In this tradition, the male has not only superiority or 
preference, but also has full family support, even if he is adult and 
lives independently, though in this case the support might be 
symbolic rather than material. Many siblings establish their own 
families and have steady jobs, so that they not need their original 
family support; even so, the original families (patriarchal families) 
may still look after them and give them such moral and financial 
support as they are able. By the same token, the siblings should do 
the same for their original family. Mutual aid is pervasive, the 
prevailing attitude being clearly reflected in the common sayings: "My 
heart is with my son" or, "I have still to look after my son as long 
as I live". In urban Iraq, in the researcher's experience, an 
unmarried son, or one who, though married, still lives in the same 
household, often gives his entire salary to his father. This is in line 
with prevailing customs in most Arab and Muslim families. As Abu- 
zahra (1976) pointed out: 
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If the eldest brother is earning money, he is responsible 
for contributing towards the upkeep of his father's 
household. He sometimes gives his father the whole of his 
salary....... If the father is poor and the eldest son is 
earning enough money, he may be responsible for the 
education of the younger brothers. Sometimes a younger, 
wealthier brother may contribute to the education of the 
elder brother's son(22). 
Accordingly, the data in table 5-7 show the sort of support 
which married sons who lived independently have presumably 
received. The vast majority of the rural and urban groups supported 
their sons both morally and materially. 
Table 5-7 Types of Family Support 
Types of support Rural% Urban% 
Migrants natives 
Total% 
Material 1 -- -- 0.3 
Moral 14 14 13 13.7 
Both 85 86 87 86.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 2.7 DF=4 N. S 
The figures reveal no significant differences (X2= 2.7 DF= 41 
between the control group and urban group (in both divisions); but 
indeed the figures are remarkably consistent, with 85% of the rural 
group asserting that they support their sons both morally and 
materially, while 86% of the migrants and 87% of the natives did so. 
Traditionally and according to religious beliefs, fathers strongly 
desire sons. As Kiray (1976) stated: 
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After childhood, the father takes care to see that his 
sons find jobs or learn the family trade, that suitable 
girls be found for them, and that at the end of his 
active years the welfare of his family can be entrusted to 
them(23) 
In this sense, the father in a traditional society, such as that 
under study, is eager to look after his sons, support them in finding 
jobs and help them to get married. Moreover he would help them to 
build a house, or pay a debt, and take their side in any dispute with 
others. 
Thus, sons are socialized in the belief, that they might be 
unable to build up their lives without family support, and they act 
on this basis. This may partially explain why those sons are totally 
subordinate to their parents. 
The question now arises, why the head of the household's 
(often the father) is committed to supporting his sons even when 
they are adults with all the ingredients to start their own life and 
build up a new family. The data of table 5-8 might shed some light 
on this. 
The information shows that 63% of the rural group replied that 
they support their sons because they regard them as a part of 
themselves, while 59% of the migrant group and 56% of the native 
group shared this view. 31% of the rural group said that they will 
need their son when they get old, compared with 35% of the migrants 
and 43% of the natives. Only 6% of each of the rural and migrant 
groups said that they support their sons under the pressure of 
tradition, while only 1% of the natives held this view. The data shows 
non-significant difference between the three groups (X2= 6.31 DF=4). 
The high concentration in first category might be explained by the 
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patriarchal family nature of Arab and Muslim world. The considerable 
level of response toward the second category reflects the general 
orientation of society, reflected in the saying, "I save my son for my 
old age and for the dark days". 
In conversation one often hears a speaker praise a youth by 
saying something like: " He carried his father on his back around the 
Kaba in Mecca. "A young man might say, " On my back (with sign to 
his back] I carry my mother five miles to the hospital"(24). The 
audience often say "God bless you", whereupon the speaker will 
continue " This is my duty. God in the holy Quran orders us to look 
after our parents". The audience often say, " If you did that your 
sons will do so with you". The speaker pretends to think and 
modestly says "I hope so". 
Table 5-8 Reasons for Support 
Why support sons'? Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Part of my self 63 59 66 59,3 
Need him in old age 31 35 43 36.3 
Tradition's demand 6 6 1 4.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 6.31 DF=4 N. S 
Very few informants claimed to support their sons as result of 
traditional pressure. The figures might indicate the reality that 
support of sons is not a traditional demand, but is derived from 
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personal motives and reflects familial cohesion. However, sociologically 
the matter of support (mutual aid) is not only one of personal 
motivation, but reflects the nature of the family system and the 
prevailing culture . In Arab society and culture, the family is seen as 
the cornerstone of the society, both in the urban and non-urban 
milieu. Traditionally and religiously, the head of a Muslim family 
should direct his efforts towards the maintenance and continuation of 
the family(25). That, of course, requires voluntary assistance, not 
only in economic, but also in social and political terms: help in the 
case of dispute or attack, theft, insult and so forth. 
On this basis, many household heads prefer and even insist 
that their married sons stay with them under the same roof. 
Similarly, a remarkable proportion of those sons, both rural and 
urban have a great desire to live as long as they can with their 
original family. Sterling (1976) in his study of two villages in Turkey, 
found that the joint household is pervasive in Turkey. It seemed 
that, whenever possible, married life began under the roof of the 
household's head; therefore, the household expanded by the birth of 
children, the marriage of sons and the birth of their offspring. There 
was a strong proscription agaist eons, married or unmarried, leaving 
the original family(26). 
Although Sterling's description focuses on the rural family in 
Turkey, a similar situation is found in the cities, in the majority of 
Middle Eastern countries, where most of the urban dwellers have a 
rural background. In the Turkish town, Kiray (1976) asserted that in 
the patrilineal extended family, married sons lived in the same 
household as their fathers and under their authority(27). In an 
Islamic group of West African towns, Ellovich (1980) found that all 
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extended family members in Dioula lived in one household, though 
mobility and migration to other cities has affected to some degree the 
Dioula family(28 . In urban Iraq, the situation is little different, as 
the extended and nuclear families flourish side by side, and the 
original family head still has absolute authority over his married and 
unmarried sons, whether they live in the same household or in a 
separate residence. Moreover most of the household heads have a 
great desire to keep their married sons under their own roof and 
supervision. The data of table 5-9 seem to enforce this view. 
The table shows that three-quarter 75% of the rural 
household's heads prefer their married sons to stay with them under 
the same roof, compared with 63% of the migrant group and less than 
half (47%) of the native group. By merging the two divisions of the 
urban group, the proportion of urban respondents preferring their 
sons to remain at home is 55%. This shows that heads of households 
in Baghdad have a strong tendency to expect married sons to stay in 
the same household as the father. It reflects the desire of those 
respondents and at the same time reveals the continued existence of 
the extended family alongside nuclear families in urban life. 
As we have already mentioned, this information reflects 
"desire". However, desire alone may not accurately reflect the actual 
prevalence of this sort of social composition. 
The data in table 4-13 (previous chapterl might shed some light 
on this natter, and illustrate the relationship between desire and 
reality. 
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Table 5-9 Respondent desire to keep their married son with them in 
the same household 
Would you like 
your married son 
to stay with you? 
Rural% Urban% 
migrants Natives 
Total% 
yes 75 63 47 61.7 
No 25 37 53 38.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 16.7 DF=2 
Turning to the data, one can easily see the decrease of the 
curve gradually from the left hand aide f rurall to the right hand 
side (urbanl, which may Indicate that Third World cities contain 
traditions and modernity side by side. To complete the picture, we 
asked the respondents why their married son do not actually stay 
with them in the same household. As table 5-10 shows, that 56% of 
the control group (rural groupl chose the answer, "To avoid the 
expected problems", while 44% felt it was better for the son to live 
independently, but none selected the second and the fourth 
categories, i. e. "To get ride of his responsibility" and "My house is 
too small". In the migrants group, 37.8% accepted the first category, 
35.1% of them accepted the third category and 27% accepted the 
fourth, but no one accepted the second category, "to get rid his 
responsibility". 35.8% of the natives chose the first category, 56.6% 
chose the third and 7.5% the fourth, As with the other two groups, 
they rejected the second category. 
Thus one can observe that many respondents do not keep their 
married son with them in the same household, not because he has 
reached adulthood and can manage on his own, but because of 
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impeding conditions: 56% of the rural group and 36% of the urban 
group thought that living with married sons might create some 
problems. 
Table 5-10 Reasons for leaving Married Sons to Live Independently. 
Why leave sons to 
live independently? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
To avoid problems 56 37.8 35.8 40.9 
To get rid his 
responsibility -- -- -- -- 
Better for him to 
live independent 44 35.2 56.7 47.0 
My house so small -- 27 7.5 12.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 14.7 DF=4 
This is born out by the researcher's previous study (1988) 
about role differentiation between wives and husbands in Baghdad, 
which revealed that one of the most important obstacles against the 
marriage settlement of the conjugal family is the interference of close 
relatives. To be exact, more than one-third of the sample strongly 
complained of relatives' interference(29). Benedict (1976) in a Turkish 
town indicated that friction soon developed between the wives of the 
brothers and other members of the household(30). Abu-Zahra (1976) 
asserted that disputes between brothers' wives and between the 
wives and their mother-in-law, over authority in the household, when 
they live together, may contribute to the splitting up of 
households(31). 
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In Iraq this phenomenon is also noticed. The relationship 
between the son's wife and her mother-in-law is always negative; 
people often say, "it is natural they hate each other". 
Apart from those who readily accepted that their sons live 
separately, and who may be considered open-minded people, the other 
urban response was, "Yes, we would prefer our married sons to stay 
with us, we wish to look after their children, but our house is too 
small". The general impression gained from the above is that urban 
dwellers would prefer their married sons to live with them in the 
same household, but sometimes are unable to manage that under 
certain social and economic circumstances [the impact of 
urbanization). However this does not mean the severance of the 
intimate contact, relationship and mutual aid and obligations. 
5.5 FAMILY PLANNING 
Under this title we have to discuss two main focal points: 
1. birth control 
2. the management of the family budget 
Although these two have a different content, birth control 
being a demographic subject, while the budget is a matter of family 
economics, nevertheless, they share the same basis: ideally every 
family should plan its fertility in the light of its budget and vice 
versa. However, the analysis will focus on the effects of beliefs, 
norms and social tradition on the family's ability to plan' its budget 
and fertility. 
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A. BIRTH CONTROL 
As we have already seen, Arab culture gives high value to 
having children, especially male. The Quranic Injunction, "Wealth and 
children are the ornament of this life"(33) has encouraged the high 
rate of fertility and inhibited the wide-spread use of contraception. 
To refuse to have children for economic reasons is to show a 
lack of faith in God. Musallam (1983) asserted that Islamic law 
sanctioned the attempt to limit fertility by contraception, whether by 
the use of medicine, sex manual, or any kind of drugs, from the 
beginning of Islamic civilization(34)0 
In Iraq, as well as in many other Arab countries, over the 
period 1947-1987, the population grew at one of the highest rates in 
the World [discussed in chapter threel, as a consequence of health, 
education and economic improvement, beside many other social and 
political factors. The lack of family planning is caused by religious 
beliefs, cultural illiteracy and the government encouragement of large 
families, in order to create the necessary labour pool to replace 
foreign workers. 
The political factor is important in partially explaining the high 
birth-rate. In the mid 1970s the government declared its wish to 
accelerate the fertility level. This declaration was followed up by 
many practical procedures as follows: 
1. Maternity leave, which had previously been confined to civil 
servants only, was extended to all women. Leave was six weeks 
after delivery, and included maternity benefit and other 
assistance (1974). 
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2. The child benefit scheme was extended to encompass more than two 
children (1976). 
3. Maternity leave was extended to two months, one before and one 
after delivery (1977). 
4. The child benefit was increased to cover up to 10 children, at the 
rate of two Dinars a month for the first, second and third 
children, four Dinars for the fourth child, increasing to sixteen 
Dinars for the tenth (1981). 
5. Families with at least four children were given free house-building 
loans (1983). 
6. All contraceptive devices were banned and abortion, in general and 
private hospitals and clinics, was made illegal (1986). 
7. Women were allowed six months motherhood leave on full salary, 
which could be extended by a further six months on half-salary 
(1987). 
These laws were enacted in the context of a social tradition, 
where sons are desired to strengthen the family position, socially, 
economically and politically. Sons are viewed as a source of support, 
not only in a parents' old age, but also in their maturity. Therefore, 
legislation is not the decisive factor determining the fertility rates; 
many urban women in Baghdad, for example, defied the legislation and 
broke the law by seeking abortion. Cultural factors seems to play a 
crucial role. In this respect, Goode spelled out several cultural 
factors which have kept the birth rate high in the Arab World: 
religious injunctions, the high rate of infant mortality, the economic 
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value of sons, high evaluation of sexual activity, early marriage and 
the high status of the mothers of sons(36). 
Obviously in Iraq as in many other Arab countries, with such 
values and beliefs, fertility, in rural and urban setting alike, is not a 
matter of individual or even conjugal family decision, it is a large- 
scale familial and perhaps even societal issue. That may be what has 
impelled some researchers to consider the determinants of fertility as 
complex and difficult to analyse(37). 
Although birth control has recently been practiced in some 
ways in urban life, especially among the well- educated, it is 
necessary to keep in mind the difficulty created by the lack of all 
contraceptive devices and the strict traditions. The data in table 5-11 
shows the extent to which birth control is practiced by the 
respondents. 
Table 5-11 Birth control 
Is birth control 
practiced? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Yes 20 22 42 28.0 
No 80 78 58 72.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 14.6 DF=2 
Firstly we asked the informants whether or not they were 
using any method of birth control. The informants responded in 
different ways. The rural and migrant group were relatively similar, 
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20% of the rural and 22% of the latter saying "Yes". However, of the 
natives, more than twice this number (42%) said "Yes". 
Nevertheless, the proportion of those who said "No" is very 
high even among the natives; 58% of them said "No" compared with 
80% of the rural group and 78% of the migrants. Despite government 
restrictions since 1985, and the strict tradition, the people have 
managed to obtain contraceptive facilities on the black market, at ten 
times the normal price or more. This finding is consistent with that 
of Al-Nassar (1990). He found 37.6% of the migrant workers from a 
rural background, and about twice this number, 71.9%, of native 
workers in Baghdad, had a favourable attitude towards the use of 
birth control devices. Even so, in his interviews, he recorded some 
individuals expressing strong views against birth control e. g. 
"Children are a gift from my God" or, "Why should we behave 
contrary to Allah's will? "(38). In Lebanon Prothero and Diab (1974) 
found great differences their study groups' attitudes toward birth 
control. As they stated: 
In one group, more than 80% practice birth control. In 
another group of the same religion, living a few miles 
away, no one says she or her husband practices birth 
control(39). 
Similarly, Yaukey (1962) found in both rural and urban milieu 
that fertility among Muslims was high compared with their Christian 
counterparts, and the rural -urban differences among Muslims were 
very small. These differences seem to shrink even further with socio- 
economic classes(40) 
However in Mosul (northern Iraq), Mustafa (1990) found a 
significant difference between migrant women's fertility and that of 
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their urban counterparts; the average number of children was 3.3 for 
native women, compared with 4.9 for the migrants(41). 
Obviously, this evidence reinforces the view, so long and so 
much reported, that the large family with many sons is characteristic 
of the Arab value system. 
A second question was directed to those who said "No" to the 
preceding question, that is "Why do you not accept the idea of using 
birth control? " As Table 5-12 shows, the majority of the three groups 
said, it is against their beliefs. The figures show no significant 
differences between the groups; 75% of the rural group, 78.2% of the 
migrants and 79.3% of the native informants chose this reply. A few 
respondents said, "It is against our tradition": 15% of the rural 
group, 12.8% of the migrants and 13.8% of the natives. A minority, 10% 
of the rural, 9% of the migrants and 6.9% of the natives said "More 
children make the marriage stronger". The last option might be 
particularly appropriate for women, since women with sons have 
higher status. As Goode put it: 
It is not surprising that the young bride was rewarded 
if she produced many sons who stayed alive. The 
marriage tie was relatively fragile, but not so for a 
woman who had produced a living son. It has always 
been viewed as improper to divorce a woman with living 
chi yen, unless there was a serious reason for doing 
Soe 
However, beliefs (religion) seems to be the main determinant of 
fertility in families which did not use any method of birth control. 
That is also what Prothero and Diab found in Lebanon, where the 
common explanation given by those who did not practice birth control 
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was, "It is contrary to religious teachings or contrary to God's 
will" (`l3 
Table 5-12 Reasons for not using birth control 
If "not" why not? Rural Urban Total 
% Migrants Natives 
Against my 
beliefs 75 78.2 79.3 77.5 
Against my 
tradition 15 12.8 13.8 13.9 
Make marriage 
stronger 10 9 6.9 8.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 0.6 DF= 4 N. S 
B. EDUCATION AND BIRTH CONTROL. 
Although traditional values play a key role in preventing the 
use of contraception, education seems to be an important factor in 
breaking down these obstacles. In this context, Rufigual-Huda (1978) 
asserted that higher education leads to remarkable use of 
contraception and consequently, to lower fertility. Education provides 
a new outlook on life, freedom from tradition, willingness to analyse 
institutions, values and conventional patterns of behaviour(44). 
Similarly, Ritchey and Stokes (1971) found an inverse relationship 
between education (as an indication of socio-economic status) and 
fertility in developing countries(45 
). However the relationship between 
education and fertility is not always inverse; Germain (1947) reported 
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that some countries with a high level of education have a high 
fertility rate, perhaps as a result of wider knowledge of nutrition 
and health services available, as well as cultural pressure for larger 
families and the desire to have sons(46). 
Table 5-13 The relationship between education and use of birth 
control 
Education level Practice of birth control 
Rural 
Yes No 
Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Yes No Yes No 
Total 
Elementary level 7 62 5 42 1 10 130 
Intermediate level 13 16 5 23 8 20 85 
High level -- 2 12 13 33 28 68 
Total 20 80 22 78 42 58 300 
N 
The researcher's own data in table 5-13 show a slight 
relationship between education and fertility. As the education level 
increases, the desire to use birth control increases. However, this is 
to some extent related to urban orientation, as 33 out of 61 
respondents of the native group with a have high level of education, 
admitted using birth control, as did 12 out of 25 respondents of the 
migrants group, but none of the rural counterpart group used 
contraception. Nevertheless, the difference seems to be non- 
significant, as a broadly similar number of the highly educated of 
urban informants claimed that they did not use any method of birth 
control. Thus fertility in urban areas is still high. This result is 
consistent with the finding of Hiday (1978) in the Philippines, where 
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urban dwellers had the highest general fertility rate in spite of their 
highly level of education(47). 
C. OCCUPATION AND BIRTH CONTROL 
It is quite clear in sociological literature that there is a 
dramatic decline in fertility rates under the stress of urbanization 
and industrialization. Recent survey research suggested that fertility 
declines were behavioural outcomes of changes in social process; 
women's participation in the labour market; individual decision-making 
which inevitably delayed marriage and increased family planning(48 . 
In her deliberate study on women's development, Yousif (1980) 
asserted that there is an adverse relationship between occupation and 
fertility: 
The employment of women exercises a marked ipence on 
family size and the practice of family planning . 
Table 5-14 Relationship between occupation and fertility 
Occupation Practice of birth control 
Rural 
Yes No 
Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Yes No Yes No 
Total 
Official - 1 13 14 24 20 72 
Farmer 20 75 -- -- -- -- 95 
Worker -- -- 9 65 5 18 88 
Self-employ -- 1 -- 2 13 18 34 
House-keeper -- 3 -- 6 -- 2 11 
Total 20 80 22 78 42 58 300 
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However, most sociologists have concerned themselves with 
fertility and family structure, focusing on the adverse relationship 
between fertility and women's involvement in non-agricultural labour. 
Our own data presented in table 5-14 confirm this view. None of the 
housewives in the sample practiced contraception, perhaps because 
they have no jobs outside the home. The proportion of those using 
birth control was considerably greater among those engaged in 
official work than among farmers and workers. However there were no 
significant differences between the migrants and the natives, for 
either males or females. 
D. FAMILY BUDGET MANAGEMENT 
Family budget management in the Arab world, as in many other 
patriarchal societies, depends primarily upon the household head 
(usually the father) who has overall authority in matters of family 
economics. Once again, religious beliefs play a major role in 
reinforcing and expanding the predominance of the patriarchal 
tendency. The Holy Quran, for instance, stated: "Men are in charge of 
women". This, of course, would include economic expenditure. The 
traditional values have always encouraged men's full economic 
responsibility for their families, and a man who allows his wife or 
daughter to share in his financial responsibility has low prestige(50). 
The family is seen as a socio-economic unit, where every member 
capable of contributing financially will do his best to maintain the 
family well-being, but control of these resources is always through 
the father. Often these resources are not commensurate with the 
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extent of family members' obligations(51). The economic unity of the 
family is unconsciously recognized, and even those members who 
marry and live separately, share the economic burdens of their 
original family , or receive assistance from them if they are not self- 
sufficient. The numerous and extensive obligations of the traditional 
family toward its members inside or outside the original household, 
with relatives, friends and neighbours, might prevent the precise 
planning of family expenditure and demolish any budget made. 
The data presented in table 5-15 reveal whether or not the 
household head is able to set a precise budget for the family's 
expenditure and financial obligations. The figures show that 15% of 
the rural group, 12% of the migrants and 22% of the natives have the 
ability to budget their families' expenses, but the majority of the 
sample can not do so. 83.7% of the whole sample could not plan their 
families' needs. 
Table 5-15 The household's ability to budget for the family's needs. 
Ability to manage 
the family budget 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
total% 
yes 15 12 22 16.3 
No 85 88 78 83.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 3.8 DF=2 N. S 
Although the proportion of the natives who were able to plan 
their families' needs were noticeably higher than their rural 
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counterparts, where 78% failed to do so, the rural group seems to be 
in a better position to budget needs than the migrants, who have 
double obligations: to their urban environment and their rural 
relatives. 
When we asked those who could not manage their family 
budget, why they failed to do so, with four given options 
[unexpected visitors, unexpected incidents, unexpected occasions, all 
of these factors] the majority, 82.4% of the rural, 58% of the migrants 
and 71.8% of the natives, said all these factors were involved. These 
results are shown in table 5-16. It is noticeable that the number of 
respondents choosing "unexpected visitors" and "unexpected 
occasions" is much higher among the migrants than among their rural 
and native counterparts. These answers reflect the expanded 
obligations of the migrants as a result of their expanded social and 
familial circle, comprising interactions in the urban milieu and 
continued obligations to their relatives in the country. It is common 
to hear such complaints as: "One needs a treasury to fulfil his 
obligations; every day there is a marriage, funeral or visitors", or, 
"What budget are you talking about? Every month some deficit could 
undermine any budget". Even native urban dwellers often fail to set 
a precise budget, because of obligations resulting from the expansion 
of the social interaction network. Thus the saying in the city is 
"Whenever your relationships expand, your problems will increase". 
However this experience does not impel urban people to change from 
intimate to more superficial, impersonal or transitory relationships. 
The figures show slight differences between the three groups 
of the sample, which can be explained in the light of individual 
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differentiation, such as might be found even in a homogeneous 
society. 
Table 5-16 Reasons for inability to budget the family' needs 
If not, why not? Rural Urban% Total% 
% Migrants Natives 
Unexpected 
visitor 8.2 20.5 7.7 12.1 
Unexpected 
incidents 3.5 2.2 7.7 4.5 
Unexpected 
occasions 5.9 19.3 12.8 12.7 
All of these 
factors 82.4 58.0 71.8 70.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 20 DF= 6 
E. EDUCATION AND FAMILY BUDGET 
In theory, one could anticipate that with increasing education, 
the opportunity and ability to plan the family budget might increase. 
However, this assumption or expectation was not born out by the 
facts. Table 5-17, shows that there was no significant difference 
between the illiterate and the more highly educated, in their ability 
to plan their families' budgets; only 17 out of 61 of the natives, and 
3 out of 25 of the migrants, succeeded in planning their families' 
budgets. This suggests that in traditional societies, obligations toward 
family and kin groups encompass all levels of the society, 
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irrespective of urban or non-urban residence, or education. Thus the 
inability to budget seems to be a matter of cultural and societal 
context, rather than merely a lack of education. Individuals with a 
high level of education might have greater familial obligations, to 
maintain their prestige in the community, and as a consequence, find 
it more difficult to budget. 
Table 5-17 The relationship between education and ability to manage 
the family budget. 
Education Ability to manage the family budge 
Rural 
Yes No 
Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Yes No Yes No 
Total 
Low education 12 57 4 43 2 9 127 
Middle education 2 27 5 23 3 25 85 
High education 1 1 3 22 17 44 88 
Total 15 85 12 88 22 78 300 
Ch12 X2= 8.5 
DF= 5 
X2= 4.2 
DF= 5 
X2= 4.2 
DF=5 NS 
The common complaint among officials, for instance, is that 
every month, at least two occasions, such as funeral, wedding, 
graduation, or new house, might arise among relatives and friends. 
All these occasions require visits and gifts, taking up a substantial 
portion of one's income. This is normal in Iraqi towns and cities, so 
the assumption that family budget planning increases with education 
can be discarded. 
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F. OCCUPATION AND FAMILY BUDGET 
In a previous study, the present researcher asked urban and 
migrant workers the following question: " If you met a relative or 
friend by chance in the street, would you: 
1- inevitably invite him to your house; 
2- invite him to a nearby restaurant; 
3- only greet him and go? 
The overwhelming majority (90%) of them (natives and migrants 
alike) claimed that to invite him home is a moral duty(52). 
Table 5-18 Relationship between occupation and ability to manage the 
family budget 
Occupation Ability to manage the family budget 
Rural 
Yes No 
Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Yes No Yes No 
Total 
Official -- 1 3 24 9 35 72 
Peasant 14 81 -- -- -- -- 95 
Worker -- -- 7 58 4 19 88 
Self-employed -- 1 -- 2 8 23 34 
Housekeeper 1 2 2 4 1 1 11 
Total 15 85 12 88 22 78 30 
Chi2 X2= 1.1 
D. F= 3 
X2= 2.9 
D. F=3 
X2= 1.5 
D. F=3 N. S 
Person's R -0.39 -0.17 -o. 13 
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Once again, the traditional value system seems to be more 
influential than one might expect, regardless of education level or 
occupation. As table 5-18 shows, there are no significant differences 
between those engaged in various careers, in urban and non-urban 
groups in terms of ability to manage the family budget. The figures 
show that the proportion of those who have the ability to set and 
adhere to a precise family budget is a small minority across the 
entire sample ( urban and non-urban alike). 
5.6. WOMEN'S POSITION AND STATUS. 
As we have said, the man in the Arab World is given 
considerable power, not because of his intelligence, resources, 
property, or even his strength, but because of "a mistaken concept 
of biology"(53), which became over time, a cultural context. In 
contrast, the woman has to submit to her father's will as long as she 
remains unmarried, and then to her husband. A girl learns In early 
childhood to reconcile herself to the fact that a boy is much more 
important; he is a guardian. When she grows up, a girl should always 
take care of her brothers and should be obedient to their wishes and 
instructions, even if she is older than them; she has to make their 
beds, cook, prepare the bath, wash and iron their clothes and so 
forth. A good wife is seen as one who understands how to serve her 
husband (54). 
In theory, the woman has no decision-making authority. This 
applies even for those who have a very strong position or have sole 
practical responsibility for managing the family's affairs. All the 
decisions should be declared by the men, A common saying one can 
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hear in coffee-houses, at work and in the public places is "Ask the 
woman for her opinion and then go against it". Civil law requires 
that the woman: 
- be faithful 
- obey 
- bear and take care of children 
- supervise the order and organization of the home 
- defer to the father, mother and close relatives of her husband. 
(55) 
The woman herself realizes her role, and to some degree, is 
satisfied; sometimes one can hear a woman say, "Such and such is a 
man's affair". Even a well-educated woman, when she has a decision 
to make, does not say, "Let me think about it", but, "Let me ask my 
father, brother or husband". For this reason Alwardi frequently said: 
"Our women are like Marilyn Monro on the outside and like 
grandmother on the inside"(56), in other words, Iraqi women, and 
those from other Arab countries, may wear fashionable Western-style 
dress and hair- style, drive a car, use Christian Dior make up and 
perfume, and even hold prestigious occupations, but essentially their 
status and authority is really little different from that of traditional, 
rural women. Well-educated women recognise that they are viewed in 
rather crude terms as child-bearers, and may sometimes worry about 
that, but they also realise that their Inferior position is not their 
own fault or that of their husband, but is determined socially and 
culturally. Nevertheless, the majority have high self-esteem and don't 
see themselves as inferior to men. Deaver (1980) demonstrated this in 
his discussion of contemporary Saudi women. He stated: 
Saudi women do not regard themselves as inferior to men. 
Part of their status is a function of that of their male 
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kinsmen. This is neither inferiority nor subordination 
since the male's status is dependent on the purity of 
the females. Seclusion is regarded by females as an 
avenue to purity, thereby maintaining the honour of the 
family which creates security. While several Westernized 
Saudi women have indicated to me they would like to 
modify the women's place in their society, when I 
examined their positions, they did not propose breaking 
down the public/private dichotomy. Rather, they proposed 
setting up school for women who were poor and/or 
without kinsmen( . 
So far, women recognize that their fathers and brothers, are 
their protectors, who have ultimate authority over them, and to whom 
they are beholden until they marry. They recognize also that it is to 
these men they may turn for aid from offence(58 . In this context, 
Mace (1959) emphasised the lack of independence of Arab women. He 
stated: 
In childhood a female must be dependent on her father; 
in youth, on her husband; her lord being dead, on her 
sons. A woman must never seek independence(59). 
Many Arab writers follow Mace's viewpoint in estimating 
women's status. Al-aqad (1969) and Kalid (1975), asserted that women 
are inferior by nature, by God's will; God said "men are superior to 
women", and made it the duty of men to strive, consequently Islam 
gave the male twice the share of the female(60) 
However, women's subordination cannot be explained by one 
reason alone, but should be viewed in the context of the socio- 
cultural system. As Baracat (1985) suggested: 
The prevailing general order and the nature of its 
division of labour, property ownership, degree and 
quality of involvement in social and economic activity, 
control over the production process and products, and 
the overall position in the social structure constitute the 
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basic factors contributing to the subordination of 
women 
(61). 
Although the subordination and inferiority of women tends to 
be taken for granted, the women have great status in the household, 
especially as wives and mothers. This status is confirmed by religion 
as well as tradition. The Prophet Muhammad said "Verily Allah forbade 
you to disobey the mother"(62) , "The woman is the queen of her 
house" and "Paradise lies under the feet of the mother"(63). The Holy 
Quran says, "They have right like those of man against them, though 
men are a degree above them"(64). 
Traditionally, as sister and daughter, and more particularly as 
wife and mother, a woman is entitled to respect. Accordingly the best 
man is the kindest to the woman and never reviles her or her 
relatives (65). On the other hand woman is still considered to be a 
source of evil, anarchy and deceit(66). 
However, woman's status is determined by her generation, age, 
marital position, fertility and her organizational role(67 . It is always 
conceded that the building up of a man is due to his wife; behind 
every successful man, there is a wise woman(68). Moreover the 
position of the woman, especially the mother, as Lichtenstadter 
maintained, depends on her own abilities and qualities. In his words: 
Some women seem to have no influence whatsoever and do 
not participate in their husband's and children's lives; 
others, though punctiliously conforming to the accepted 
pattern of segregation, are the centre of their home and 
are consulted and taken into confidence by their husband 
and their grown-up sons, while they have almost complete 
authority over the younger children. Such women 
acquire, in consequence a good standing in the wider 
family circle(69) 
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A woman acquires full freedom when she becomes old, beyond 
childbearing age. Such women can be bawdy and vulgar in their talk 
before men without receiving condemnation; they may even talk back 
to men and, in the presence of younger men, have authority. Since 
they are the keepers of the home, they often gain an upper hand 
over the man of the house during his declining years(70). Such 
license is not given to the younger women. 
Women's status in Iraq broadly conforms to the pattern 
described above. The data in tables (5-16) to (5-20) may illustrate the 
position and status of women in urban and rural settings. 
According to the figures in table 5-19, the majority of the 
whole sample thought that the mother has less status than the father. 
This result is in line with the nature of Arab society described 
earlier, where the father enjoys full authority and power over his 
family. Thus it is not surprising to see the informants' responses 
centralized on the category that refers to the high status of the 
father compared with the mother, though a remarkable proportion of 
the informants said, "The mother has equal status with the father" as 
the table (5-19) shows: 41% of the control group, against 27% of the 
migrants and 37% of the natives. A small minority said, " The father 
has less status than the mother", which can be explained in the light 
of individual differentiation theory. A non-significant difference was 
found between the rural and the urban groups (X2= 5,5 DF= 4). The 
data confirm the view found in the literature, that the patriarchal 
authority is strongly evident in the Arab world and women are 
inferior to men. However, that does not demolish the idea that woman, 
especially the wife/mother, enjoys a reasonable status and has 
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absolute power over her family members, both male and female, except 
the head of household. 
Other questions were asked to clarify some aspects of woman's 
position. Informants were asked their response to the statement: 
"Women plan and men execute the -plan". The three groups' answers 
showed non-significant differences, (X2= 3.0 DF= 4), most of the 
informants rejecting the content of this statement. 
Table 5-19 Women's status 
Women's status Rural 
% 
Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Less status than 
father 55 70 58 61 
Equal status 41 27 37 35 
Father less status 
than mother 4 3 5 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 5.5 D. F= 4 N. S 
Table 5-20 shows that 70% of the rural group denied that the 
woman "plan" and man "execute" the plan, against 59% of the 
migrants and 66% of the native group. Although the proportion of 
those who agreed that women plan is not significant, such individuals 
would be regarded, in the patriarchal system, as making great 
mistakes. Arabs not only deny the dominance of the woman as 
"planner" but also regard this prospect as insulting to men. In 
practice, to the researcher's knowledge, women often play a 
significant role in decision-making behind the scenes, but there is a 
176 
dichotomy between public and private behaviour. A man must, 
traditionally, never show the effectiveness of his wife in front of any 
one else, while the wife exercises a constrained influence over 
decisions. In cases where the woman is obviously dominant, the 
husband loses his respect and honour in the eyes of his friends, 
relatives and even his own original family(71) 
Table 5-20 Woman's position as shown in her role in planning 
Women planning Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Agree 6 10 9 8.3 
To some extent 24 31 25 26.7 
Disagree 70 59 66 65.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 3.0 D. F= 4 N. S 
Those of our respondents who admitted the planning role of the 
women, might have done in recognition of their wives' great 
psychological influence, or they may have thought such an answer 
would impress the interviewer with a sense of the modern, broad- 
minded attitude. 
Substantially, the woman is still subordinate to man which 
surely reduces her ability to plan or dominate. If she shares in the 
decision-making, or even succeeds in dominating it, she has to do so 
indirectly, hiding behind her husband/father/ son, to follow 
convention. 
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More evidence about the inferiority of the woman is shown by 
table 5-21. When the question concerns "the final word about the 
number of children", one might anticipate that the mother/wife has 
the upper hand because it is, substantially a female concern, but this 
seems to be the case only among egalitarian societies. In the 
traditional world, where marriage and fertility are familial and even 
societal issues, the decision does not rest with the wife alone, but 
with the patriarchal household's members and their relatives. 
Table 5-21 The position of the woman shown through the final word 
about the number of children 
Who has the 
final word? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Me 36 33 35 34.7 
My wife 10 17 14 13.7 
Both 31 28 37 32.0 
Others 23 22 14 19.6 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 5.7 DF= 6 N. S 
As we can see in table (5-21), a remarkable proportion of all 
informants claimed, they could themselves decide the number of 
children they wanted: 36% of the rural group, 33% of the migrants 
and 35% of the natives . At the same time the proportion of those 
who replied "both" (husband and mate) was also high; 31% of the 
rural, 28% of the migrants and 37% of the natives. However, the 
differences between the three groups seems to be non-significant 
(X2= 5.7 DF= 6). Most of the informants who replied "other" claimed 
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that God alone is responsible for the number of children. Even those 
who said "me", are often heard saying: Bada Mashiat Allah "After God 
will, I will decide". As Lutfyya (1966) put it, "All children were born 
simply because God willed it" 
(72). This result is in keeping with Arab 
society and culture, which reflects the effectiveness of the traditional 
value system. 
However, the question arises here: Is this view held to the 
same extent by all age groups and education levels?. 
A. AGE AND THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
As the information in table 5-22 shows, the major concentration 
of the responses among the youth group (25-34), were in the 
category "both" in rural and urban groups alike: 13 out of 20 of 
rural informants said "both", compared with 18 out of 43 of the 
urban group [both migrants, and nativesl. The oldest age group 55> 
focused on the category "other"; 10 out of 11 rural respondents, and 
25 out of 33 of urban respondents chose this answer, Although the 
result of this table shows some level of penetration of the urbanized 
and Westernized values among the younger group, many of whom 
have given up some of their patriarchal authority and permitted the 
woman to share the decision-making about the number of children, 
there is still a large proportion, particularly among the older men, 
who retain strongly conventional behaviour; the (35-54) age group 
strongly upheld the category "me". A small number of the total 
sample gave the priority or the initiative to the woman to decide; 
these were so few as to be treated as individual cases with no 
further significance. 
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As we have already said, the information seems to reflect some 
modernity, especially among the youth. However, though some of the 
youth proclaim modern urbanized views, in the researcher's 
experience, a "double standard" applies, in that much behaviour still 
reflects traditional rural attitudes to women. For instance, girls are 
expected to be virgins until marriage but there is no stipulation that 
men remain chaste. If a man has an intimate relationship with a 
woman, no harm or shame touches him, but if it is merely rumoured 
that a woman has such a relationship, the position is quite different. 
She and her paternal relatives are ashamed(73). 
Table 5-22 The relationship between age and number of children 
Age Rural 
M* W* B* 0* 
Urban 
MWB0 
Total 
25< 1 -- 3 -- 3 2 2 -- 11 
25-34 5 1 13 2 18 7 18 -- 64 
35-44 19 3 10 2 21 11 24 3 93 
45-54 10 6 5 9 22 11 17 8 88 
55> 1 -- -- 10 4 -- 4 25 44 
Total 36 10 31 23 68 31 75 36 300 
Chit X2= 56 DF=12 
Pearson's R= 0.24 
X2= 53 DF=12 
Pearson's R= 0.35 
*M= Me *W= my wife 
*B= both *0= other 
B. EDUCATION AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
Following on from the analysis of the previous table, 
educational levels may also be important in clarifying the position of 
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woman, as it might be thought education would modify traditional 
views. However, the data in table 5-23 show that there were 
significant differences between the informants who had a low level of 
education and those who had attained a higher level. 
Nevertheless, the two groups have some conformity as regards 
the participation of woman in their decisions. Only a small minority, 
as in the previous table (age), gave the initiative to the woman Even 
among urban respondents with university education, the number of 
those who share the decision-making was equalled by those who still 
feel that the priority and the initiative remains with the man (26 
individuals to each). Thus, the traditional values which reinforce the 
superiority of man and inferiority of woman have a strong effect, not 
only on those who have a low level of education , but to some extent 
on those who have a high educational level. 
Table 5-23 The relationship between education and number of children 
Education Rural 
M* W* B* 0* 
Urban 
MWB0 
T* 
Illiterate 9 7 5 19 4 6 5 19 74 
Can read 19 1 7 2 6 7 5 6 53 
Elementary 5 2 13 1J 11 1 5 2 40 
Intermediate 3 -- 5 -- 14 4 15 4 45 
Secondary -- -- -- 1 7 5 9 1 23 
University -- -- 1 -- 26 9 26 3 65 
Total 36 10 31 23 68 32 65 35 300 
Chit X2= 52 DF=15 
Pearson's R= -0.08 
X2= 38 DF=15 
Pearson's R= 29 
M- = Me W- = My wife 
B* = Both 0* = Other T* = Total 
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C. MEN'S ASSISTANCE IN HOUSEHOLD TASKS 
The preceding questions revealed that women's position is still 
inferior to men, despite urbanization and Westernization. This is 
further demonstrated in table 5-24 which reveals the extent of men's 
assistance in household tasks. The data show that the overwhelming 
majority of the rural group, 86%, replied that they never help their 
wives, as against 84% of the migrants and 59% of the natives. 
Table 5-24 Men's assistance within their wives'household tasks 
Helping Wives Rural 
% 
Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Always 3 3 3 3 
Sometimes 11 13 38 20.7 
Never 86 84 59 76.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 27.8 DF=4 
Rural and migrants' responses were very similar, but the 
natives showed significant differences, a remarkable proportion, 38% 
saying that they help their wives "sometimes", compared with 11% of 
the rural and 13% of the migrant group. The percentage of those who 
always help was the same in each group. 
Although the native's participation in their wives'household 
tasks indicates some degree of urbanism (as a way of life), the 
majority of urban dwellers still do not help their wives. In the 
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researcher's experience, even women who work outside the home, 
bear all the domestic burden: cooking, cleaning, washing clothes and 
gardening. Women usually have no desire to see their husbands 
involved in what they regard as woman's tasks; for instance, they 
dislike a man helping in the kitchen , and say "Oh. no, you have to 
sitdown and take your rest". This may be because the woman has no 
desire to see the man enter her kingdom and disturb her 
arrangements, or because the patriarchal authority of the man is 
often despotic, so that when the man interests himself in women's 
work, he may interfere. Thus a common expression in Iraqi society is, 
"When the man goes into the kitchen the woman does not do her 
work as well as normal". 
To obtain a more complete picture of urban inhabitants' 
assistance in their wives' household tasks, table 5-25 shed light on 
the nature of that help. 
Table 5-25 Type of assistance in household tasks* 
Types of help Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Cleaning -- -- -- -- 
Washing clothes 1 -- -- 1 
cooking 4 -- 1 5 
Ironing 3 9 37 49 
Washing dishes 1 1 6 8 
Other 7 5 1 13 
Total 16 15 45 76 
* The informants were allowed to select more than one option 
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According to the information, the overwhelming majority of the 
natives were helping with tasks which were originally not women's 
duties: 37 respondents out of 45 of the native group claimed that 
they help in ironing, compared with 9 respondents out of 15 of the 
migrant group, and only 3 respondents out of 16 of the rural group. 
No one helped with cleaning and only one native with washing 
clothes. Only one native helped with cooking. The easiest task after 
ironing is "washing dishes", 7 informants of the urban group (both 
migrants and natives) said they did this task. 
Basically, in a patriarchal authority, the husband regards any 
help as a concession, and often avoids any such "concession", based 
on the traditional argument that woman is greedy, and if one helps 
her, for example in cooking, she will begin to expect such help every 
day. Thus even now when a man intends to marry, he is told by his 
mother to "slay the cat", i. e. to be harsh from the beginning in front 
of his bride, in order to maintain his authority in the coming days; 
otherwise he will be dominated by his wife and bring shame to his 
family and relatives. 
In this example we see women encouraging men to subordinate 
women. Thus it is not to be expected that a man will participate in 
what are conventionally regarded as feminine tasks. However, some 
kind of participation is emerging, attributable to large-scale 
urbanization and Westernization. 
5.7. MARRIAGE 
In patriarchal Arab society, marriage has been seen as a 
familial and societal tie rather than a matter of individual desire. 
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Functionally, it is perceived as a mechanism of sex fulfilment and 
economic cooperation 
(74); reproduction, human survival, reinforcement 
of family ties and interests, perpetuation of private property through 
inheritance, socialization and achievement of other goals that 
transcend the happiness of the individuals to guarantee community 
interests(75). Accordingly marriage for Muslims is normally arranged 
by the families of the principals, frequently without a prior meeting 
of the two principals. The major reasons for marriage are not 
companionship, romantic love or achievement of transitory individual 
happiness, but rather "fertility", permanence and the alliance of two 
family groups(76). Some individuals in towns and cities might marry 
spouses of their choosing, but they must first obtain their 
parents'consent. Without their assent the marriage will not take place. 
Even if the bridegroom insists and ignores his parents refusal, the 
bride's family will not accept him, because they recognize that 
marriage is not an individual affair, but a familial responsibility(77). 
Generally speaking, marriage is compulsory and is completely in 
the hand of the parents. The parents are morally obliged to find a 
mate for their sons, and the sons are expected to accept and obey 
the parents' choice. Traditionally, the principals to be married did 
not see each other until before the wedding, but this custom is dying 
out(78). Where a young man's father is living, the father is expected 
to take a significant role in the negotiations, and the same is true 
for a young woman. Now, if questioned, men will assert that marriage 
negotiations are their concern alone. Substantially, women will take a 
very different view of the process, are involved and will, in fact, 
take quite an active role in the suggestion of marriage partner and 
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in preliminary negotiation 
(79). In this context the common expression 
is: "The master key to the father's consent is the mother". 
Informal mediators are often used in the betrothal process. In 
Iraq, usually a group of women prepare the ground for the men's 
negotiations. They often discuss all the requirements and practical 
procedures, including the amount of the dowry (mahr) and the future 
residence of the couple, and when they reach agreement, the men 
need only talk in an amicable way before giving the formal 
endorsement. The men endorsement is needed just to give the 
women's agreements a social and legal acceptability, in conformity 
with the traditional values of the patriarchal society. 
A. POLYGAMY 
Marriage in the contemporary Arab World take two major forms: 
monogamy and polygyny. According to Islamic law, a man is permitted 
to take up to four wives, but this freedom is hedged by an important 
restriction, that a man should treat all of them equally, in terms of 
their economic and psychological well-being(80ý. The Holy Quran says: 
"If ye fear that ye will not deal fairly with the orphans 
marry of the women who seem good to you, two or three 
or four and if you fear that ye can not do justice, then 
one (only), or that your right hand po? ges. Thus it is 
more likely that ye will not do injustice .- 
Thus, the man has a right to have as many as four wives at 
the same time, only if he can act with perfect justice towards all of 
them. This may be possible to achieve in material terms, but it Is 
unlikely emotionally. Thus the permission for polygyny is in reality 
quite restricted, and this restriction is widely observed In the Arab 
community, especially among urban inhabitants. However, polygyny 
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fulfilled several functions: to ensure a large number of children, to 
provide necessary manpower and satisfy other economic and social 
conditions(82). 
Although polygyny in Iraq was already on the decline, in 1977 
the government decreed that any man who would like to take an 
additional wife, must first seek the permission of his first wife. This 
diminished the phenomenon to a minimal level. 
The effects of this legislation on marriage forms in Iraq are 
clearly apparent in our own data, where only two informants among 
rural group had a second wife (table 5-26), while none in urban 
areas (both migrants and natives) claimed to have more than one 
wife. One of the most important reasons for the decline in polygyny 
in Iraq and many other Arab countries as well, is the diminishing of 
household work(83)9 and the tremendous increases of the economic 
burden of the family, as well as large-scale urbanization (as a 
process, not as a way of life). 
Table 5-26 Number of wives 
Number of wives Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Only one 98 100 100 98 
Two 2 -- -- 2 
Three -- -- -- -- 
Four -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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B. CHOICE OF MATE 
Ideally, marriage in the Arab World is not a personal choice, 
but is imposed on the individuals by the cultural system, through the 
family and close kin. The parents, especially the father, theoretically 
control the selection of a mate(84). Nowadays, the principals exercise 
considerable influence over the choice of mate particularly in urban 
centres. However, the final choice remains in the hands of the 
parents; the son might suggest a bride, but the final consent must 
be given by the parents. Their consent is often subject to two 
conditions: the reputation (honour) of the bride and her family , and 
her efficiency(85). 
The choice of bride suggested, might be wide or narrow in 
terms of the kinship group (endogamy), but in almost every case the 
first name proposed is that of the Bint Al Amm (father's brother's 
daughter). First cousin marriage on either the mother's or the 
father's side is desirable(86), but mate selection from the father's 
side is preferred for many reasons: Firstly, the dowry (mahr) is 
often a symbolic one. Secondly, the property of the bride and her 
heritage remain in the family. Thirdly, the couple's mutual 
understanding might be better than that between strangers; it is 
believed that a wife of the same blood, might be more inclined to 
stand beside her husband in a crisis than would a stranger. 
Moreover, a paternal cousin feels that his Bint Amm is his 
responsibility, whether he marries her or not, so if he marries her, 
moral obligation and blood ties prevent divorce(87). This function is 
to maintain the coherence of the community and not "a sort of 
scandal" as Claude Levi-Strauss claimed(88). 
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Girls, in the choice of mate, are heavily influenced by local and 
kinship factors. They prefer, first and foremost, the conventional 
Muslim marriage to the first paternal cousin, because, substantially 
the first paternal cousin stands next to the brother as protector(89). 
This right is alluded to in a number of proverbs: "Her (the 
girl's) binding and her release are in the hands of her Ibn Amm" or 
" The girl who is desired by her Ibn Amm is forbidden to a 
stranger". On the girl's side, the common proverb is, " The feet of 
ibn Amm are better than the head of the stranger"(90) 
In Iraq as Patal pointed out: 
First cousin marriage is the invariable rule. A girl 
belongs of right to the son of her father's brother (Ibn 
Amm) unless he expressly renounces his right to marry 
her. Evený1)this case she may not marry without his 
permission. 
This tradition has remained to some extent active both in rural 
and in urban communities, but nowadays it is under attack, especially 
among the younger generation. Girls have begun to object if they do 
not like their Ibn Amm and their opinions are often respected. 
Consultation with the girl before the final decision, is required by 
religion and law, though the strict tradition in Iraq, as in most Arab 
and Muslim societies, gives priority to parents' supervision and 
consent. In our case, as Table 5-27 shows, we found the vast 
majority of the sample, both rural and urban, claimed that the father 
has the absolute authority to choose his son's bride. 
The tendency for the choice of bride to be made by the fattier 
alone falls from rural to native respondents: 76% , 68%, and 53% for 
the three groups respectively. The role of the mother with the 
father's consent, however increases: 15% of the rural group, 25% of 
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the migrants and 41% of the native group. Only 5.3% of the entire 
sample said they chose their mates themselves. 
Here, we have a clear-cut indication of the predominance of the 
patriarchal family in the social structure. In spite of the 
mother/wife's participation in such cases, the mother often plays only 
a lesser role; she might choose the bride and try to persuade her 
husband to accept her favourite choice, but the final words and the 
procedures (if he agrees) should be in the father's hands. 
Table 5-27 Choice of mate 
Who chose/will 
chose your wife 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
myself 6 4 6 5.3 
Father 76 68 53 65.7 
Mother with 
father consent 15 25 41 27.0 
Other 3 3 -- 2.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Xz 20 DF= 6 
I-- I 
C. AGE AT MARRIAGE 
Honour is one of the core values in Arab culture. Woman 
represents the honour of the family, thus she is secluded, prohibited 
from the man's realm In work and entertainment, and even from 
exchanging visits with friends and non-close relatives. All these 
restrictions are imposed In order to maintain the family honour. It is 
believed in the Arab World that women are weak in sexual matters, 
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and need constant supervision by an adult man or old woman. Male 
honour is closely linked to female purity; hence, a girl must remain a 
virgin till marriage. If she loses her chastity, it affects not only her 
own reputation but also that of her father, brothers and all her 
relatives(92), and she might expose herself to capital punishment by a 
member of her family. For that reason women are secluded and denied 
access to the work market. Thus only 5% of all adult women are 
employed in non-agricultural labour in most Islamic nations of the 
Middle East and North Africa(93) 
In this cultural context, it is not surprising to see early 
marriage in Iraq for both males and females, but particularly female. 
Goode (1963) refers to the marriage of girls as young as nine or ten 
years of age. He argues that the system that permits marriage before 
puberty or in the earlier years of adolescence as "fits well with a 
system of high control by elders over mate choice"(94). 
In fact, in a society which practices pervasive sexual 
segregation, emotional attachments can not be formed, and marriage is 
arranged early to prevent young people from undermining the 
traditional system. Thus it is in the interest of the elders who wish 
to maintain the traditional family system, to arrange marriage at as 
early an age as possible. (95). 
Early marriage is considered desirable and practiced not only 
in the Arab World, but in most Islamic countries. In Afghanistan, for 
instance, Hanifi (1979) reported that "a boy usually marries between 
the ages of sixteen and twenty-two, while girls ordinarily marry 
three to four years earlier(96). In 1960, in Amman and Beirut the 
averages range from 17 to nearly 22 years(97). In 1971 In Iran girls 
were often married before the age of fifteen years(98). In Iraq, 
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Mustafa (1990) found the averages in Mosul city (northern Iraq) to be 
from 18.2 to 21.1 years(99). Alnassar (1990) revealed an average of 
from 18 to 25 years in Baghdad city(100). 
In our own data, as Table 5-28 shows, the preferred ages at 
marriage for men were in the 20-24 and 25-29 categories, with slight 
difference between the rural and urban groups. For women, it was 
younger in the categories 20< and 20-24 with significant differences 
between the rural and urban groups. More than half of the rural 
sample (61%) were concentrated in the category 20<, while more than 
three-quarters (78.5%) of the urban group were concentrated in the 
category (20-24). The mean of the male desirable age for marriage is 
25.1 years, while the mean for female is 21 years. this result is 
consistent with Alnassar's result mentioned above. 
Table 5-28 Age at marriage 
Age at 
marriage 
Rural% 
MF 
Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
MFMF 
Total% 
20< 4 61 2 26 4 7 17.3 
20-24 43 36 43 68 36 85 51.8 
25-29 48 3 47 6 40 8 25.4 
30> 5 -- 8 -- 20 -- 5.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mean of rural: 
Male=24.1 
Female=19.7 
Mean of Urban: 
Male= 25.4 
Female= 21.6 
192 
D. RESIDENTIAL RULE 
Arab society has been described as patriarchal, patrilineal, and 
patrilocal. All the power is concentrated in the hands of the males 
(father, spouse, grandfather... etc. ), and as a result the residence was 
traditionally absolutely patriarchal; the bride left the natal household 
to join the household of her husband(101). Thus the typical 
household consists of the parents, their unmarried and married sons 
and their wives and children(102). 
Although this rule has somewhat changed, with a move toward 
the individual household, the past custom is still widely upheld in 
rural and urban settings. In the past two decades, couples 
compulsorily joined the household of their parental extended family, 
because the father's household was considered the main source of 
livelihood. Property remained under his authority as long as he 
lived(103). 
Accordingly, matrilocal residence is discouraged, regarded as 
shameful and breaking of tradition. A bridegroom who intends to live 
with his bride's family brings shame, not only to himself, but also to 
his original family and relatives. In Iraq public opinion is against 
such cases. The people often call a person who intends to do this 
(ga'dy), a perjorative word, which means in folk idiom a person who 
loses his authority and lives at others' expense, even if he has a job 
and supports his wife financially. Abu-Zahra asserted this fact when 
she stated: 
If he goes to live in his wife'f10 Tother's house, his 
authority over his wife diminishes 
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On this basis, people avoid matrilocal residence in order to 
maintain their prestige in the eyes of their original families, friends 
and the whole community. However, to every rule there are 
exceptions. Some individuals break with tradition and live with or 
near their wives families. Some are forced to do so , because either 
wife's family has no adult male to take care of the family, or the 
wife's family is very rich and forces them to do so. Attitudes toward 
residence are manifested in table 5-29, which shows that only 3% of 
the rural group, 8% of the migrants and 4% Of the natives would 
"agree" to live with their wives' families. On the other hand the 
proportion of those who would "refuse" to join their wives' residence 
is very high: about 80% of the three groups, with slight differences 
between them. 
Table 5-29 Residential rules 
Live with wives 
families 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Totals 
Refuse 81 76 82 79.7 
Persuade her 16 16 14 15.3 
Agree 3 8 4 5.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 3.2 DF= 4 N. S 
This result is consistent with Al-nassar's findings. lie found 
that 2 respondents out of 260 migrants and none out of 140 natives 
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in Baghdad city claimed to have positive attitudes toward matrilocal 
residence, and the overwhelming majority strongly rejected it. Some 
were reported as saying "If I live with my wife's parents, I will lose 
my power" and, " How could I live with my wife's parents?. It is a 
shame in my society"(105). 
The result is also consistent with Prothero and Diab's findings; 
they found that the residential pattern, in which the newly married 
couple stayed with the husband's parents, was very strong among 
the villager and among the lower class of the city(106). From these 
results, it can be concluded that the patrilocal residence rule is still 
much in evidence in both rural and urban communities in Iraq. Again 
this reflects the continuation of female subordination, despite large- 
scale urbanization. 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
Arab society has been widely described as patriarchal, 
patrilineal, patrilocal, polygynous and characterised by the extended 
family. The family is considered the basic social unit and the 
cornerstone of social organisation in both urban and rural 
communities. It is the pivot of social, political, economic and religious 
training and practices; it provides security and protection for its 
members, and it is centre for their recreation and affective life. The 
predominance of the extended family system entails concentration of 
power in the hands of the older males (often the father or the eldest 
son), male superiority over females, and discouragement of family 
planning (both birth control and family budget arrangement). 
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In the first section of this chapter, the researcher investigated 
the range of the power structure of the family. As the data showed, 
the older man enjoys absolute authority over his wife/wives and his 
sons, whether unmarried or married in both rural and urban 
communities, with almost no-significant differences between them. The 
obedience of children to their parents, even when they become adults 
and get married, which is determined by religious and traditional 
values, is evident. On this basis the extended family still has a 
strong presence, not only in its traditional construction, but also In 
its function inside the nuclear family. This fact is manifested through 
the reciprocity of mutual aid, interdependence, wide participation in 
major life occasions and subordination of the young to the old and 
the females to males. Therefore, the father has full authority inside 
and outside the home, and has the absolute right to make decisions 
on behalf of his family members. Accordingly, the relationships inside 
the family are formed vertically rather than horizontally. In such 
relations, at the upper level, communication often takes the form of 
orders, Instructions, warning, threats, shaming and so forth, whilst at 
the lower level it might take the form of crying, self-censorship, 
covering up and deception. 
This absolute authority might transfer to the eldest son when 
the father dies, as a continuation of the patriarchal authority. 
The status of the males was shown to be very high compared 
with that of females. This was clearly seen in the question as to 
whether the family which has a large number of males has a high 
status. The information received showed that the overwhelming 
majority agreed with this statement. This notion has several sources 
of reinforcement throughout socialisation; the male learns from early 
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childhood that he will be the "man of the family", responsible for his 
mother, sisters and younger brothers. The data demonstrated also a 
complete conformity between rural and urban informants as regards 
male status; 100% of the three groups said "Yes, if we have a son 
who gets married and lives independently, we will support him, 
morally and materially". This view is typical of traditional societies, 
where the family 'looks after its sons and helps them to find jobs, 
helps them financially to get married, to build a new house, to pay 
debts and takes side with them in any disputes. When we asked the 
informants " Why will you support him? " the vast majority said, 
"because he is a part of myself". Some said, ' "I need him when I get 
old". This also explains why they prefer to keep their married sons 
with them in the same household. This result is in keeping with the 
common impressions of the superiority of the males, and the 
effectiveness of the patriarchal family, in both rural and urban 
settings. 
The third section tried to test the family's ability to plan its 
budget and fertility. It could be anticipated that the urban family 
would have greater likelihood of budgeting and using contraception, 
but the fact is quite the contrary. Family planning (birth control) 
faces strong obstacles: religious values which encourage high 
fertility, and traditions that regard a large number of children as the 
main reinforcement of the family's economic position and political 
prestige., Family budget management is undermined by extensive 
obligations: weddings, funerals, illness, expected and unexpected 
visitors. One commonly hears in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities 
complaints such as, "One needs a treasury to fulfil his obligations", 
or, "I plan my family budget, but every month I have shortfall, with 
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obligations extra to the budget". When we tried to measure the impact 
of education and occupation on the budget using (X2) we found no- 
significant differences between those who have high and low level 
education/occupation, in urban and rural populations alike. 
The woman's position and status, discussed in the fourth 
section showed inferiority of women compared with men, though, her 
status increases if she gives birth to sons, while the restrictions are 
lifted when she becomes old. Although the majority of the informants 
claimed that the mother has less status than the father, a remarkable 
proportion of them said the mother has equal status to the father, 
and a minority said the father has less status than the mother. 
However, when the inquiry turned to responses to the statement 
"Women plan and men execute the plan" the majority strongly 
rejected it, and once again there were slight differences between 
rural and urban group responses. The only relatively active 
participation of woman was seen in the question about the number of 
children, where a remarkable proportion of the informants claimed 
that they share the decision with their wives, with non-significant 
differences between rural and urban groups. By crosstabulating age 
and education as independent variables, with decision-making about 
the number of children, we found greater impact of urbanization and 
Westernization on the younger groups and the well-educated than on 
others. However when the inquiry turned to the husband's assistance 
in his wife's domestic tasks, the vast majority said they never help, 
with slight differences between rural and urban informants. Even for 
those who admitted they help, the assistance that they offered was in 
tasks not normally regarded as women's tasks. Most helped with 
ironing, none helped with cleaning, and only one out of (300) 
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informants helped with washing clothes. These results reflect the 
dominance of the male, who still views the woman through the 
traditional values, as an inferior creature, physically and mentally. 
The final section examined the nature of marriage: polygyny, 
choice of mate, age at marriage and residential rules. The information 
revealed some similarity between the rural and urban groups, as 
regards the decline of polygyny, where only 2 out of 300 informants 
had a second wife. 
Because of the predominance of the traditional view of 
marriage, which regards it as a familial rather than individual matter, 
the family plays an essential role in mate selection, and the 
patriarchal authority emerges again as a decisive factor in 
determining the proper mate for both sons and daughters. Relatively 
early marriage is preferred, particularly for girls; there were slight 
differences between rural and urban groups, but the data showed 
that preferred age at marriage was less than 25 years for males and 
less than 21 years for females. This result is consistent with recent 
findings. 
As concerns residential rules, the patriarchal authority entails 
patrilocal residence, and in a society dominated by strict tradition, it 
is not easy to accept matrilocal residence, If one breaks the value 
system, he is socially despised, mocked and vilified. People in Iraq 
usually regard him as "powerless". For these reasons the 
overwhelming majority of the informants claimed that they would not 
live with their wife's family, with conformity between the two sets. 
In the light of these results we may conclude that the 
pervasiveness of traditional values in the urban context has 
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diminished the margin of differentiation between the rural and urban 
areas, and created to some extent, "ruralization of the city". 
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CHAPTER SIX 
KINSHIP RELATIONSHIPS 
. -f 
6.1 TNTRODUCTTON 
As we have said earlier in this thesis, the distinction between 
the family and kinship is unjustifiable in both structural and 
functional terms. The kinship system in the Arab World is based 
primarily upon the household unit or extended family and its 
expansion. Discrimination is only justifiable from a methodological 
viewpoint. However, whatever distinction is made, it is certain that 
the kinship system is large, complex and has considerable influence 
on both urban and rural dwellers. 
The effectiveness of the kinship system can be seen, for 
instance, in the marital ties, and more generally in the prevalence of 
endogamy and exogamy which are regarded, as Parsons (1971) has 
said, as central to all kinship system"). 
). It can also seen in mutual 
obligations, loyalty, nepotism and many other facets. 
Accordingly, this chapter seeks to underline the effectiveness 
of the kinship system in the urban milieu compared with that in its 
rural counterpart, to acknowledge the diffusion of the traditional 
values, which we have presumed might have a great impact on the 
components of urban life. 
Traditionally, urban sociology has tended to underestimate the 
effectiveness of the kinship system in the city, where urbanization 
and modernization are expected to reinforce individuality, transience, 
and superficial relationships, rather than familism, kinship loyalty and 
nepotism. This view, however, is no longer tenable in view of much 
available evidence, particularly in traditional societies such as one 
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under study. Thus, the content of this chapter is mainly devoted to a 
consideration of four salient issues: 
- Kinship control over marriage 
- Mutual obligations 
- Loyalty and nepotism 
- People's attitudes toward each other as "kin" 
These facets might reflect some features of the kinship system 
in an urban setting with reference to Baghdad city as a case study. 
6.2 KTNSIITP SYSTEM TN THE ARAB WORT, D : GENERAL OUTLOOK 
Undoubtedly, the Arab World today has undergone remarkable 
changes, not only in demographic or technological terms, but also 
socially and economically. These changes are reflected in every aspect 
of the social system. 
In spite of these changes the kinship system has survived 
apparently free of damage, and one could anticipate that it will be 
alive as long as the patriarchal authority and family unit remain 
intact, not to mention the religion, which plays an essential role in 
maintaining active kinship ties. However, kinship is a broad concept, 
which begins with the conjugal family and covers large institutions: 
lineage, subtribe and tribe, which encompass hundreds of people, all 
connected genealogically and descended from one known or unknown, 
genuine or hypothetical ancestor. As Keesing (1975) reported, kinship 
is the network of relationships created and extended outward, by 
genealogical connection and social ties: 
Genealogical connection between parents and child are 
extended outward to connect ego (the point of reference) 
to the parents of ego's parents and to the children; to 
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connect ego to her or his siblings (by their genealogical 
connection to the same parents); and outward through 
parents siblings to "collateral" relatives(2). 
In this sense the large kin groupings, in the Arab World, are 
social structures that aim to look after the legal, political, economic 
and social problems, that the family alone can not handle(3). That is 
so, not only in the absence of centralized state authority, as Goode 
has asserted(4). It seems to exist also where the grip of the state is 
strong. In Baghdad, for instance, kin groups are strongly functional; 
all the traditional obligations: cooperation, loans, mutual aids, 
protection and nepotism are applicable. Thus, urban social agencies 
do not weaken the role of kinship. 
In spite of the atrophy of the large kin construction [subtribe 
and tribe] in the urban Arab community, the factual evidence of 
kinship group behaviour is considerable. The prevailing kinship 
network in the urban Arab community impelled Eickelman (1974) to 
ask the question: Is there an Islamic city?. After his brilliant analysis 
of a Moroccan urban setting, he concluded that there is not(5). He 
found, instead, that the city was divided into quarters; each 
household in the quarter (darb) was considered to be bound together 
by multiple personal ties and by common interests. These complex ties 
are said to symbolize closeness in both urban and rural milieu. Thus 
he defined the quarter (darb) as the extension of the kinship group 
(qaraba) (6). 
Beyond the individual's own extended family, which entails 
large-scale mutual obligations as we have described earlier [see 
chapter two], there are the wider dimensions of kinship: lineage, clan 
and tribe. The most important kin are those linked by patrilateral 
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descent, including the extended family together with married aunts, 
married sisters and the women of one's cousin' households, and 
matrilateral kin: one's mother's brother (khal), mother's sister (khala) 
and their siblings(7). Patrilateral kin have higher status than 
matrilateral kin(g), If the latter are of a different lineage , subtribe 
or tribe. This is reflected in the common proverb, "The Khal 
[mother's brother] is left out and the Amm [father's brother] Is given 
authority", The Khal and the Amin are considered the nearest kin 
after one's own brothers and sisters. Those uncles [of both sides] 
have greater affection and responsibility for their nephews and 
nieces than for other, more remote relatives, and will give 
disinterested help when it is needed or after the parents' death. 
They may give their nephews or nieces a larger wedding gift than 
they would present to more distant cousins(9). 
Mutual obligations at the lineage or tribe levels apparently 
occur among a remarkable proportion of urban dwellers in Arab 
communities, especially among the poor class, those of rural 
background and the old families in the cities. Gulick spelled out this 
notion in his analysis of the kinship system in Tripoli (Lebanon) by 
saying: 
.,, less influential members want to maintain close 
relationship with their richer, more influential clansmen. 
When the latter have political ambitions, they can make 
good use of the loyalty of their poorer, remote relatives, 
as well, of course, as of the loyalty of those non- 
relatives for whom they can do favours. The political 
bosses (zu'ama) build their power party in this way, and 
those who seek to wrest their power from them try to do 
likewise(10). 
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Kinship ties in some contexts are assumed to be a guarantee of 
loyalty. This is the case not only in the monarchies in the region, 
but also in other structures. Loyalty seems to be pervasive 
everywhere in the Middle East, irrespective of the shape of the 
political authority(I1). On this theme, Lutfyya has emphasized that all 
young men of the same lineage (hamula) or even the tribe (as 
characteristically used in Iraq) refer to each other as Ibn Amm 
(father's brother's son) and to all the young ladies as Dint Amm 
(father's brother's daughter). The older men are all regarded as 
Amamm (paternal uncles) and all the ladies are referred to as Ammat 
(paternal aunts)(12). 
This is not simply a matter of terminology. This sense of family 
ties entails a complex series of reciprocal favours and obligations: 
exchanged visits, assistance in major family events, such as birth, 
circumcisions, marriage, mourning , funerals and so forth. In Iraq it 
might be expanded more and more to cover promotion, move to a new 
house, new jobs, the purchase of a new car, and even the transition 
of the children from one class or stage to another in school, though 
large-scale urbanization has brought, inevitably, some increase in 
anonymity and drift towards individualism(13). The main obstacle to 
anonymity and individualism is religion. Relatives, according to the 
holy Qur'an, are accorded special respect. The Prophet Muhammad is 
reported to have said: "He who breaks off the ties of blood will not 
enter paradise"(14). In this sense, Korson pointed out: 
Individualism is a concept not in tune with the Muslim 
ethos, because individual ambitions and success are 
translated to mean improving the position of the whole 
family, whether in financial, social or prestige terms(15). 
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Definitely, religious commandments reverberate in all Muslim 
societies, despite cultural differentiation. Thus, religion might be a 
crucial factor in encouraging "nepotism", not only in socio-economic 
terms but in political terms as well. In the military overthrows which 
have occurred in the Arab World, the new governor has often 
charged the previous one with a high degree of corruption and 
nepotism. Nepotism, however, is a logical consequence of a society 
which is heavily infused with the ideology of the importance of kin 
ties(16). 
6.3 KTNSIITP CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE. 
Kinship in the Arab World, as we have already seen, has a 
visible presence in the urban milieu. It is derived mainly from a 
strong tradition of intimate family ties, and encouraged by religion. 
This has led to complex mutual obligations, one facet of which is 
controlling marriage, which we will discuss in this section. 
The ideal type of Arab and Muslim marriage is between first 
paternal cousins, with the next preferences being given to more 
distant paternal cousin, cousins on the maternal side, others of the 
lineage, and those from the same tribe, in that order(?? 
). In spite of 
this strong tradition, the rule has some exceptions, recalling Sapir's 
remark that "All grammars leak". Marriage may occur outside the 
realm of kinship and this is becoming more common among the urban 
indigenous today. The conventional marriage pattern may be broken 
by many urban individuals under the influence of Western culture 
through mass contact, subserved by the revolution in communications. 
Nevertheless, modernization and Westernization have not entirely 
caused kinship to lose its function, especially where marriage is 
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concerned. This situation seems to be similar to that reported from 
Africa and other Muslim countries in Asia, that the kinship network 
retains its meaning in both rural and urban areas(18). 
In a strong patrilineal system, parallel cousins are the 
preferred marriage partners, extended to other relatives. Exogamy 
may occur, but it is not the rule. As Gulick has reported: 
This marriage system is a reflection of one of the most 
fundamental concepts in Arab culture. If the Arab in the 
street could fully verbalize this concept, he would say 
something like that: "The strongest tie which binds one 
person to another is the tie of blood, reckoned in the 
male line. The only people in this hard world in whom I 
can put my full trust are my relatives. Therefore, the 
best people in the world are my relatives--- my brother, 
my father, my father's brothers and their sons, and 
beyond them, every one in my father's lineage. When one 
marries, one chooses the best person one can find, and 
the best person is to be found among one's kinsmen--- 
the closer the better"(19). 
Accordingly, when an individual intends to marry, he normally 
thinks, first and foremost, of his close relatives, which Tannos 
thought might ensure the kin group's soiidarity(20). Moreover, the 
bride-price is highest if a man takes a bride from outside his kin 
groups(21). However the decisive reason for maintaining the tradition 
of endogamy is to keep property within the kin group. Nevertheless, 
the general function of this pattern of marriage is to maintain the 
social relations of which it is the product. This might explain why kin 
groups have to control marriage. 
Endogamy has been strongly criticised by t3ourdieu (1972), who 
presumed that parallel cousin marriage is a matter of serving male 
interests. He stated that "the father ritually advises his son, 'Don't 
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listen to your wives, stay united amongst yourselves"'. He 
erroneously interpreted this as " naturally taken to mean 'marry 
your children to one another"(22), and viewed this kind of 
relationship as a type of scandal. In fact, endogamy and parallel 
cousin marriage are a cultural composition, which emerged and 
developed under certain socio-economic and ecological circumstances, 
like many other types of marriage in the world. Whatever the reason 
is, marriage is compulsory and completely under the parents' control. 
The children expect to accept and obey their parents' choice. 
Marriage is conceived as between two families , not two spouses(23). 
So far, research has demonstrated that endogamy, particularly 
parallel cousin marriage, is still prevalent, even in large cities such 
as Cairo, Kabul and Tehran(24). 
In Iraq, the pattern of marriage among relatives, particularly 
parallel cousins, is breaking down. Two or three decades ago, first 
cousin marriage was the invariable rule. A girl had to marry her ibn 
amm [ father's brother son ] unless he abandoned his right to marry 
her, but even then, she could not marry anyone else without his 
consent(25). This rule has now been broken down by the younger 
generation, especially urban inhabitants. However, a sizeable 
proportion of the urban residents still prefer the old style of 
marriage, among close relatives. The data available in table 6-1 might 
shed more light on this fact. 
The information in the table shows that about one-third of the 
whole sample married relatives. Although there is a significant 
difference between the rural and urban group, a remarkable 
proportion of the urban residents still preferred to marry among 
their relatives. As the data shows, more than half of the natives or 
2.1.5 
54% claimed that they married relatives, compared with 68% of the 
migrants and 76% of the rural group. 
Table 6-1 Marriage among relatives 
Is your wife a 
relative? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Yes 76 68 54 66 
No 24 32 46 34 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2 = 11 AF= 2 
Although there is no written law on the subject of marriage 
among relatives, tradition is sometimes more effective than written 
law; everybody knows by socialization in early childhood that a girl 
should marry her father's brother's son (ibn amm). Nowadays many 
urban residents are still concerned about the old style of marriage. 
For example, when one's brother has a new baby girl, he may say " 
We hoped for a boy, but it does not matter, she has a lot of father's 
brother's sons", or "She has come at the right time, she is for her 
Ibn amm". This fact was noted by Granqvist, six decades ago, when 
he said that betrothal was normally arranged by the relatives at the 
birth of the girl(26). A letter received from the researcher's sister in 
law after the Gulf War, included the following passage: 
Assel is now seven month old, she is drinking milk in 
spite of the shortages. She smiles and my father teases 
her saying "don't dance", but she dances, I have 
repeated that she will be, if God wills, the bride of Sinan 
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"her sister's son" but her father angrily repeated that it 
will never happen, he would like to marry her to her ibn 
amm, .. Imagine!. 
This passage might have been a joke, or a way of indicating 
that life in Baghdad had returned to normal, but actually it reflects 
the attitude, not only of individuals but also of the social system as 
a whole, toward the early nominal binding of the children. It also 
reflects the strength of the emotional bond among the kin group. 
Geertz (1979) indicated that marriage among relatives prevails 
among the urban residents in Morocco. He recorded the views of the 
people there and reported that " marriage among relatives over 
generations has produced a complex interwoven network of multiple 
consanguineal ties" (27). Such expressions are commonly heard 
everywhere in the Arab and Muslims countries. 
To clarify the position, we asked the informants who replied 
"Yes" to the previous question, to indicate the degree of kinship with 
their wives. The responses in table 6-2, show that 32.9% of the rural 
sample had married cross-cousin relatives, while 57.4% of the migrants 
and 44.4% of the natives had done so. The figures indicate that 
parallel cousins no longer have preference. Cross-cousins have 
replaced the parallel-cousins; only 21.1% of the rural sample claimed 
that they were married to parallel cousins, compared with 17.6% of 
the migrants and 38.9% of the natives. Though the native group show 
no significant difference for either cross or parallel-cousin, 
nevertheless, the majority of the entire sample, both rural and urban 
informants had married a cross-cousin or parallel-cousin, while the 
rest (the minority) had married either from the lineage or from the 
tribe. 
217 
This result indicates that a sizeable proportion of urban 
informants still prefer marriage among relatives. The reason, as far 
as the researcher knows, is not only to maintain the family property, 
but because many people think that a wife chosen from among one's 
relatives might put up with the husband's wrong doings, slips and 
mistakes and stand with him in a personal crisis, more than could be 
expected of a non-relative wife. At the same time, the wife is quite 
secure in her marital life because it is unlikely that a man would 
abandon or divorce a blood-kin wife. 
However, this kind of marriage is not confined to Arab and 
Muslim culture as Patai alleged(28); it is practiced among many other 
nations and ethnic groups. Spanish villagers, for instance, prefer 
marriage among kin groups and perceive a relationship between 
inheritance from the same grandfather and first cousin marriage(29). 
Among non-Muslim Indian people, marriage is endogamous; It occurs 
to maintain the caste(30). 
Table 6-2 Degree of relationship with wife 
Degree of relation- 
ship with wife 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Cross-cousin 32.9 57.4 44.4 29.3 
Parallel-cousin 21.1 17.6 38.9 16.3 
From lineage 26.3 22.1 9.3 13.4 
From the tribe 19.7 9.3 7.4 7.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 25.9 DF= 6 
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In order to define their attitudes toward marriage among 
relatives [endogamy], we asked the respondents, whether or not they 
would prefer for themselves and for their sons to marry relatives. 
The answers, as table 6-3 shows, indicate similarities rather than 
differentiation among the three groups' attitudes, where 66% of the 
rural group favoured marriage among relatives, while 76% of them 
[back to table 6-1] had actually practiced this type of marriage. 60% 
Of the migrants expressed this preference, while 68% of them actually 
practiced endogamy. 49% of the natives favoured it, while 54% already 
practiced it. 
Although the data shows some regression from the left to the 
right [from rural to native], it indicates that the attitude toward 
marriage among relatives remains highly favourable, even among the 
pure urban residents. The differences between the three groups are 
not as high as one might anticipate. That means, of course, that the 
cultural system has a great influence over the whole society, 
irrespective of residential area. 
Table 6-3 Attitudes toward marriage among relatives 
Attitudes toward 
marriage among 
relatives 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
To marry relative 66 60 49 58.3 
To marry non- 
relative 34 40 51 41.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 6.1 DF= 2 
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This result is consistent with what Cohen found twenty six 
years ago among the Palestinian hamolas [lineage] 
where the hamolas appears as a group of men who 
through their marriage to one another's sisters or 
a recent attempt to study a Moroccan city, Geertz 
the people of Sefrou city most commonly married 
kinship groups(32). 
A. EDUCATION AND MARRIAGE AMONG KTN GROUP 
on the west bank, 
are mainly linked 
daughters 
(1979) found that 
among their own 
The information of table 6-4 shows that contrary to expectation. 
a sizable proportion of those with a high level of education in all 
three groups, were married among their relatives. If we note the 
precise figures we will see, the two of the control group who have a 
high level of education claimed that they married among their 
relatives, compared with 11 out of 25 of the migrants and 26 out of 
61 of the natives. 53 out of 69 of the rural group with a low level of 
education were married among their relatives, compared with 39 out 
of 47 migrants and 8 out of 11 natives. 
The figures indicate that there is no contrast on either side of 
the curve, in other words, there is no significant relationship 
between level of education and marriage among relatives (X2= 9.8, 
14.9, and 9.5 respectively DF= 5 ). The only way to explain the 
relative similarity between them is through the cultural view, where 
both side submitted to and were affected by the traditional values. 
Therefore it seems that education does not substantially counter 
these traditional values. 
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Table 6-4 Education and marriage among relatives. 
Education and 
Marriage among 
relatives 
Rural 
yN 
Urban 
Migrants 
YN 
Natives 
YN 
Total 
Low level edu 53 16 39 8 9 2 127 
Middle level edu 21 8 18 10 19 9 85 
High level edu 2 -- 11 14 26 35 88 
Total 76 24 68 32 54 46 300 
X2= 
DF= 
9.8 
5 N. S 
X2= 14.9 X2= 9.5 
- Y*- Yes 
-N 
*= NO 
B. OCCUPATION AND MARRIAGE AMONG KIN GROUP 
If education level does not significantly alter attitudes toward 
intermarriage, it can be anticipated that the same will apply to 
occupation. This view is sustained by the information of table 6-5, 
which shows that the majority of the respondents in all occupations 
claimed that they prefer intermarriage, except for the officials who 
showed some indications of breaking with this pattern; only 19 out of 
44 native official preferred intermarriage, and 13 out of 27 migrants. 
The circumstances of the officials and the difficulties of urban 
life might impel them to look for suitable wives who can share the 
burden of the household expenses, for in the researcher experience, 
officials often marry after courting women working with them in the 
same office. This might explain the higher ratio of marriage to non- 
relatives. In such cases they should ask about their intended mate's 
reputation and tribal origin, to check "honour" of her family and find 
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out whether there are any relatives' objections. In many cases, the 
girl's kin group put a stop to any engagement with a non-relative, 
whatever the occupation or education level. 
Table 6-5 Occupation and marriage among relatives 
Occupation Rural% 
Yes No 
Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Yes No Yes No 
Tot l% 
Official -- 1 13 14 19 25 72 
Peasant 72 23 -- -- -- -- 95 
Worker -- -- 49 16 15 8 88 
Self-employed 1 -- 1 1 18 13 34 
Housewife 3 -- 5 1 2 -- 11 
Total 76 24 68 32 54 46 300 
X2= 4.4 
DF= 3 
X2= 7.4 X2= 5.1 
N. S 
6.4 LOYALTY AND NEPOTISM 
As a result of the prevailing patriarchal, patrilineal and 
patrilocal society and the high value of intermarriage, it can be said 
that most of the individual's activities are centralized on the kin 
group. The importance of kinship to the individual lies in its 
protective power; it is the body to which the individual may turn for 
assistance in times of crisis, insult or injury; it is of greater 
protective value to the people than lesser kin. units since it 
possesses the largest numerical strength. Insult to a kin group 
member by non-kin or by a member of another kin group immediately 
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rallies all the kin group, especially close kin, together in common 
concern for a member of the common blood line(33). However the 
importance of the kingroup is not only as a source of protection; it 
is a reference group, it provides economic support, and its members 
are united in religious participation. Thus the wide-spread loyalty to 
the group is not surprising. Familism one of the most common facets 
of rural and urban life alike. In fact, the entire culture of the Middle 
East is so permeated with family loyalty and influence that the terms 
familism and kinship have been properly been applied to it. The 
individual remain tied to his extended family beyond adulthood and 
into middle age. Subservience to family authority and reliance on the 
advice of elders remain characteristic traits of men in their thirties 
and forties(34). Ingrained habits of family loyalty are strong in both 
formal and informal situations. It is extremely difficult for the 
individual to divest himself of a protective attitude toward his 
kinsmen, who expect him to render special services and favours to 
them(35). In this sense Gulick pointed out that the majority of Arab 
city dwellers' loyalties are to their families and to their kin group in 
their home village, which may or may not be in a local minority. For 
that reason, as he said, "the Western observer often finds the Arab 
city so confusing and chaotic"(36). He ascribed this chaos and 
ambiguity to the loyalties to multiple groups which remain intact in 
the city, while none of the inhabitants is directed to the city itself, 
Accordingly the majority of Middle Eastern city dwellers do not seem 
to develop the kind of individualism and the anomie which are 
frequently encountered among urban dwellers in the West, who have 
neither established satisfactory group identifications in the city nor 
retained strong identification with their families or home towns(37). 
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Thus, the individual is highly dependent on his family and kin 
group for his short-term needs. Seeking assistance to cut through 
bureaucratic red tape is a well-known and widely accepted practice 
in Arab and Muslim culture. The individual begins his undertaking by 
seeking aid from relatives and through them, friends and friends of 
friends. The individual whose assistance is being sought may, indeed, 
be under obligation to the one seeking help or perhaps a member of 
the supplicant's family or from the kin group, lineage, tribe and so 
forth(38 . Thus loyalty to the larger 
kin group is tangible not only in 
terms of mutual assistance, but also in "nepotism", which would occur 
when two or more individuals compete to seek the same goal. 
A. TRTAAi, SURNAME 
The most important facet of the loyalty to a large kin group is 
nominal identity. In the Arab World, a person is often not seen as 
belonging to the city or the community as an individual, but as a 
member of his family and Ashira [tribe], so he takes as his surname 
not the name of the family, as In the West, but the tribal name, e. g. 
Alduleimy referring to the Duliem tribe. Al-zubaidy and Al-nealmy, are 
common tribal names in Iraq, while Rababaha, Al-Khal and Alkhori are 
found in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In Iraq it is common to see on 
shop fronts, tribal surnames sometimes without a first name, e. g. Al- 
Duliemy Company, Al-Jbouri Carpenter. On a smaller scale, sometimes 
people take the name of their city or district, for example Al-Ileety, 
attributed to Ileet city or Al-Basri, attributed to Basra city or Al- 
Adami, attributed to the Al-Adamia district of Baghdad; however even 
this does not indicate loyalty to the city itself, so much as reference 
to some heterogeneous community descended from one original tribe. 
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Tribal surnames are also used in commercial advertisements and in 
politics, to play on tribal loyalty in seeking support. The latest form 
is quite similar to that prevailing in Africa: the kinship bonds are 
put to use in a highly selective way. In Mombasa, for instance, where 
about 90% of the trade union labour belongs to tribal units, the union 
leaders were able to use the appeal to tribalism in gaining union 
support(40). 
Table 6-6 Tribal surname 
Tribal surname Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Important 94 87 84 88.3 
To some extent 6 11 8 8.3 
Not important -- 2 8 3.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 12.5 DF= 4 
The available data might shed more light on the use of the 
tribal surname as an indicator of kin group loyalty. Table 6-6 shows 
that the overwhelming majority of the entire sample regarded the 
tribal surname as important; precisely, 94% of the rural group, 87% of 
the migrants and 84% of the natives. On the other hand, none of the 
rural group said it is not important, while only 2% of the migrants 
and 8% of the natives. 
This result calls to mind Gulick's remark that "the village and 
the city subcultures have many traits in common"(41). Tribal surname 
seems to be one of these "traits in common" in Iraq. 
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The question which arises here is, why is tribal surname so 
important? This question was put to the informants, and their 
responses, as table 6-7 shows, concentrated on two out of three 
choices. The two choices have approximately equal responses, 
especially among urban respondents [both migrants and natives], but 
there are significant differences between the control group [rural] 
and the urban group. 83% of the rural group claimed that tribal. 
surname is important "because it indicates our original roots". The 
remaining 17% said, "because we need it socially". 49% of the migrants 
and 35.9% of the natives referred to original roots, while 51% of the 
migrants and 64.1% of the natives said the name is needed socially. 
No one, in any group, claimed it might be important for another 
reason. 
Table 6-7 Why is the tribal surname so important? 
Why important Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Reflect original 
roots 83 49 35.9 56.0 
Need it socially 17 51 64.1 42.0 
Others -- -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 46.7 DF= 2 
So far the result is to some extent as anticipated, though one 
might ask in what way the name is needed socially. Even those who 
(lid not choose the reason "original roots" have riot abandoned 
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tradition,. as they appear to see tribal surname as a form of identity 
to cope with the common current values and to avoid inferiority in 
society based on the ground of tribalism and traditionalism. Thus, the 
replies to this question give no indication of urbanization, 
modernization or Westernization. 
B. MET)TATTON 
Further evidence to confirm the concept of kinship loyalty and 
nepotism is the frequency of intercession and mediation, which seem 
to be common facets of a society highly respecting kinship ties. The 
advantage of favouring a relative over a non-relative in business is 
to obtain loyalty, trustworthiness and dependability; this may be 
considered more essential than obtaining the best talent available. For 
these reasons, many businessmen and governmental agencies fill 
positions from members of kin groups(42). Gulick (1969) explained this 
phenomenon, stating: 
Because most Middle Eastern villages are small, every 
resident knows every one else personally. To a 
considerable extent city dwellers (both migrants and 
native urbanites) tend to live in a similar, personalized 
environment. Nepotism in government and business is an 
aspect of this kind of interaction, as are the highly 
elaborated courtesies of wastes-- the use of intermediaries 
in adjudicating disputes or in seeking assistance from 
power figures(43). 
Thus the practice of looking for a relative to act as mediator to 
cut through bureaucratic red tape, is widespread. Even though 
contrary to government principles, it is even practiced among those 
who issued the legislation. Mediation is prevalent in Arab society, not 
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only to cut through bureaucracy, but in every other aspect of life, 
including marriage, looking for a job, or obtaining scarce goods. 
Table 6-8 Intercession for relatives 
Do you intercede 
for relatives? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Not hesitate 94 93 87 91.3 
Hesitate 4 6 12 7.3 
Do not do 2 1 1 1.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 5.5 DF= 4 N. S 
To examine this phenomenon, we asked the informants if they 
practice Intercession (mediation) in favour of their relatives. The 
overwhelming majority responded in favour, irrespective of their 
milieu. As table 6-8 shows, 94% of the rural group claimed that they 
do not hesitate to intercede in favour of their relatives, while 93% of 
the migrants and 87% of the natives agreed. On the other hand, only 
2% of the rural group and 1% of the urban group responded 
negatively. 4% of the rural group said that they might hesitate before 
becoming involved in any mediation, compared with 6% of the migrants 
and 12% of the natives. 
The figures confirm our claim, that mediation. Is widespread, 
and is a normal consequence of a society which highly values kinship 
ties. 
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6.5 MUTUAL OBLTGATTON 
As we have seen, the reciprocal obligations of the kinship 
system are not confined to members of the individual household, but 
extend to other relatives: parent-child, brother-sister, cousins and so 
on, extending to encompass lateral relatives: lineage, sub-tribe and 
tribe. In such relationships, kinship loyalty and mutual support are 
clearly conceived as virtues(44). The major and most visible 
reciprocal obligation is among brothers and sisters, as Abu-Zahra 
(1976) pointed out: 
When a man dies leaving unmarried daughters, it is his 
brother's responsibility to arrange these daughters' 
marriage. It is they who are asked for the girls' hands, 
and the eldest brother is responsible for signing the 
marriage contract. During the betrothal and wedding 
ceremonies the father's brother plays all the social roles 
which are usually the responsibility of the father. If 
there are no father's brothers, a father's brother's son (45) 
may play this role. 
The bond between brothers and sisters, remains very close, 
even after marriage. A girl's brothers remain her protectors and a 
safe haven in case of need. Girls are aware that their original 
household is always kept open for them, no matter what happens. 
Thus there reigns in most homes a warm, cheerful atmosphere of love, 
harmony, mutual trust and respect which reflects this feeling of 
security(46). Moreover, a married sister and her children may also 
receive financial support from her brothers if her husband is in 
need. Even if she is not in need, her brothers must visit her on each 
of the two big feasts to give her and her children gifts(47), and pay 
her similar visits on certain occasions such as illness, circumcision, 
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marriage, funeral, mourning rites and so forth. If their sister's son 
becomes involved in a dispute they are expected to support him(48). 
It is obligatory, then, for brothers to assist each other in 
order to maintain the family unity, even if they are scattered in 
different towns and cities. If one of them setting up a new house, 
the other should help him financially or practically. Visits and meals 
are normally exchanged at least weekly, if not daily, especially when 
brothers are clustered in the same quarter of the city(49 . Mutual 
obligations between brothers are the foci of a complex network of 
relationships, which also includes uncles and their sons [on both 
sides of the family]. In Iraq there are many ranks of relatives, and 
priority is often given to those up to the third rank(50); among 
those, the mutual obligations are unlimited, whereas they are confined 
to the main life occasions with others. 
A. EXCHANGE VTSTTS 
No one can exactly understand what Lerner (1958) called 
"empathy" among Arab people, unless he lives and carefully 
experiences this tangible fact. Lerner himself explained it as a result 
of extensive exposure to the mass media of communication(51 . In fact, 
it is a cultural heritage which derives its roots from the patriarchal, 
patrilineal, patrilocal system and extended family , which endeavour 
to maintain the family unit over huge "mutual emotions" rather than 
"emotional despotism". Mutual emotions, protective feeling and 
interdependency, might contribute to reinforcing the continuity of 
strong ties. One of the most important facets of this continuity is 
frequently exchanged visits. Aswad (1974) considered that exchanged 
visits occupied a major portion of time among the elite women in the 
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small Turkish city of "Antakya". These visits are based on the 
principle of balanced reciprocity. Close relatives dominate the 
category visited more frequently, but most visiting between immediate 
relatives is clone on a basis of generalized reciprocity. 
(52). She 
concluded that "The visiting patterns follow crucial intermarriages 
between the elite families"53). Korson thought that kin ties are 
continually reinforced by almost daily visits. He found little 
differences in behaviour and attitude toward this form of leisure 
activity among different social classes. He recorded the experience of 
one professor as follows: 
One university professor, in discussing the importance of 
kin ties, reported that he and his four brothers, all 
married, and all living in the same city, took turns 
visiting one another's home one evening per week on a 
regular basis. These visits included wives and 
children 
(54). 
Despite the fact that members of families are scattered over the 
towns and cities, these people are not forgotten or truly isolated. 
There is always a great deal of travelling about and visiting one 
another. Even a trading trip, as Geertz said, "can be seen as a 
string of family visits"(55). Benedict (1974) mentioned that on certain 
days or the month a family has an open day [Kabul in Turkish, 
Istiqbal in Arabic] to receive relatives and friends. lie defined these 
fixed days as a distinct form of visiting, and he alleged that such a 
phenomenon is known to have been prominent in most Middle Eastern 
countries from Morocco to Turkey, including Iraq(56). However, as far 
as the researcher knows, this phenomenon has not been practiced in 
the last two decades. Urban Iraqi households receive visitors, almost 
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every day. Most of those visitors are relatives. Daily visits among 
close relatives are quite common and even among laterals, reciprocal 
visits are considered an ethical obligation. The best leisure time is 
that spent in visiting relatives, neighbours and friends. Mustafa 
(1990) found that the majority of his informants {81%} in Mosul city 
[northern Iraq] preferred spending their free time in visiting 
relatives(57). A similar result was obtained by Al-Nassar (1990) in 
Baghdad, where more than 90% of his respondents said that they 
spend most of their leisure time in visiting relatives(58). Our own 
data, as shown in table (6-9) confirmed that exchanged visits with 
relatives are indeed a remarkable phenomenon. The overwhelming 
majority of the entire sample claimed that they exchange visits with 
relatives on occasions or otherwise. 93% of the rural group said "both 
on special occasions and otherwise", compared with 77% of the 
migrants and 78% of the natives. A small minority claimed that they 
exchange visits only on the main occasions: 5% of the rural, 21% of 
the migrants and 21% of the natives. The slight differences between 
the three groups do not reflect a sharp contrast between rural and 
urban behaviour. However, exchanging visits with relatives is not 
only an Arabic and Islamic phenomenon, it prevails among many other 
cultures and societies, Gargue (1965) in his study of kinship ties 
among French-Canadians of Montreal, found that the members of the 
broader kin group vary in their position in the formal and informal 
patterns and their closeness to ego's domestic family. These roles 
divide the total kin into a number of subgroups having special 
functions, but the whole kin group exchange visits on formal 
occasions(59). Similar findings were, obtained by Gavrielides (1974) in 
Greece, where most of the relatives, friends and patrons visited each 
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other on formal and informal occasions, such as childbirth, wedding 
and funeral, but large-scale visits took place between close kin such 
as brothers and sisters outside these occasions(60). In urban Africa, 
Southall (1961) describes the diffusion of the kin obligation to assist 
one another and exchange visits with occasion and without occasion 
to fulfil familial obligations(sl). Similar findings have been observed 
in Lima, Mexico and other Latin American cities(62). 
Table 6-9 Exchange visits with relatives 
Exchange visits 
with relatives 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
On specific occasion. 5 21 21 15.7 
From time to time 2 2 1 1.7 
Both 93 77 78 82.6 
Total 1.00 100 100 100 
X2= 13.2 D. F= 4 
Although visiting patterns among relatives are well-known in 
most patriarchal cultures, their level depends on the intensity and 
expansion of traditional values and the level of industrialization. 
However, this phenomenon seems to be more visible in the Arabic and 
Islamic World than any other society. Accordingly, exchanged visits in 
urban Iraq as well as most of Arabic and Islamic societies should be 
taken for granted. 
Another relevant point to be tested, is whether or not those 
visitors give prior notice to the hosts of their intention to pay it 
visit. 
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The data in table 6-10 show that the majority of the informants 
responded positively to the third category, which indicates that 
relatives should not need any appointment to visit each other. 72% of 
the rural group, compared with 70% of the migrants and 47% of the 
natives, held this view. However a significant number prefer visits to 
be by arrangement: 27% of the rural, 29% of the migrants and 41% of 
the natives. 
Table 6-10 Appointment to pay visit 
Appointment to 
visit 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Always 1 1 12 4.7 
Sometimes 27 29 41 32.3 
Never 72 70 47 63.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
x2= 26.9 D. F= 4 
There were significant differences between the three groups, in 
that urban informants are more likely to make arrangements before 
visits. In the researcher's experience, households refer some warning 
when the visitors are not close relatives like brothers, nephews, 
nieces, uncles and aunts, but close relatives can visit any day at any 
time without giving notice of their visits. 
Thus the making of appointments among relatives in Iraq, Is 
not popular, as one might anticipate. This is a normal consequence of 
a society deeply based on kinship ties accompanied with strong 
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emotion, and it will be so as long as the family unity is intact and 
functionally integrated. 
Table 6-11 shows the extent to which the informants make 
appointments before knocking on the doors of the hosts. The data 
indicates that the majority did so "sometimes": 53% of the rural 
group, compared with 45% of the migrants and 52% of the natives. 45% 
of the rural, 45.5 of the migrants and 43.6 of the natives said that 
their relatives gave hints sometimes. 
Table 6-11 Making appointments 
Always or 
sometimes 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Always for me 2 1.8 12.8 5.5 
Always for them -- -- -- -- 
Sometimes for me 53 52.7 43.6 48.8 
Sometimes for 
them 45 45.5 43.6 44.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Although there are slight differences between the rural and 
urban groups, these differences do not reflect a sharp contrast 
between them. However, this result strongly reflects the general 
social context, which confirms the tradition of close relations among 
relatives that would not entail any kind of formal consideration. In 
this context, if one visits a relative without appointment and says "I 
am sorry I have come without telling you first", they often reply " 
No no never mind, it's your home, you are one of our family, you can 
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come and go any time". Emotional blackmail is widely practiced. Hosts 
may be embarrassed when someone visits them without letting them 
know, but will still say "Don't worry, you are one of our family", and 
may insist on his accepting hospitality even if he is coming only to 
ask about something. When he goes, however, they may criticise him: 
"He is rough, uncivilized, he caught us unprepared". Gulick drew 
attention to the practice of emotional blackmail. The man may say " If 
you do not accept my hospitality, it means you do not love me, and I 
will, therefore, act accordingly"(63). This might well explain the 
family's concern with the guest rooms. When one undertakes to build 
a new house, much careful thought is given to the guest rooms. A 
perfect description of the guest rooms in Morocco has been given by 
Geertz. He stated: 
Two of the largest rooms on the ground floor are more 
ornately decorated. The doorway of one is strung with 
varicoloured electric lights, like Christmas decorations, 
and the room is furnished with velvet-covered divans 
and bolsters, a large portrait of the king on the wall, 
and a picture of a young man of the family on another. 
These are the rooms used for entertaining important 
guests, for the long dinners and ceremonial serving of 
tea that are demanded by the Moroccan code of 
hospitality(64). 
Fernea (1970) described the guest house (mudhif) In rural 
southern Iraq, as "a distinctive and characteristic feature of the 
region"(05), He explains its function as a centre of traditional tribal 
political life, and the setting for visitors from other tribes or even 
from the administrative centres of the near cities or the capital(66). 
According to the deep rooted tradition of hospitality in the 
rural areas, urban dweller are always under attack from villagers, 
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who claim that urban natives are miserly and greedy. In their turn, 
urban dwellers who already have a guest room, go to great lengths 
to make it as large as possible, and to decorate it lavishly. 
Table 6-12 shows that 99% of both rural and native groups 
have a separate guest room in their own homes, compared with 91% of 
the migrant group. The data demonstrates that there is no difference 
between the rural and the urban natives. The slight difference in the 
case of migrants can be explained in the light of the housing crisis 
and poverty, which prevails among the migrants who often live in 
Shanty towns. 
Table 6-12 Guest room 
Do you have 
a guest room? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Yes 99 91 99 96.3 
No 1 9 1 3.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X2= 12 D. F= 2 
Accordingly the guest room seems to be very important. The 
people often say "The guest room is the face of the house, it reflects 
the status of the family". Thus the people strive to exhibit the best 
things they have, such as Chinese rugs, T. V and video, strings of 
coloured electric lights, a large portrait of the president, a picture of 
one or more of the males of the family, paintings and so forth. 
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B. OTHER PRACTICAL, OBLTGATTONS 
It is necessary to discriminate between genealogical and 
classifactory kin groups. Among the first, there are real mutual 
obligations, reciprocal assistance, participation in main life occasions, 
mutual protection and they act in many cases as a collective group. 
Among the second, the obligation does no exceed the minimum: mutual 
respect and at best, playing a mediating role to solve problems. The 
blood kin group itself is divided into close relatives, such as 
brothers, sisters, siblings, uncles, aunts and their sans, who share 
strong emotional ties, and lateral relatives who are theoretically 
hound by obligation, but in fact have no broad obligation on the 
practical level. However, priority in everything is given to close 
relatives; for instance, even when a son gets married and lives 
independently, his obligation to give his time to his father takes 
precedence over his obligations or enjoyment in the husband-wife 
relations hip(67). 
The attitude toward close kin is less calculating and impersonal. 
Those who are members of the nominal lineage, who trace their origin 
to the same ancestor or descendants of one grandfather, do continue 
to constitute a corporate group and many others cooperate 
economically. Many wealthy urbanites contribute heavily toward the 
education of their brother's sons, while others permit their father's 
brother's sons to look after some of their interests(68). 
Obviously, kin obligations in the urban Arabic and Islamic 
World are based on both patrilineal descent and marriage. People are 
very aware of their relationship to kinsmen; they employ kinship 
terminology in daily life, and the kinship system is symbolized in all 
life crises, rites and ceremonies. Eickelman spelled out the practical 
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obligation in Morocco, through participation in the activities 
connected with births, circumcisions, weddings, funerals, graduation 
from school or memorization of the Qur'an and protection(69). 
Accordingly, close kinsmen show great solidarity in situations 
that demand help and cooperation, in addition to the social and 
ethical obligations such as consulting one another in the marriage of 
their sons or daughters, contributing to blood money and even in 
showing respect for elders(70 . 
Table 6-13 Relatives' obligations 
Relatives' - Rural% Urban% Total% 
obligation Migrants Natives 
Believe and 
obey 94 91 83 89.3 
Do not believe 
but obey 4 6 15 8.3 
Do not believe and 
would not obey 2 3 2 2.4 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
R2= 9.2 D. F= 4 
For our own data, it was suggested to informants that many 
people do riot believe in relatives' obligation, but they obey under 
certain circumstances. Respondents were asked to clarify their own 
position. As table 6-1.3 shows, the majority claimed that they believe 
in relatives' obligation: 94% of the rural group, compared with 91% of 
the migrants and 83% of the natives. 15% of the natives said that 
they do not believe in relatives' obligation, but obey under certain 
circumstances, compared with 6% of the migrants and 4% of the rural. 
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On the other hand only 2% of the rural group, 3% of the migrants 
and 2% of the natives said that they do not believe and would not 
obey. 
The slight differences between the rural and the urban groups 
might be attributed to some extent to urbanization, and to individual 
differences. Though the data indicate there is widespread adherence 
to the tradition of mutual obligation among relatives, crosstabulation 
of those who do not believe and would not obey with education, 
reveals that education level has affected the attitude toward 
relatives' obligation, especially among the urban group; the two urban 
informants who rejected such obligation, as table 6-14 shows were of 
high educational level, and the three informants of the other urban 
subgroup (migrants) were of middle educational level, while the two 
rural respondents had little education. 
{ 
Table 6-14 Relative obligation and education 
Education Relatives obligations 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Low level 2 -- -- 2 
Middle level -- 3 -- 3 
High level -- -- 2 2 
Total 2 3 2 7 
These figures not give a precise indication, as most of the 
rural group were illiterate while most of the urban group were of 
middle or high level of education. Nevertheless, the figures for the 
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respondents who rejected relatives' obligations are not statistically 
significant. 
Responses to the further question, "Who do you mainly depend 
on, when you are in a financial crisis? ", reinforced the result of the 
previous question, where about three-quarters of the rural group 
and more than half of the natives claimed, as table 6-15 shows, that 
they mainly depend on their relatives, while approximately equal 
numbers of the rest depended on either neighbours or friends. A 
remarkable difference between urban and rural responses is 
demonstrated in the third category, where the natives score more 
than twice the rural ratio (32% compared with 13%). This might be 
explained by the requirements of the urban milieu. 
Table 6-15 Respondents' dependence in financial crisis 
Who do you mainly 
depend on in 
financial crisis? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Relatives 75 71 52 66 
Neighbours 12 13 16 13.7 
Friends 13 16 32 20.3 
Others -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100 
X 2- 15.5 D. F= 4 
in traditional societies, neighbours and friends are often 
relatives who are clustered in the same quarter of the city or in 
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near-by quarters. Gulick draw attention to this phenomenon as found 
in Tripoli (Lebanon): 
It is not uncommon for brothers to wish to live near each 
other. This is, of course, the conventionally proper thing 
to say. If in fact the brothers in successive generations 
of a clan did live close to each other, the result would 
be residential cluster of clansmen(72). 
Actually, there is no salient evidence at the present time of 
such residential clusters. Formerly and in the old districts of 
Baghdad city, the residential areas were divided into tribal quarters 
[see chapter three of this thesis]. Now, although relatives do cluster 
to some extent in certain districts and combine in an overlapping 
network of relationships, this does not occur to the extent it did two 
decades ago; under economic pressures and the housing crisis, the 
convergence of relatives has diminished. However, relative divergence 
does not necessarily imply any breakdown in kinship structure. 
6.6 PEOPT, F'S ATTTTITT)T"; TOWATH) FACTT OTHER AS "KTN" 
The attitudes of people toward each other as "kin" depend 
mainly on two factors: 
- The degree of relationship; a positive attitude associated with deep 
emotion and mutual assistance is felt toward genealogical 
relatives, 
- Economic and political status; when one's economic or political 
status improves, the number of following relatives increase. 
Lateral relatives soon become "cousins", even though some 
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followers may not have seen or be personally known to their 
more influential relative. 
Accordingly, kinship terms are linguistic symbols of kinship 
status. Different status and the quite different interaction patterns 
between them, call for various types of behaviour or attitude on the 
part of any one individual. In Gulick's words: 
The kinship system seems to revolve around this 
question: must there be a one-to-one correspondence 
between the patterns of "lumping" and of differentiation 
of certain relatives in any one kinship system, and the 
prevailing behavioural and attitudinal patterns concerning 
relatives in the culture which uses that system? 
(73) 
In this regard, individuals are identified by kinship, usually by 
familial and tribal affiliation. Men and women always identify 
themselves as belonging to a certain family and tribe(74). In general, 
our respondents conformed to this traditional view; relatives are very 
important and highly valued. Nevertheless, there were some gestures 
of dissent. For instance, opposition to first cousin marriage arose 
among many people in both rural and urban groups(75), and many 
people are rethinking the behavioural rule that "You should side with 
your brother in any dispute, regardless of whether he is right or 
wrong". The question then arises, to what extent is public opinion 
revising the traditional norms and changing its attitude toward 
relatives? The data might shed more light on this point. 
As shown in table 6-16, the informants were asked to reply to 
the statement, "I would side with my brother against my paternal 
cousin, and with my paternal cousin against any stranger". The 
majority of the whole sample agreed with the content of the 
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statement: 92% of the rural group, 91% of the migrants and 82% of the 
natives. The sample responses show non- significant differences 
between the three groups (X2= 6.1. D. F= 4). This conforms with the 
literature, where brothers, father's brothers and father's brothers' 
sons are strongly connected and give each other unique support. 
Only 2% of the whole sample disagreed with the statement. 
Table 6-1.6 Attitudes toward brothers and paternal cousin 
I would side 
with my brother... 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Agree 92 91 82 88.3 
To some extent 7 7 15 9.7 
Disagree 1 2 3 2.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 6.1 D. F= 4 N. S 
This result, indeed, indicates that the sample's attitude is 
consistent with the traditional norms of family ties and obligation, 
and this might be reflected to some extent in the whole social 
organization. 
To check the reliability of this result, we asked the informants 
to respond to another statement expressing a negative attitude, 
"Relatives are scorpion-like". The result, as table 6-17 shows, again 
indicates conformity toward traditional norms among the majority; 72% 
of the rural group, 71% of the migrants and 67% of the natives 
disagreed with the statement, while 3% of the rural, 7% of the 
migrants and 9% of the natives agreed. 
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Table 6-1.7 Attitudes toward relatives 
Relatives are 
scorpion-like 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Agree 3 7 9 6.3 
To some extent 25 22 24 23.7 
Disagree 72 71 67 70.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 3.3 D. F= 4 N. S 
However a remarkable proportion of the three groups agreed 
"to some extent" with the proposition: 25% of the rural group 
compared with 22% of the migrants and 24% of the natives. This 
ambivalent attitude may be explain in terms of the conflict between 
two cultures (traditional and modern), so that many people have 
partly accepted the new culture while being still strongly held by 
the old, creating a dualism. Dualism is very common in the Arab World 
by virtue of continuation of the kinship system alongside 
urbanization, westernization and industrialization. On the other hand, 
as a consequence of residential clusters, many problems and quarrels 
might arise explaining the comment which is sometimes heard, "Do not 
approach your relatives, their scorpions will bite you"(76). 
Turning to the data, the figures show no significant differences 
between the three groups (X2= 3.3 D. f= 4), which means that their 
similarity of view is greater than the differentiation between rural 
and urban informants. 
To clarify the informants' attitude towards relative ties and 
obligation and to reinforce the two previous statements, the 
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researcher asked the informants to react to another statement, "A 
man's only relative, is his money". 
Table 6-18 Attitude toward relatives 
A man's only 
relative is his 
money 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
Agree 11 13 16 13.3 
To some extent 20 29 23 24.0 
Disagree 69 . 58 61 62.7 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 3.7 D. F= 4 N. S 
The result as shown by table 6-18, manifested some similarity 
with the responses to the previous question, which reflects the 
importance of the kinship system to both rural and urban dwellers. 
The majority in each group, with slight differences, responded that 
they "disagree". More precisely, 69% of the rural group, compared 
with 58% of the migrants and 61% of the natives had this view. On 
the other hand, 1.1% of the rural group, 13% of the migrants and 16% 
of the natives agreed. Once again, a sizeable proportion of the 
informants agreed "To some extent": 20% of the rural, 29% of the 
migrants and 23% of the natives. Indeed, economic status, even in 
traditional societies, is highly valued, even though the majority of 
the sample reflected social orientations based on the conventional 
attitude toward relatives. One hears everywhere in the Arab World, 
particularly in Iraq, that, "Money is not every thing; money comes 
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and goes, but relatives are the only permanent capital", or "Money is 
the. dirt of life, we do not live to collect money, but on the contrary 
we spend money to maintain our ties to serve each other", or "I 
would not exchange my relatives with all the earth's treasures; they 
are my back-belt". 
From these findings, people's positive attitudes toward each 
other as "kin" seem to he highly prevalent in the urban setting in 
Iraq. It is not just an individual attitude, but a cultural construction, 
so the individual's attributes and actions may only be understood in 
term of kin group membership, or in Rosen's (1979) words: 
In societies characterized by sharply delineated 
corporate groups, the attributes and actions of a 
particular individual may, to a great extent, be 
understood in terms of the conditions and 
consequences of group membership(77). 
6.9 CONCLUSTON 
It might be thought that the traditional kinship system could 
not coexist with urbanization. It would be diminished to the minimum 
or die completely, especially outside the conjugal family. However this 
is not the case in the Third World, or even, to some degree in 
wealthy Far Eastern countries such as Japan and Korea. 
In the Arab World, kin groups have remained alongside 
urbanization and Industrialization, contrary to Wirth'ci theory. Studies 
throughout the Middle East, have shown that the kinship system has 
remained healthy and is highly valued, not only in the rural, but also 
in the urban environment. 
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In this chapter the researcher has attempted to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the kinship system in the urban milieu in Iraq. 
Firstly the data reveal that marriage among relatives is highly 
preferred in both rural and urban areas. There is, of course, no 
written law compelling one to marry among his relatives, but the 
conventional system has strong influence reinforcing intermarriage. 
According to the figures, about 54% of the natives have married 
among their relatives, about 30% of them married a parallel- cousin 
and 44% of them married a cross-cousin. The result indicates that 
parallel cousins are not so strongly preferred as was once the case, 
but the data demonstrate that a sizeable proportion of the informants 
still prefer intermarriage. The reason in the researcher's experience, 
is not only to maintain the family property or for a low bride-price 
as the literature has asserted, but also because people think a wife 
chosen from among relatives might show greater support and loyalty 
to her husband than a non-relative. Moreover, the woman is assured 
greater stability in her marriage, because no one would expect a 
husband (who is always regarded as the protector) to divorce his 
blood-kin wife. 
As regards the impact of education and occupation on 
orientation toward intermarriage, the data reveal non-significant 
differences between those of high level and low level of education, 
and between rural and urban occupations. 
Secondly, the investigation focused on loyalty and nepotism 
among kin groups through two facets, tribal surname and mediation. 
Regarding the first, the information revealed that tribal surname is 
very important, not only as a nominal identity, but also as a 
reflection of kin loyalty. The overwhelming majority of the urban 
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informants claimed that tribal surname is "important", while a small 
minority said it was "not important". In response to the question, 
"Why is tribal surname important? ", the rural informants gave the 
priority to the first option, "It reflects our original roots", while the 
urban respondents gave priority to the second option, "We need it 
socially". The result indicates that urban dwellers accept the tribal 
surname as a form of identity to cope with the common values and to 
avoid inferiority in a society heavily based on tribalism and 
traditionalism. 
Regarding the second aspect, the data reveal that mediation is 
widely practiced among relative groups to cut through the 
bureaucratic red tape of the governmental administration as well as 
in aspects of social life including, marriage, looking for jobs and so 
forth. According to the figures, 94% of the rural informants claimed 
that they do not hesitate to intercede for their relatives, compared 
with 90% of the urban respondents. (X2) shows no significant 
differences between them. The results confirm the researcher's 
anticipation and at the same time represent a normal consequence of 
a society which highly values kinship ties. 
Thirdly, the analysis was concerned with mutual obligation as 
reflected in exchange visits and other practical obligations. Although 
visiting patterns among relatives are well-known in many societies 
and cultures, the phenomenon is more visible among Arab and Muslim 
peoples; our own data show that the majority of the sample, both 
rural and urban informants, frequently exchange visits with their 
relatives, both on special occasions and otherwise. About two-thirds 
of them said that relatives do not need a preceding warning or 
appointment to visit each other; relatives, especially close relatives 
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could knock on the door any day, at any time, and the hosts are 
often delighted because a large number of visitors reflects the high 
status of the hosts. This might explain the exaggerated concern given 
to the gust room, or "Mudif". Everyone, rural or urban, poor or rich, 
Muslim or non-Muslim, gives the guest room priority when building or 
furnishing a house. Thus the data show 99% of the rural and urban 
dwellers equally have a separate guest room. 
Other practical obligations are widely seen among relatives: 
financial support, practical help, exchange of gifts, and many other 
kinds of mutual help. Thus one can depend on his relatives when he 
meets with some crisis. In our study, more than 60% of the urban 
respondents claimed that they mainly depend on their relatives in a 
financial crisis, while only 2.5% of all urban informants said they do 
not believe in relatives' obligations. Thus relatives' obligations seem 
to be highly valued and widely observed. 
The fourth concern was how the informants express their 
attitudes towards each other as "kin". In practice, their attitudes 
towards each other depend mainly on the degree of relationship and 
on economic and political status; whenever the relatives are either 
close or of high economic and political status, positive attitudes seem 
to be more visible, as reflected in the proverbial statement, "I would 
side with my brother against my paternal cousin and with my 
paternal cousin against any stranger". The overwhelming majority of 
the sample, both rural and urban agreed, while they rejected the 
unfavourable statement "A relative is scorpion-like". In another 
unfavourable statement, "A man's only relative is his money", the 
result was approximately similar to the preceding one. 
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Finally, kinship ties in Iraq, as in all Arab countries, in rural 
and urban areas alike, remain intact, not only among the conjugal 
family, but also elaborated to encompass large aggregations: extended 
family, lineage, subtribe and tribe. Genuine obligations are practiced 
to maintain the blood ties which seem to be a normal consequence of 
a society characterized by corporate groups. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEIGHBOURS AND 
NEIGHBOURHOOD 
7.1 TNTRODUCTTON 
Sociologists and anthropologists are accustomed to describe the 
ideal type of individual contacts in cities as transitory, anonymous, 
segmental and impersonal, comparing with intimate and personal in 
rural areas. In the advanced world of surplus economy, with large 
and complex institutions such as clubs, associations, hobby and work 
groups, it is possible to live for many years in a certain 
neighbourhood without knowing even one's next door neighbour. The 
house itself is used almost like a hotel, only for eating and sleeping. 
In such cases, local community communication might diminish to the 
minimum, or even ultimately disappear. In contrast, in the less 
developed world, local aggregations kinship, neighbourhood and 
friendship- often prevail. Cultural tradition, together with religious 
commandments play an essential role in keeping local community 
contact intact. 
Thus, this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the following 
points: 
- Neighbour relationships 
- Mutual obligation 
- Neighbours and social control 
- Attitudes toward neighbours 
The analysis focuses on the social rather than physical aspects 
of the neighbourhood, as modern trends in the latter do not always 
reflect people's behaviour and attitudes. For example, many people in 
the Arab World live in modern houses of Western style, but they act 
and behave like villagers. Like the family and kinship, neighbourhood 
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is considered one of the most important elements in the structure of 
the local community. Thus, the picture of Arab urban life will be 
made more complete by looking at this component of the local 
community, as a theme of analysis, to test our main assumptions. 
7.2 NFTGHAOUJRHOOD AS A SOCTAL COMPONENT 
It might be quite difficult for someone who was born and lived 
all his life in an industrial culture to imagine the pattern of 
neighbourhood that prevails in less developed countries. Westerners 
often do not regard the neighbour, hood as any more than a number of 
people living beside each other or near each other in one block or 
district. One may not know his next-door neighbour, and neighbours 
do not interfere in each other's lives. Thus neighbourhood, under 
such circumstances, does not mean more than a physical aggregation 
of individuals. As Anderson spelled out: 
The neighbourhoods are now said to be "open" while the 
homes are more "closed" than formerly. The 
neighbourhoods still exist but the neighbourly lack of 
privacy has been replaced by more discrete relationships 
and restraint(l) 
This description purported to depict the rural neighbourhood 
in Western culture. So the privacy, secrecy and strain would be even 
more effective in an urban milieu. Daily travel to work may break 
down the strong neighbourhood feeling. Mann (1965) compared the 
house's function with that of a hotel by saying: 
The comparison with an hotel is , of course, too extreme 
to be real but the meaning is significant, that the young 
person uses the home as a centre from which he, or she, 
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will go out to a wide variety of interests, the home 
having the principle function of providing a place to 
sleep and eat(2). 
Two things tend to work against strong neighbourhood ties: 
high mobility and wives' continuing in work after marriage(s). 
If one considers the neighbourhood in physical terms, then it 
is viewed as a place covering a limited area, bounded by streets, 
railway line or parks separating off an area and its inhabitants, or 
where historical and social tradition make people view an area as a 
distinctive unit(4). Indeed, the neighbourhood is more than an 
ecological form, it contains inhabitants having something in common. 
This, to some extent, gives them a collective character, which affects 
and reflects people's feeling about living there and the kind of 
relations they establish(5). 
Many sociologists have emphasised the importance of physical 
attributes(6). However, the researcher has to take physical features 
for granted, and view the neighbourhood in the light of people's 
interaction, relationships and their general orientation toward each 
other. 
The neighbourhood as a social rather than a physical 
environment is almost invisible in highly industrial cultures, since 
mass production, high technology, transportation and improved 
communications have led to privacy, alienation and fast mobility. 
Intimate relationships, face to face contacts with mutual rights and 
obligations prevail in the less developed world. 
In Butler's terms, there are two types of neighbourhoods: 
neighbourhoods of primary relationship and neighbourhoods of 
secondary relationship(7). 
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In an urban community with reference to Western culture, 
certain areas that might be called neighbourhoods do not have 
primary group character. Such areas may still be called 
neighbourhoods, but natives in new African towns have no other 
conception of community life than that of the primary contact 
neighbourhood of the villaget8 . 
As a consequence of highly urbanized societies and 
disappearance of strong neighbourhood feelings, both "alienation from 
society" and "alienation from self" are strong features of normal life, 
so that people cannot relate to the world around them(9). This 
phenomenon is not evident in those parts of the world which maintain 
primary ties. 
In the urban Arab World, as well as in most urban settings in 
the Third World, neighbours and close friends with whom one has no 
genealogical links can be referred to and treated as kin. Religious 
values might be one of the most important factors impelling people to 
maintain close relationships with neighbours. The Prophet Muhammad 
is reported to have said, " Repeatedly Gabriel advised me to do good 
to my neighbour till I thought he would make him heir (of my 
legacy]" and "He is not a believer who eats his fill while his 
neighbour goes without food"(10). Cohen recorded Arab people's 
impressions of religious obligation towards neighbours: 
Despite the increase in population and the expansion of 
housing, neighbourliness, apart from kinship ties, has its 
own values and norms in village culture. The villagers 
say that the prophet Muhammad ordained the good 
treatment of nei hbours, as far as the seventh house 
from one's own( 
1 l5. 
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This view has also been confirmed in urban areas. Thus, 
selection of neighbourhood areas is a matter for care, because the 
house is the main focus of leisure and recreation, as there is little 
entertainment outside the home, or in Gulick's words "... relatively 
little social life out of their own [or friends' or relatives'] private 
homes"(12). Common proverbs which might shed more light on this 
point are: 
- Ask about your neighbours before you build your house. 
- Your neighbour is your refuge. 
- Your next-door neighbour is better for you than your far-off 
brother. 
- As long as your neighbour is prosperous you will be prosperous 
too. 
- God and your neighbour are the only two who know your affairs 
best(12). 
Accordingly, neighbours come next to one's own immediate 
family and before more distant relatives. People frequently repeat 
"Your neighbour, your neighbour and your brother" referring to the 
importance of neighbours, who have priority over one's brothers. In 
this regard, neighbours are to some extent an extension of the 
domestic circle, when it comes to needing help, or simply company. 
From this point of sentiment, neighbour relationships are strongly 
binding, involving exchanges of meals, gifts, visits, and many other 
obligations similar to those seen among close relatives. Saunders 
(1980) described such position: 
In Mirria a neighbourhood is to some degree an extension 
of the domestic sphere of its residents. A wife who never 
goes to market may pay day-time visits to the compound 
next door, or sit at her own doorway to chat. Many 
activities, such as marriage, involve several households 
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but less than the entire community. Marriage decisions 
privately made within two households must be followed by 
public ceremonies which involve only a portion of the 
Mirria community primarily neighbours and kinsmen of 
the newly-weds(13). 
Such entertainments and participations of neighbours prevail 
everywhere in the Arab World. In Cairo, as Almessiri reported, 
neighbours enjoyed the collective spirit on several occasions; this is 
clearly seen in marriages and funerals: virtually every individual in 
the neighbourhood (Hitter) should participate in the newly-weds' 
celebrations; in funerals most of them follow the coffin to the mosque 
and complete all the relevant rituals, as well as giving moral and 
material support to the dead person's family. Both occasions are 
regarded as common occasions, which entail a sizeable number of 
supporters and followers from the neighbourhood residents(14). 
In Mosul city [northern Iraq] Mustafa found that the urban 
neighbourhood plays a significant part In the life of its residents(IS). 
7.3_ NFTGHnoURS RELATTONSTTTPS 
Despite the complexity of urban life, as a result of size of 
population and expansion of residential areas, neighbourhood remains 
one of the most important prevailing groups in Baghdad. Although 
many individuals complain of neighbours' intervention in their 
domestic affairs: lack of privacy, gossip and snobbery, many of them 
can not imagine life without neighbour interactions. One can often 
hear such expressions in Baghdad as, "Paradise without people is 
unbearable", or " Alienation is death without a coffin". Woman have 
extensive contact with neighbours. They often spend many hours a 
day in gossiping. In the researcher's experience, informal 
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relationships among neighbours are very evident, even among the 
high class; one can easily go back and forth to one's neighbour's 
house any day, at any time. Neighbours help each other not only in 
emergency, but also in ordinary daily life. 
The data of table 7-1 which concerns the quantity of 
neighbours' contact, demonstrate that daily contact is highly 
prevalent in the urban milieu. The figures reveal that the majority of 
all informants claimed that they have relationships with more than 
four households of their neighbours; precisely, 95% of the rural 
group, 73% of the migrants and 53% of the natives. The data reveal 
significant differences between the three groups (X2= 47.7 D. F= 6). 
Table 7-1. Relationships with neighbours 
How many Neighbours 
do you have 
relations with 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
None 1 -- 2 1.0 
Only one 1 2 3 2.0 
2-3 3 25 42 23.3 
4> 95 73 53 73.7 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 47.7 D. F= 6 
The only way to explain these sharp differences is through the 
impact of urbanization. Urbanization, however, does not demolish or 
even diminish neighbourhood as a primary group, as more than half 
the natives and three-quarters of the migrants extended their 
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immediate contact to more than four of their neighbours, while most 
of the rest had relationships with 2-3 of their neighbours. Only one 
percent have no contact with neighbours at all. 
The latter figure has no statistical significance. Thus the 
overwhelming majority of the sample had direct relations with more 
than one neighbour up to more than four, despite the differences 
between the three groups, which seem to disappear if we merge the 
third and fourth categories. However, the result demonstrates that 
direct contact with neighbours is pervasive in the rural and urban 
milieu alike. This result is consistent with that underlined by Cohen, 
who claimed that Arab people frequently repeat that the Prophet 
ordered them to respect their neighbours till the seventh house; and 
that entails daily informal contact between them(16). The common view 
is that the boundaries of the neighbourhood extend to encompass 
one's seventh neighbour and no more; beyond that, it becomes a 
district: Mahla, carat, Kara, narb in local words. 
To complete this picture we asked the informants, "What form 
of relationship would you prefer with neighbours? ". The overwhelming 
majority of the entire sample, claimed that they prefer intimate 
relationships with neighbours, as table 7-2 shows: 93% of the rural 
group, compared with 91% of the migrants and 69% of the natives. 
The downward tendency of the three groups in attitude to intensity 
of relationships reflects a growing tendency among the natives to 
prefer superficial relationships, compared with the rural group: 30% 
of the natives, against only 7% of the rural and 9% of the migrants. 
This result revealed a significant difference between the three 
groups (X2= 27.4 D. f= 4), which can be explained in the light of 
urbanization which entails high motivation to mobility and privacy. 
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However, even this is a very small proportion, compared to the large 
number who prefer intimate relationships. Moreover, even those who 
replied that they prefer superficial relationships, in practice are not 
isolated or under strain, and they do not suffer alienation, because 
traditional values remain healthy and active, so if they do not have 
contact with neighbours, then they do with relatives and friends. 
Table 7-2 Form of relationship with neighbours 
Form of relationship 
with neighbours 
Rural% UJrban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Superficial 7 9 30 15.0 
Intimate 93 91 69 84.3 
No relations -- -- 1 0.4 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 27.4 D. F= 4 
Activities and occasional participation with neighbours give rise 
to a number of more or less strong links among neighbours, which 
might account for significant differences, especially as the informants 
in general have no desire to cut off relationships with neighbours, 
except for one individual (0.4% of the sample) who Is not statistically 
significant. In this context only four decades ago in the United State 
of America, Foley (1952) found that about three-quarters of middle 
class residents of Rochester, New York City, had at least chatting 
relationships with other people in the block, while two-fifths of the 
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informants said that such relationships extended to all the residents 
in the block-neighbourhood (t7 ). 
So far, in terms of contact, urban neighbourhood in Iraq, is 
regarded as a strong, intimate and personal relationship, and there is 
a marked absence of privacy, strain, and alienation, as a result of 
traditional values prevailing. This image is quite similar to that found 
by Pons (1970) in Africa, where despite the diversity and increasing 
heterogeneity of the urban population, the fabric of social relations 
remained relatively uniform, and social cohesion continued to be 
predominantly communal rather than associational(18). 
7.4 MUTUAL OBLTGATTONS 
On the individual level, political, financial and psychological 
crisis, in addition to collective emergencies: marriage, funeral, and 
illness, constitute the main occasions for neighbouring. These 
occasions entail mutual obligations, some of which are regarded as 
universal. For example, among the working class in a North German 
industrial suburb, participation in funerals is considered a universal 
obligation, help in sickness more or less universals but joining in 
marriage or religious celebrations are more properly matters for the 
particular families involved(19). 
Obviously, neighbours are expected to help each other in times 
of need, help in emergency, exchange tools and equipment, visit 
informally, ask advice and chat(2»). In highly industrial Japan, Dore 
(1958) found that neighbours' informal relationships are carried on 
even in the capital, Tokyo, itself. Neighbours express complete trust 
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in each other, lend and borrow freely and act as guardians of each 
other'-, houses, health and reputations(21). 
A. NFTGNROURNOOI) RIGHTS 
The ideal-type situation of neighbours is sufficiently compact to 
permit frequent and intimate association and a strong sense of self- 
consciousness, and is capable of influencing the behaviour of its 
several constituents. Thus there is an awareness of mutual rights and 
obligations between the group members if they are to be so 
influenced. This self-consciousness is backed up by the homogeneity 
of the neighbour community(22). 
To test this assumption in practice we asked the informants, 
whether or not they practice the norms that reinforce mutual rights. 
The data in table 7-3 are based on the question, "Do your neighbours 
respect neighbourhood rights? ". The respondents reacted relatively 
similarly to the three given options: 67% of the rural group said that 
they "always" respect neighbourhood rights, compared with 63% of 
the migrants and 52% of the natives. 32% of the rural group said 
they do so "sometimes", compared with 36% of the migrants and 46% 
of the natives. Only 1% of the rural group, and 1.5% of the urban 
(both migrants and natives) said that they "rarely" did. 
The result shows that the majority of the sample, with non- 
significant differences between rural and urban groups, thought that 
neighbours "always" respect each other rights. Such a response is 
quite expected in a traditional society such as the one under study, 
where everyone is aware of the importance of neighbourhood ties and 
local norms. 
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Table 7-3 Respect of neighbourhood right 
Neighbourhood 
rights 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Always 67 63 52 60.7 
Sometimes 32 36 46 38.0 
Rarely 1. 1 2 1.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 5.2 D. F= 4 N. S. 
Accordingly one should be very polite, respectable, and careful 
in one's behaviour with neighbours. Moreover it is a moral duty to 
ask about one's neighbours, if one has not seen them for several 
days; visit them in serious illness; help them whenever they need it; 
share with them in sorrow and happiness; protect and take side with 
them against any attack or dispute and even consult them in many 
other cases. This interdependency prevails in both the rural and 
urban milieu. These norms play a key role in community activities and 
are used as criteria by which people evaluate each other. 
B. EXCHANGE VTSTTS 
There was no precise information about how frequently 
neighbours are in contact with each other, so the researcher 
proposed to inquire into this, suggesting a range from weekly to 
yearly. Firstly, however, informants were asked whether or not they 
exchange visits with their neighbours. According to the responses 
shown in tale 7-4 the overwhelming majority of the whole sample 
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replied in the affirmative. All of the rural and migrant respondents 
said they frequently exchange visits with their neighbours, as did 
98% of the natives. Only 0.77. responded negatively. This non- 
significant proportion can be explained in the light of individual 
differentiation. However, the uniformity of the informants' responses 
reflects the tendency of the social organization. 
Table 7-4 Exchange visits among neighbours 
Exchange visits 
with neighbours 
Rura % Ur. band 
Migrants Natives 
Totals 
Yes 100 100 98 99.3 
No -- -- 2 0.7 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 4 D. F= 2 N. S 
To complete the picture an enquiry was directed toward the 
frequency of visits. The responses reflect considerable diversity. As 
table 7-5 shows, the figures are sharply stepped downward from left 
to right: 93% of the rural group exchange visits once or more a week, 
compared with 68% of the migrants and 57% of the natives. Although 
the figures reflect significant differences between the three groups, 
as (X2) demonstrated, a remarkable proportion (72.7%) of the three 
groups said they exchange visits more than once a week. The rest 
(27.3%) visit a few times a month. None, however, chose the third 
Category, "a few times a year", which would be regarded as a real 
criterion to indicate disordered relationships between neighbours. The 
result reveals the intense and intimate relations among neighbours. 
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Even the 2 individuals who rejected the idea of exchanged visits with 
neighbours in the previous table, changed and responded like the 
others, reflecting the effectiveness of traditional values. 
Table 7-5 Frequency of exchange visits among neighbours 
Frequency of 
visits 
Rural, % Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Totai% 
Once a week or more 93 fib 57 72.7 
Few times a month 7 32 43 27.3 
Few times a year -- -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 34.2 D. F= 2 
According to Mustafa's fieldwork in Mosul city (northern Iraq), 
the majority of his sample spend a good part of their free time in 
exchanging gossip with neighbours(23). A similar result was found in 
Africa by Parkin (1969) who claimed that the neighbourhood unit is 
more significant for women than for men as a field of contact. He 
stated: 
Women in the town often admit to long leisure hours 
during the day and may gather at a water tap or in 
front of a neighbour's house and gossip from early in 
the morning until shortly before the younger children 
come home from morning school. Much of the preparation 
for meals: the peeling of vegetable or plantain, or the 
brewing of tea, is done out of doors and provides 
additional contexts for the exchange of gossip(24). 
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Daily visiting between neighbours, relatives and friends is a 
normal result of a society heavily based on conventional values, 
especially in the shanty towns and to a lesser degree, among those 
who reside in more affluent areas. 
C. EXCHANGE MEALS 
The exchanging of meals is an aspect of the firm tradition of 
the Arab World particularly Iraq. The phenomenon is not confined to 
religious occasions such as the feast month (Ramadan), though it 
increases on such occasions, compared with other times(25). This kind 
of contact is very important in maintaining neighbourhood obligation, 
alongside urbanization and modernization, which have started to some 
degree to permeate the social structure, undermining some of the 
tradition. Nevertheless, such conventional acts remain intact, as our 
own data reveal. 
According to the content of table 7-6 , the majority of the 
rural group, 63%, claimed that they frequently exchange meals with 
neighbours, compared with 47% of the migrants and 34% of the 
natives. 36% of the rural group said they exchange meals with 
neighbours "sometimes", against 53% of the migrants and 64% of the 
natives. Only 1% of the rural group and 2% of the native said 
"rarely", while none of the migrants did so. 
The significant differences between the rural and urban 
groups, do not negatively influence the result, in that 99% of the 
whole sample claimed that they exchange meals with neighbours ei ther 
frequently or sometimes. 
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Table 7-6 Exchange meals between neighbours 
Exchange meals Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Frequently 63 47 34 48.0 
Sometimes 36 53 64 51.0 
Rarely 1 -- 2 1.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 18.6 D. F= 4 
D. MIITUATS HELP 
Despite the differentiation in quality and degree, help among 
neighbours seems to prevail not only in the Arabic and Islamic world, 
but also in many other societies, including highly urbanized societies. 
Mann described neighbours' assistance in Britain, in serious illness 
and at other times. In his words: "Help in sickness and distress is 
often given in cases other than emergencies" 
(26). 
Studies conducted over the last several decades show that this 
source of help is relatively unchanged in its dimensions; Fralnd et al 
(1981. ) summarized the importance of helping networks to individual 
health and well-being as follows: 
Individual caregivers in an individual's personal network, 
made up or family, friends and neighbours, remain the 
primary reference point for those seeking and obtaining 
help .... An individual's social network is a major factor in 
defining the nature of problems, providing help, 
influencing what sources of outside help will be obtained, 
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and aiding in adjustment to a wide range of acute and 
S(27). chronic problem, 
Thus, Hallman (1984), considered the neighbourhood web of 
social relationships as a "treasure" in dealing with life's problems(28). 
Dennis (1963) recorded the experiences of some urbanized people of 
neighbourly help, particularly in emergency situations such as illness. 
He quoted the following: 
Mrs X, Mrs Y and Mrs Z made the meals, cleaned the 
house, saw to the doctor's instructions, did the washing, 
looked after the children, did the shopping. No gifts, no 
payment, only "thank you"(29). 
Sharing equipment, exchanging loans and shopping for each 
other are other facets of the informal relationship among neighbours. 
The data displayed in table 7-7 show whether respondents help their 
neighbours. The information reveals that all of the rural and migrant 
groups claimed that they do help their neighbours, as did 99% of the 
natives. 
This result reflects a complete conformity between rural and 
urban respondents, which can be explained, once again, in the light 
of cultural unification. 
It can be concluded that neighbours can never hesitate to do 
what is necessary to help each other. Traditionally help is regarded 
as a moral duty. Neighbours are often treated as family. Indeed, as 
Cohen claimed that most neighbours are relatives: "Splitting 
households tend to continue living in close proximity to each 
other" (30), but there are many others classified as non-relatives, who 
are viewed always according to the same norms. 
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Table 7-7 Do neighbours help each other? 
Neighbours help Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Tota1X 
Yes 100 100 99 99.7 
No -- -- 1 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 2 D. F= 2 N. S 
When we asked about the form of help, the informants 
responded in different ways. As table 7-8 shows, the majority of the 
Sample, with non-significant differences between the three groups, 
claimed that they help their neighbours in all the given items: "All 
these things"; precisely, 78% of the rural group, compared with 72% 
of migrants and 63% of the natives. Meanwhile, among the other items, 
"Using equipment" takes a remarkable proportion of the responses; 
13% of the rural group, 19% of the migrants and 27% of the natives 
said they exchange and share equipment, while the other options 
(shopping, lend them money) received fewer responses. The result 
reveals that primary relationships among neighbours are very strong. 
In this regard Gulliver (1971) asserted that any neighbour who would 
like to render assistance and gain reciprocal rights should readily do 
so, and due to the conventional values all the members of the 
community could wish to commit themselves to the reciprocal 
obligation(31). In a study of neighbourhoods in the Detroit area 
conducted by Warren (1981. ), informants were asked about recent 
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concerns not requiring high expertise for solutions. Example were 
felling blue or tense, thinking about retiring, going back to school, 
changing jobs and suspicious people in the neighbourhood. For help, 
married persons turned most frequently (82%) to their spouse: 42% 
used co-workers as helpers. Other helpers were friends (41%), 
relatives riot living in the same household (37%), immediate 
neighbours(27%) and less than 8% were a variety of professional 
workers: police, doctor, teacher, counsellor. Except co-workers, most 
of these helpers were within the neighbourhood. When the informants 
asked if they had been helped by neighbours during a life crisis in 
recent years, 56% said they had(32 . 
Table 7-8 Form of help among neighbours 
Form of help Rurale Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Tota1X 
Shopping 2 5 5 4.0 
Using equipments 13 19 27 19.7 
Lend them money 7 4 5 5.3 
All these things 78 72 63 71.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 9.2 D. F= 4 N. S 
In many traditional societies, a wide range of cooperation and 
mutual aid is given whenever it might be needed. Such assistance 
often occurs voluntarily or spontaneously among close kin and 
neighbours. Neighbourly relations are significant in terms of 
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exchanging equipment and services. In this regard, Holy (1974) has 
pointed out: 
A women can ask any of her female neighbours for 
embers to light a fire, and she may borrow from her 
neighbour a pot or other needed item... A man living 
alone is not forced to do women's jobs such as cooking 
or preparing millet beer, thus exposing himself to 
ridicule, for he may fully rely upon help of his 
neighbours(33). 
Accordingly, mutual assistance among neighbours is really a 
matter of daily life, not only in rural areas such as that described 
above, but everywhere in the Arab World. The people who help each 
other are mainly close neighbours or may be relatives. This view is 
reinforced by our own data as well as by the theoretical constructs 
of writers like Hallman (1984), who considered the neighbourhood 
community as: 
a people possessing shared values, common interests and 
norms of conduct, engaging in social interaction and 
mutual aid, having their own groups, associations and 
institutions to help meet their basic needs(34). 
E. PARTTCTPATTON 
To go further, such types of interaction, including involvement 
in mutual assistance, interests, common values, reciprocal rights and 
obligations, are quite tangible in Iraqi urban areas. To clarify this 
point, we asked the informants, "Do you participate with your 
neighbours in the main life occasions, such as marriage, illness, 
funerals,..? ". The data in table 7-9 reveal that the overwhelming 
majority of the whole sample, with slight differences between rural 
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and urban groups, claimed that they "always" participate with their 
neighbours in main life occasions: precisely, 93% of the rural group 
compared with 90% of the migrants and 78% of the natives. On the 
other hand only one individual among the native group said "rarely". 
This exception can only be explained in the light of individual 
differentiation. 
This result confirms the preceding findings which reveal the 
continuation and effectiveness of the primary relationships among 
neighbours in urban life, which reflect the influence of the 
traditional values, despite urbanization, modernization and 
Westernization. 
Table 7-9 Participation with neighbours in the main life occasions 
Do you participate 
with your 
neighbours? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Tota1X 
Always 93 90 78 87.0 
Some times 7 10 38 12.7 
Rarely -- -- 1 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 12 D. F= 4 
Further evidence was obtained by asking the informants, "Do 
you call on new neighbours? ". The answers reveal significant 
differences between the three groups. Nevertheless, as table 7-10 
shows, the vast majority said "yes": 97% of the rural group compared 
with 94% of the migrants and 78% of the natives. The highest 
proportion of those who replied negatively were among the natives; 
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22% compared with 3% of the rural and 6% of the natives. The only 
way to explain such an increase of negative responses among natives 
is either that they deal with new neighbours with some suspicion (as 
unknown), as a result of subordination to the requirement of 
urbanization, or they express their hospitality in other ways. However 
such a reaction is riot found, or is very limited, among the rural and 
migrant groups, who regard a new neighbour as a new guest, who 
should not tire himself in cooking for three to seven days. All the 
neighbours will either invite him for dinner or cook for his family. 
Although the majority of the natives follow the tradition of 
calling on new neighbours, in some of the most urbanized areas in 
Baghdad, in the researcher's experience, this tradition has been 
modified; two or three days after his arrival, the neighbours pay him 
a visit, bringing a suitable gift. This, like the traditional custom, 
helps to maintain neighbourhood ties and norms. Thus, the traditional 
virtues of neighbourhood relations are preserved, though the 
influence of urbanization and Westernization has led to some 
modification of customs and daily habits. 
Table 7-10 Calling on new neighbours 
Do you call on 
new neighbours? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Yes 97 94 78 89.7 
No 3 6 22 10.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 22.5 D. F= 2 
279 
In this sense Patai pointed out: 
The phenomenology of Westernization is sufficiently well 
attested, and it would be a relatively simple task to draw 
up a long list showing what traditional features in the 
Middle Eastern culture have been replaced in the course 
of the past 100 or 150 years by what new features 
introduced from the West. (35) 
7.5 NFTGNAOIIRS AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
Social control is a term used to designate social behaviour 
which influences individuals or groups toward conformity with 
established norms. It is exercised by groups, both formal and 
informal, and by institutions or other social agencies. Conformity is 
the favourable response to social control. Thus there are many forms 
and methods of control and different degrees of conformity. Much of 
this depends on the extent to which the ways of behaving of groups 
or society are repeated for generations and formulated into ritual, 
symbolized linguistically, or crystallized in social customs and 
habits(36). Informal social control prevails in traditional societies, 
including the one under study, hand in hand with formal control, but 
the informal type seems to be more visible and more effective. As 
Patai stated: 
In traditional Middle Eastern society, social control and 
political organization are based on family ties, or at least 
are modelled after the structural pattern characterizing 
the family(37). 
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In such societies, the parallelism between familial and social 
order goes even further. Everyone has to exercise self-control to 
avert a clash with neighbourhood norms. Since the family is based on 
a community tradition, one's freedom is restricted whenever it 
conflicts with the freedom of others. Thus one should be careful in 
his behaviour and act in such a way as to maintain kinship, 
friendship and neighbourhood ties. 
However, this is not only a matter for individuals, it is also a 
familial one. Both individuals and family have to act conventionally to 
maintain the family's reputation. The family, for instance, should 
suspended its own celebration, if there is any, when their neighbour 
is in mourning; or at least they should celebrate silently. People 
often make a distinction between rough and respectable neighbours. 
The respectable ones are home-centred, conventional and morally more 
consistent and controlled, while the rough are often disorganized and 
unconventional in manners and morals(3$). The latter are strongly 
criticised and may be exposed to social ostracism, and it is extremely 
difficult for such an individual or family to restore their harmony 
with neighbours, even if they desire to regain their position by 
adhering to norms of behaviour. 
Although ne ighbourhood in traditional societies seems to be 
homogeneous, with cooperative interactions to cope with the informal 
social control, people are very sensitive toward each other as a 
consequence of curiosity, snobbery and intrusion. Thus one should be 
very careful in his behaviour to avoid the criticism of neighbours, 
who watch and may interfere in small and big issues. In this regard 
neighbours are considered an active social control device. To test 
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this attribute in practice, we asked the informants whether or not 
they take care of their behaviour to avert neighbours' criticism. The 
information of table 7-11 shows that the overwhelming majority of the 
whole sample, with non-significant differences between the three 
groups, claimed that they do their best to avoid neighbours' 
criticism: precisely 97% of the rural group compared with 95% of the 
migrants and 97% of the natives. No one said they "never" do so, and 
only 3% of the rural and the natives and 5% of the migrants claimed 
to do so only "sometimes". 
This result reflects the tendency of the whole society, not only 
the sample, where everybody should direct his behaviour in 
conformity with the community norms. 
In traditional society, jealousy and gossip are common as a 
consequence of direct contact between neighbours. This phenomenon 
might lead to conflicts and dispute, often created by women and 
children, who are more frequently in interaction with neighbours than 
men(39). Thus one should do his best within the scope of the 
expected roles, to avert gossip. This phenomenon might play a latent 
role in exercising reciprocal social control, helping to sustain the 
common standards(40). In this regard Keller pointed out: 
Gossip, or the transmission of scandalous information, 
reaffirms the distinction between respectable and 
disreputable conduct and thus helps promote latent 
consensus on manners and morals(41). 
Accordingly, close contact among neighbours is a general 
criterion for maintaining social standards of correct beliefs, helps 
reaffirm accepted standards and thus contributes to social 
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integration (42). Gossiping and spying upon each other may play an 
essential role as informal means of social control(43). Accordingly, 
ambivalent feelings may emerge, of caution and love, leading to 
anxiety. 
Table 7-11 Avoidance of neighbours criticism 
Avoidance of neig- 
hbours criticism 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Always 97 95 97 96.3 
Sometimes 3 5 3 3.7 
Never -- -- -- -- 
Total 100 100 100 100,0 
X2= 0.7 D. F= 2 N. S 
7.6 NEIGT(ROURS' ATTITUDES TOWARD FACH OTHER 
Despite the negative attributes which emerge as a consequence 
of direct daily contact, neighbours are still held in respect and 
affection by their local community. Religious instruction might play an 
essential role in maintaining neighbourly ties and keeping up the 
traditional values; in turn reflected in neighbours' attitudes toward 
each other. 
However neighbours' attitudes in traditional societies are more 
than like and dislike; they are based on strong emotions and 
attachment, not only toward residents but also toward residence. In 
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Baghdad one hears people say, "I was born in this neighbourhood 
and I would like to die in it", or "This is my birth place and should 
be my grave". Thus when people select a residence, they are facing a 
big decision. Moving house is difficult because of the strong emotions 
of attachment to place. Nevertheless, they have to consider, as 
Hansen (1975) said, " many variables" 
(44). Ideally they give priority 
to their neighbours: their reputation, behaviour, and relationships 
with others. Then they might think about the other ingredients such 
as accessibility to major roads, convenience for work, public 
transportation, shopping, parks, schools and so forth. 
In this regard, neighbours' attitudes toward each other are 
often based on the feeling that human beings tend toward 
aggregation, sociability and contact rather than scattering, privacy 
and alienation; exchanged help and information rather than self- 
sufficiency and segmentation. Thus one should be friendly, helpful 
and tolerant with his neighbours to obtain internal peace and good 
will. Matthews (1966) recorded the impressions of a Tennessee Ridge 
community, who reckoned the great sin of omission was to fail to be 
helpful to members of their neighbourhood(45). Cohen and Shinar 
(1985), in an empirical study of the neighbourhood and friendship 
network in Jerusalem, found that in response to the question, "Who 
are your three best friends? ", 35% of respondents named at least one 
friend in the neighbourhood 
(46). In another empirical study in 
Pittsburgh, the researchers discovered that about two-thirds of the 
5,896 respondent; felt more loyalty to their neighbourhood than the 
city(47). Gulick noticed that many people who had moved from houses 
in the old city of Tripoli (Lebanon) to newer sections had mixed 
feelings about the move. Most of them, except those who moved 
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voluntarily, regretted leaving their former neighbourhood residence, 
claiming that they had lived in their neighbourhood for a long time, 
and their friends were there. Nevertheless they tended to form ties 
with their new neighbours, as a continuation of their positive 
attitudes toward neighbours(48 . In this regard, Almessiri noticed that 
residential mobility out of or into neighbourhood areas in Cairo is 
very limited, because of the phenomenon of residential emotion(49). All 
these studies reveal that people almost everywhere, held positive 
attitudes toward neighbours, whom they regarded as family or 
friends. 
In Iraq, people's attitudes toward their neighbours are not 
solely governed by residence, but are associated with deep emotions. 
In the case of movement from one area to another in the city, people 
do not forget or ignore their previous domestic relationships with 
their former neighbours. They often keep in touch with each other; if 
they do not exchange daily or weekly visits, then they inevitably 
ring each other and participate in the main events of life: marriage, 
illness and so on. 
This does not mean that attitudes are always positive. Of 
course, there are some negative attitudes on the individual level. 
However, generally, attitudes are more positive than negative. The 
data in table 7-12 might shed more light on this point. The table is 
based on the question, "How do you regard your neighbours? ". The 
first or the three options "like my family" obtained the majority of 
the responses; 82% of the rural group claimed that they regard their 
neighbours like their families, compared with 61% of the migrants and 
56% of the natives. 
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Table 7-1.2 Attitudes toward Neighbours 
How do you regard 
your neighbour? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Like my family 82 61 56 66.3 
Like my friends 18 39 43 33.3 
Like strangers -- -- 1 0.4 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 18.5 D. F= 4 
Despite the significant differences between the three groups 
(X2= 18.5 D. F= 4), the attitude toward neighbours was very positive. 
The responses, in fact, to some extent reflect the nature of residence. 
For those in rural areas, neighbours are often literally relatives, as 
families cluster together in one area. Thus the rural group responded 
more positively to the first option. In contrast, relatives in urban 
areas might be scattered in different districts in the city. Thus, the 
urban informants responded more positively to the second option 
compared with rural anti migrant groups. Only one individual from 
the urban group responded negatively, "Like any other stranger". 
The result is consistent with the findings of many studies in Arabic 
and Islamic societies, where neighbours are reckoned to some degree 
an extension of the domestic sphere of its residents. 
In Iraq, in the researcher's experience, people often regard 
their neighbours like family not only in conversation or exchanging 
help, but also in sharing secrets, visiting freely any time, and 
interdependence in daily life as well as in emergencies. The common 
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expression in this regard is, "What happens to your neighbour 
happens to you. If they get happiness, you get your share, if they 
get sadness, you have to get it as well". Another saying is, "Your 
neighbour is your brother, except he was not delivered by your 
mother". For this reason, Abu-lughod asserted that social life in the 
city (Cairo) is based more and more on the immediate neighbourhood 
group(5'». Almissiri recorded some people's attitudes toward 
neighbours and neighbourhood in Cairo. She reported that one said, " 
Living in a neighbourhood is like living in a private kingdom; 
censorship is very tight, and no stranger can look down on us, so I 
would not like to leave my neighbourhood". Another said, "Everybody 
in the neighbourhood knows each other; the children know each other 
as well as the parents; it is like a village"(51). 
To confirm the extent of positive attitudes toward neighbours 
we asked the informants to respond to the statement, "When a man 
wants to buy or rent a house, he should ask first about the 
neighbours". The responses, as table 7-13 shows, revealed significant 
differences between the three groups. Precisely, 77% of the rural 
group gave their agreement with the statement, compared with 66% of 
the each division of the urban group. The neutral category, "To some 
extent" received a remarkable proportion of the informants' 
responses: 1.2%, 28% and 33% from rural to native respectively, while 
the third category, "Disagree", received a small response: 11% rural, 
6% migrants and 1% natives. 
The question here is why the rural group gave more agreement 
compared with migrants and natives, when one might expect the 
opposite. This can be explained by the fact that rural residents are 
more conventional. Thus, as a principle, rural respondents have to be 
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more cautious in renting or buying a new house. On the other hand, 
rural residents often reside in areas where most of the population 
are kin, so they do not need to ask about neighbours, as everyone 
knows each other. 
Table 7-13 Attitudes to neighbours revealed in buying or renting a 
new house 
Do you ask about 
neighbours when you 
buy or rent a new 
house? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
Agree 77 66 66 69.7 
To some extent 12 28 33 24.3 
Disagree 11 6 1 6.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 19.3 D. F= 6 
However, the three groups showed great interest in the 
neighbourhood issue, when choosing a new house. That is, of course, 
because the house is not only for eating and sleeping, but is the 
focus of all the family entertainment, because of the seclusion of 
women and the lack of public amenities and entertainment. This might 
be why Gulick said that there is little social life outside the private 
home (52). 
On this basis, in renting or buying a new house, one is often 
guided by friends or relatives who are located there and know the 
house and the neighbourhood. However, if the move is arranged by a 
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local agency, the purchaser or tenant can be advised by the agent, 
as to what action to take if the neighbours are not as described, and 
one might leave the neighbourhood if he find unsuitable neighbours. 
These attitudes are confirmed by the figures, which reveal that in 
such a position, traditional factors are more effective than 
modernization. 
Further evidence was obtained by asking the informants, "Do 
you think it is possible to ignore neighbours? ". The responses reveal 
significant differences between the three groups, but the majority of 
the three groups claimed that "it is impossible". 75% of the rural 
group compared with 57% of the migrants and 41% of the natives gave 
this response. On the other hand only one per cent of each of the 
rural and migrant groups said it is "possible", compared with 3% of 
the natives. However the "sometimes" category received a significant 
proportion of the informant's responses, especially among migrants 
and natives: 42% and 56% respectively. The statistical criterion 
reveals that the ability to ignore neighbours increases with urban 
characteristics. To explain this point, we need to remember what we 
mentioned before: rural areas often encompass kin groups; they share 
the same characteristics, interests, values, norms and other 
behavioural aspects. In brief, they live a homogeneous way of life, 
that is not always possible in the city, where one's kin might be 
scattered over large areas of the city, in different neighbourhoods, 
classes, associations and work groups, with different interests, norms 
and way of life. This variety in the city might impel its dwellers to 
react in different ways, according to their interests, despite the 
dominance of the traditional values, which seems to be common factor 
between them. In any case, the proportion of those who felt able to 
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ignore their neighbours, even among urban respondents is very 
small. 
Table 7-14 The possibility of ignoring neighbours 
Can you ignore 
neighbours? 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Tot l% 
Possible 1 1 3 1.7 
Sometimes 24 42 56 40.7 
Impossible 75 57 41 57.6 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 24 D. F= 4 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
It does not seem, from these results, that traditional values and 
behaviour are vanishing from the urban milieu. Our own investigation 
in this chapter demonstrates that such values are still firmly held in 
the city, and influence many dimensions of behaviour. Even in highly 
urbanized countries which have already replaced primary contract, 
with a secondary one, some features of these contacts are relatively 
tangible. In the Third World, especially in the Arab World, friends 
and neighbours who have no genealogical links can be referred to 
and treated as kin. One, can easily observe and recognize the strong 
emotion accompanying the informal chat, mutual help, reciprocal rights 
and obligation and positive attitudes even in urban settings. Our case 
in Iraq emphasized that informal contacts and face to face 
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relationship remain the major focus of social interaction. The figures 
demonstrated that more than half of the urban informants have 
intimate relationships with more than four of their neighbours, while 
about three quarters of the urban informants claimed that they 
prefer deep relationships with their neighbours and they act 
accordingly. The result reflects the deep-rootedness of the traditional 
values, despite the atrophy of the population and expansion of 
residential areas, as a consequences of the urban explosion. Even the 
minority who said they prefer superficial relationships with 
neighbours, do not suffer loneliness or alienation, because intimate 
ties still stand, if not with immediate neighbours, then with close kin 
and friends. 
Evidence of primary relationships between neighbours was 
found by discussing and analysing mutual obligations among 
neighbours. In conventional societies such as that under study, the 
parallelism between familial and social order may go further; every 
one has to exercise self-control, not as a response to civil law, or 
formal institutions, but to avert a clash with the neighbourhood 
community. The family, for instance, has to suspend its celebrations 
when close neighbours (up to the seventh house) are in mourning, 
and they will offer support if one of their neighbours becomes 
seriously ill. Moreover, neighbours often behave toward each other 
politely, respectfully, and helpfully. They will side with each other 
against any outside attack. 
These facets were discussed in relation to mutual rights, 
exchanged visits, meals and help. The information showed that more 
than 55% of the urban respondents claimed that their neighbours 
"always" respect neighbourhoods rights. 99% of the urban group 
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often exchange visits with their neighbours, while more than 60% of 
them do so once a week or more. More than 80% of the urban 
informants frequently or sometimes exchange meals with their close 
neighbours, 99.5% of them help their neighbours, by shopping, 
loaning equipment, lending money, or all these things, and more than 
85% claimed that they "always" participate with their neighbours in 
the main life occasions. These results reflect once again the intensive 
and intimate relationships between neighbours, which are quite in 
conformity with those prevailing among their rural counterparts. 
Evidence was also found of the role of neighbours as a social 
control device. The homogeneity of the neighbourhood community does 
create large-scale harmony, but at the same time leads to sensitivity 
as a consequence of face to face contact, curiosity, snobbery and 
intrusion. Thus people are very careful in their behaviour to avoid 
gossip and criticism, which are reckoned as active informal social 
control. Looking at the statistics, we found that about 96% of the 
urban informants said that they "always" review their behaviour to 
avoid neighbours' criticism and gossip. 
Finally, we considered how neighbours saw and evaluated each 
other; in other words, what sort of attitudes prevail among them. 
Despite the negative attributes which might prevail as a consequence 
of daily direct interaction, positive attitudes seem to be more visible 
in urban neighbourhoods in Iraq. For instance, when moving to 
another section of the city or to another city, neighbours often keep 
in touch with each other, if not by exchanging visits from time to 
time, then, by telephone. The data revealed that more than 58% of the 
urban informants regarded their close neighbours like their families; 
66% thought and asked about the neighbours before undertaking to 
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buy or rent a new house. To go further, the researcher asked the 
informants if it is possible to ignore neighbours. Only 2% of the 
urban informants said it is. The result reflect the widespread positive 
attitudes among neighbours toward each other, as a consequence of 
deeply rooted traditional norms which are maintained in urban as well 
as in rural life. The impact of modernization and Westernization seems 
to be very limited in the face of this extensive and strong tradition. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SOCIAL TIME 
R. I. TNTROOUJCTTON 
We have been concerned in the previous chapters, to show that 
traditional values prevail in urban life in Iraq. This chapter 
continues with this theme, looking at the use and abuse of social 
time. 
In practical terms, time is of less importance in Iraq compared 
with the Western stereotype. The rhythm of life as a whole in the 
Middle Eastern countries is slow, because of the overlapping of rural 
and urban values, and the predominance of the agrarian values, 
which are maintained not only in family, kinship and neighbourhood 
patterns, but also in temporal behaviour. Despite urban expansion, 
the city often reflects the rural rhythm. For instance, when a rural 
individual would like to visit his relative or neighbour, he will often 
say, "I would like to visit you tomorrow'. At best he might add, "In 
the after noon", while a city-dweller might add " When the weather is 
better". For the rural person, the appointment is open from midday 
to midnight, while for the urban one it refers to the time between 
four o'clock in the afternoon and nine or ten o'clock at night. That 
is, if they give notice at all; often people call on each other with out 
warning. In an official's apartments, friends and relatives commonly 
pay visits, spending on unlimited time -one, two, or three hours- 
taking cup after cup of coffee and tea, while the people outside wait 
for the private visit to end. 
Accordingly, the concept, "time is money", widely hold and 
adhered to in industrial culture, seems to be far away from the 
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attitude of traditional societies , not only in appointments, but also in 
general orientation toward past, present and future, as well as in 
work and leisure time. 
These points will be tested in this chapter by reference to the 
informants' attitudes, under the following headings: 
- Time perception: lateness and punctuality. 
- Work and leisure time. 
- Temporal orientation. 
- Social time as a dependent variable. 
However, it should be noted that the analysis focuses on social 
time as an aspect of social behaviour and not as an independent 
variable. 
8.2. FROM SACRED TO SECULAR TIME 
The concept of time as a criterion by which to study social 
behaviour is a relatively recent development in the social sciences(1). 
Time, in the past, was closely connected with mythology. It has been 
conceived as "the medium of sacred history. Time was thought of, but 
more often celebrated, as a sequence of specific events that befall a 
chosen people"(2). On this basis, one can not understand events by 
considering people and physical environment only; it is necessary to 
consider three interrelated components-. 
_ 'people, 
place and time, In 
this context Werner (1988) pointed out: 
Rituals and other sermonised and ritualized activities can 
readily be seen as transactional unities. They involve 
particular people in particular roles, with particular 
environmental features such as objects, places, settings 
and the like. in addition, rituals are explicitly temporal in 
that they involve a past and a likely future, as well as 
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the present enactment; they often occur with particular 
frequency and regularity, for particular lengths of time 
and so on. 
(3) 
The Durkheimian school Is regarded as the first group of 
sociologists to develop the sociology of time. They based their notions 
about time on the sacred and cyclical phenomena exhibited in 
traditional societies( 4). Durkheim himself posed the question, "What is 
time? " and concluded that time without processes, divisions, 
measurement, succession of hours, days, months and years, seems to 
be incon. ceivable(5). Durkheim's linkage between time and social 
activities impelled his followers to continue the study he began in 
"Elementary forms of religious life", focusing on the qualitative 
nature of social time in religious rituals. Marcel Mauss emphasised 
that the representation of time in religion and magic rituals points to 
its social origin(6). 
In brief, the Durkheimian school paved the way to the sociology 
of time and proposed a basic theoretical approach. From his 
departure point onwards, the concept of social time emerged. Time 
had a specifically social dimension; it was derived from social life(7 . 
Many pioneers, such as G. H. Mead, Sorokin, Gurvitch, Merton, 
Causer and others made extensive efforts to study social time, either 
in the micro or in the macro context. The common ground among them 
related to their theoretical approach: the dimension of time, the 
movement of social phenomena, temporal orientation and social 
change(8). Sorokin and Merton for instance, underlined duration and 
indication of time as a reflection of social activities or group 
achievement(9). Gurvitch (1964) defined social time thus: 
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Social time is the time of convergency and divergency of 
movements of the total social phenomena, whether the 
total social phenomena are global, group or micro-social 
and whether or not they are expressed in the social 
structure. The total social phenomena both produce and 
are products of social time. They give birth to social 
time, move and unfold in it ... social time thus can not 
be 
defined without defining the total social phenomenon(10). 
Gradually, successive empirical studies moved towards building 
up a picture of secular time, the time of everyday life, by using 
monographs, questionnaires, interviews and participant 
observation(1i). Pronovost summarizes social time themes which 
became the object of study as follows: 
An increasing specialization in themes and perspectives 
can he observed along with the variety of work. 
Particular times have become the object of study, such as 
working or school time, cycles and constraints within 
family time, and leisure time. ... collective memory, time 
patterns according to one's place in the life cycle, the 
management of time and the diversity of presentations of 
the past, present and future. Age groups and social 
classes, men, and women, worker., peasants and the 
unemployed, are among the many social actors whose time 
patterns are studied(12). 
On this basis, the concept of social time has became more 
secular, as fieldwork has taken place and created a world-wide 
perspective. 
8.3. SOCTAT, TIME TN TRADTTTONAT, SOCTETT ES 
Most of the efforts of sociologists and anthropologists have 
been directed toward describing and understanding tithe dimensions 
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of non-Western cultures and societies(13). Thus most social scientists 
who consider time in relation to culture saw it as an aspect of 
culture, not an independent variable(14). 
In fact, all human events and activities take place in time and 
time is always used as a criterion to control these activities, but 
people react to, refer to and use time in different ways, according to 
individual differentiation and cultural variety. In this regard Bock 
(1969) stated: 
Every culture provides a series of temporal categories 
and relationships in terms of which persons may orient 
themselves and coordinate their activities. And as with all 
things cultural, the categories of time found in one 
society are partly arbitrary, differing from those of other 
societies in significant ways(15) 
A long time ago, Malinowski studied time-reckoning in the 
Trohriands. He found that the people reckoned time in practical as 
well as sentimental ways; practically, time can he fixed by reference 
to some recurrent natural phenomenon which can be foreseen and 
defined; important and dramatic incidents, such as a year of famine, 
serious disputes within the community, a slave raid, or head-hunting 
expedition which can be remembered for a long time. It is viewed 
sentimentally, in relation to the solar movements or many other 
astronomical elements, such as the succession of seasons, the trade 
and monsoon winds, and so on(16). In his study about time and social 
structure in the Ashanti culture, Fortes (1970) followed Malinowski, 
defining social time function through three dimensions: duration, 
continuity and growth process, which reflect people's activities 
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according to natural events which have happened or might be 
expected(17). 
Most traditional societies conceive time to some degree 
dependent on natural and sentimental phenomena rather than 
recognition. In a recent study about time in the black culture, Jones 
(1988) defined five dimensions of human experience: time, rhythm, 
improvisation, oral expression and spirituality. These dimensions 
reflect basic ways in which individuals and cultures orient themselves 
to living. In time and rhythm, he found significant differences 
between the Euro-American and Afro-American perspectives. The main 
difference is that while the Euro-American focuses on the present as 
a threshold to future goals, the Afro-American view present goals 
more and more in terms of the past as a source of reference(18). 
Levine (1988) displayed a dramatic differences in pace of life between 
peoples from different cultures. He described the highly 
industrialized culture (North America and Northern European nations) 
as a prototypically fast culture(19. He depicted its tempo as follows: 
The value of promptness, the sense that time is it 
commodity not to be wasted, and the need to make every 
minute count have been seen as particularly 
characteristic of people from the United States, Germany 
and Switrerland(20). 
In contrast, cultures such as the Navajo Indians, traditional 
Mediterranean Arabs and Latin Americans are described as slow 
cultures, which are not concerned with exactness and do not feel the 
need to make every minute count(21). , all (1977) . termed American 
time as "monochronic". Overseas Americans suffer psychological stress 
when confronted by the polychronic time system prevailing in Latin 
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America and the Middle Eastern countries. In the markets of the Arab 
World, one is often surrounded by other customers vying for the 
attention of the clerk, with no order as to who is served next, and to 
the northern European or American, confusion and clamour 
ahound(22). 
One of the most important studies about social time in an Arab 
community was made by Bourdieu (1963). Although it is an old one, or 
even out of date, like the study of Evans-Pritchard about the Nuer 
in Sudan, it is considered a basic attempt which still makes a rich 
contribution to interpretation of temporal behaviour. On the other 
hand it reveals that social change which encompasses most aspects of 
social life, seems to have less effect on the value system. Bourdieu 
emphasized that the Kabyle community of Algeria lives at the rhythm 
of nature and the ritual calendar; submission to nature is inseparable 
from submission to the passage of time as seen in the rhythms of 
nature. The Kabyle submission to the passage of time is such that no 
one dreams of mastering, using up or saving time(23). Moreover most 
of their activities are not subordinated to the requirement of 
civilization promptness, exactness or punctuality. In his words: 
All the acts of life are free from limitations of the time- 
table, even sleep, even work which ignores all obsession 
with productivity and yield 
(24). 
As in Algeria and all Middle Eastern countries, Iraqis use time 
with little concern for its value; no one deals with time as being 
saved, spent, wasted, or lost, even among the highly educated. 
Sometimes, people and institutions schedule Important activities and 
projects, but do not accomplish them on schedule, because they do 
not look to time as a value, as does the Westerner, who acts 
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unconsciously according to the rule that "time is money". In fact, the 
people claim to believe that time is gold, or that time is like the 
sword; if you do not cut it , it cuts you. However in practice, they 
act against such ideal-types, as we shall see. 
8.4 TTMF PFRCFPTTON: LATENESS AND PUNCTUALITY 
Every society, whatever its state of development, has a 
perspective of time, not only as an independent variable, but also as 
a cultural theme, used to coordinate human activities, relationships 
and interactions. Despite cross-cultural differentiation toward time , 
human beings share such notions as before , after, during and so on. 
People often arrange themselves, their relationships, objects and aims 
accordingly in everyday life(25). Nevertheless, people's attitudes 
toward time differ markedly according to cultural variety. Some 
societies might see time as "gold", other as a "pastime" and others as 
"something mysterious, passing and everything goes older". 
Table 8-1. reveals some features of Iraqi people's attitude 
toward social time as a criterion to coordinate their activities. The 
attitude of the majority of the whole sample toward lateness, was 
convergent. Precisely, 49% of the rural group responded positively to 
the statement, "It is no problem to be ten minutes late for an 
appointment with friends", compared with 63% of the migrants and 
64% of the natives. if we look at responses in the "strongly agree" 
category, the rural group seems to be more liberal toward delay 
behaviour; 18% of them replied thus, Icompared with 14% of the 
migrants and only 4% of the natives. However, merging "strongly 
agree" with "agree", the result is remarkably reversed; the migrants 
and natives become more tolerant of delay than the rural group, 
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Various possible explanations may be made for this. It may be that 
the rural respondents like to appear well-urbanized and so claim to 
respect time, or perhaps they have no need for appointments because 
they are often closely related. On the other hand the urban 
respondents might often be delayed by transportation difficulties; 
sometimes the departure of the bus may be as much as an hour 
behind schedule. 
Table 8-1. Delay behaviour in an appointment with friends. 
It is no problem 
to he ten minutes 
late 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
S. Agree 18 14 4 12.0 
Agree 49 63 64 58.7 
N. opinion -- -- -- 
Disagree 28 14 31 24.3 
S. disagree 5 9 1 5.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 24 D. F= 6 
In general, people whether in the rural or urban milieu, do not 
view appointmenLs as something important. This result is consistent 
with Hall's view. He emphasized that Middle Eastern people often do 
not give appointments the same weight as is given by those from 
Europe or the United States(26). Levine (1988) told a funny story 
about two Afghan brothers who had agreed to meet each other in 
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Kabul, but neglected to specify what year and what time. He 
concluded, that lack of concern with exactness in time is pervasive in 
traditional societies 
(27). Levine and West (1980) in a comparative 
study about time and punctuality in Brazil and the United States, 
found that Brazilians were more often late for appointments and social 
gatherings. Brazilians expressed less regret over being late. 
Americans had more negative attitudes toward a person who is 
frequently late, and rated punctuality as a more important trait in a 
colleague or friend than did Brazi]ians(28). He concluded: 
Our original notion that Brazilians are less concerned 
with lateness and are more frequently late received 
empirical confirmation(29). 
Table 8-2 Late for work 
I have never seen 
my colleague late 
for work 
Rural% Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
S. Agree 4 7 1 4.0 
Agree 26 30 31 29.0 
N Opinion 2 2 -- 1.2 
Disagree 57 52 64 57.7 
S. Disagree 11 9 4 8.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 11.5 D. F= 8 N. S 
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Similarly, when respondents were faced with the statement, 
"I 
have never seen my colleague late for work", the figures of table 8- 
2, shows that the highest concentration of the responses was located 
on the negative side of the continuum; 57% of the rural group, 52% 
of the migrants and 64% of the natives said they "disagree". This 
means that the majority of the respondents have actually seen their 
colleagues late for work. By merging the two negative categories, the 
ratio rises to three-quarters of the whole sample. Because the 
statement was not personally directed, attitudes were revealed 
frankly and clearly. 
This result reflects the stereotype of traditional cultures, 
where time is not so important. In this respect, Levine and Wolff 
(1985) compared the time sense of 91 male and female students in 
Niteroi (Brazil) with that of 107 similar students of California State 
University in Fresno. They found that on average, Brazilian students 
defined lateness for lunch as 33.5 minutes after the scheduled time, 
compared with only 19 minutes for the American students. However, 
Brazilians allowed an average of 54 minutes before they considered 
someone early, against 24 minutes to the Fresno students. They 
concluded that Brazilians are more flexible in their concepts of time 
and punctualit y(30). 
In a field study in Baghdad (1981) the present researcher 
found that about 30% of his total sample used to delay a few minutes 
for work time. Most of them thought that a few minutes lateness does 
not affect the running of the work. Some of them claimed that they 
are sometimes forced to delay because of unforeseen . circumstances 
beyond their control, such as difficulties of transportation, home 
problems, illness of children, meeting friends and so forth(31). 
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A. EXACTNESS AND APPROXIMATE TIME 
Lateness and delay might give some indications about exactness, 
which requires that a high value be put on time in every day 
behaviour. Traditional culture often has a slow rhythm with less 
concern about time. Levine described the Brazilian people's lack of 
exactitude, in his anecdote about his first day's visit to Niteroi 
(Brazil). He wrote: 
I asked someone the time. It was 9: 05 a. m, which allowed 
me time to relax and look around the campus before my 
10 o'clock lecture. After what I judged to be half an 
hour, I glanced at a clock I was passing. It said 10: 20 ! 
In panic, I broke for the classroom, followed by gentle 
calls of "Nola, Professor" and "Tudo bem professor? ", 
from unhurried students, many of whom, I later realized, 
were my own. I arrived breathless to find an empty room. 
Frantically, I asked a passer-by the time. "Nine forty- 
five" was the answer. No, that could not be. I asked 
someone else. "Nine fifty-five". Another said, "Exactly 
9: 43". The clock in a nearby office read 3: 15. I had 
learned my first lesson about Brazilians: Their timepieces 
are consistently inaccurate. And nobody minds(32). 
Levine's description of Brazilian inaccuracy, indeed, completely 
conforms to the situation prevailing in Arab World and in Iraq 
particularly. The available data might stied more light on this fact. 
The informants, as shown in table 8-3, were asked to respond to the 
statement, "The best way to meet one another is at an approximate 
time". The highest concentration of responses was in the positive 
categories; 58% of the rural respondents, 54% of the migrants and 57% 
of the natives agreed with the statement, i. e. a majority of 56.3% 
prefer "approximate time" instead of exactness. In the researcher's 
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experience, urban residents in Baghdad, even those who are highly 
educated, prefer to indicate approximate time when arranging to meet. 
Common expressions are, "I will see you between six and eight p. m", 
or, "Wait for me for an hour; if I don't come, you can be free". 
Accordingly, they seem to have little concern for accurate or exact 
time. 
Table 8-3 Exactness and approximate time 
The best way to 
meet other is 
at an approximate 
time 
Rural Urban% 
Migrants Natives 
Total% 
S. Agree 6 16 5 9.0 
Agree 58 54 57 56.3 
N. Opinion -- 2 -- 0.7 
Disagree 35 25 38 32.7 
S. Disagree 1 3 -- 1.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 18.7 D. F= 8 
Further evidence is provided by responses to the statement, 
"One does riot need a diary to arrange his activities". A diary Is an 
indication of the need to control time in daily activities. In Iraq, 
people do not usually use a diary even professionals, officials and 
those who have had a Western education. As one said, "I do not need 
an extra mind, my memory is enough". 
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The data in table 8-4 shows a significant proportion of the 
informants agreed that a diary is not necessary; about 70% of the 
whole sample either have negative attitudes towards using a diary or 
have no opinion about it at all, with significant differences between 
the three groups (X2= 59 DF= 8). 
The diary, however, reflects a clear relationship between 
general attitudes toward activities and time spent on them(33). 
Activities in the urban milieu are more varied than in rural areas. 
Thus the use of a diary to arrange those activities is more likely to 
occur in the city than in the village, especially in traditional cultures 
such as the one under study. 
Table 8-4 Using the diary to manage activities. 
One does not need 
a diary to arrange 
his activities 
Rural% Urband 
Migrants Natives 
Totals 
S. Agree 12 14 7 11.0 
Agree 35 33 28 32 
N. Opinion 32 40 9 23.0 
Disagree 20 11 54 27.3 
S. Disagree 1 2 2 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100,0 
X2= 59 D. F= 8 
Turning to the data, about half the native Informants had 
positive attitudes towards using a diary. Although attitude to some 
degree reflecLR actual behaviour, expressed attitudes do not always 
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correspond with behaviour. In the researcher's experience, in a 
traditional society such as the one under study, it is important to 
discriminate between words and deeds, as many people, if not the 
majority, behave in ways quite different from those indicated by 
their words. In our case as in many others, verbally, respondents 
express the value of using a diary, but in practice, they do not do 
so. This interpretation might explain the remarkable proportion of 
positive attitudes towards using a diary, in both settings. 
B. TTMF-BhJDGFT 
Time-budgeting first took place in the advanced World, starting 
in the USSR in the 1920s. The aim is to measure and describe, how 
time is actually used, usually on a daily basis(34). Accordingly the 
time-budget is a process for managing time by redistribution of all 
parts of social and individual time, to enable individuals, institutions 
and society as a whole to use time in a way suited to their needs 
and aspirations. The earliest time-budget studies were highly 
concerned with division of time for work and leisure(35). 
As a consequence of industrial, technological, information and 
communication development, western culture has made extensive 
efforts to systemize time, whilst underdeveloped countries continue to 
use time in arbitrary ways, not only at the individual level, but at 
the societal also. 
To test the attitude toward time-budget, we asked the 
respondents their reaction to the negative statement, "A time-table 
makes a man robot-like". The majority, as table 8-5 shows, responded 
positively to the statement, with significant differences between the 
three groups (X2= 38 D. F= 8), which means that they agree that a 
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time-table makes a man like machine, reflecting a negative attitude 
toward time-tables. 
The data, however, show unexpected attitudes among the rural 
group, whose rate of positive response, when the two categories 
"strongly agree and agree" were merged, was the same as the native 
response: 51%. However, there were fewer negative responses among 
rural respondents than natives: 30% versus 43%. 
Table 8-5 Time-budget 
A time-table makes 
a man robot-like 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 15 30 8 17.7 
Agree 36 38 43 39.0 
No opinion 19 14 6 13 
Disagree 28 15 43 28.7 
S. Disagree 2 3 -- 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100.1 0 
X2= 38 D. F= 8 
The only way to explain the positive. attitude of the rural is 
that they da not suffer from time-table stress, as they do not work 
compulsorily at set times. Their work schedule is determined by 
natural phenomena rather than the clock, e. g they wake up at down, 
go to the farm with their livestock directly soon after first light, 
these might. be considered a "set time", but not in the same sense 
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the term might apply to urban people who experience time table 
stress, as work and leisure time are more rigidly set. 
Further evidence might shed more light on this point. The 
result of the statement, "I always eat, sleep and wake up at a set 
time", confirms, to some degree, the findings of the previous one. 
According to the data in table 8-6, the native informants responded 
less positively than the rural informants: 58% versus 77% (by merging 
the strongly agree and agree categories), which indicates that rural 
informants were more favourable towards time-budget (set time) than 
the natives. On the other hand, negative responses among natives, 
were about twice those of their rural counterparts: 41% versus 23%. 
Table 8-6 Set time 
I always eat, sleep 
and wake up at a 
set time 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 14 32 12 19.3 
Agree 63 49 46 52.7 
No opinion -- 21 1.0 
Disagree 22 12 41 25.0 
S. Disagree 1 5 -- 2.0 
Total 100 100 100 10010 
X2= 42 D. F= 8 
It can be concluded from the data, that urban residents have 
no strong tendency toward "set time". In the researchers experience, 
Iraqi people often do not systemize their daily habits. Whereas 
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English people, for instance, often have a set dinner time, tea time, 
shopping time, holiday time and so forth, such is not usually the case 
in Iraq. For example, dinner may be at 1 p. m, 3. p. m, or 5. p. m. Any 
time during the day or evening, could be tea time. 
C. RAYTHIM OF It1FF 
Differences in pace of life attributed to cultural variety are 
often described as dramatic. Sociologists and anthropologists have 
distinguished between "fast" and "slow" cultures. Bohannan (1980), 
for instance, has described the greeting style among the Tiv, a 
primitive people in Nigeria, compared with their neighbours the 
Hausa. He described the Tiv as "fast" people; they spend little time 
in greeting rituals, while the Hausa people spend a long time in such 
rituals. Thus, they are described as "slow" people(36). 
The tempo of life, however, is derived from the way in which 
people evaluate and use time. In Rezsohazy's (1972) terms: 
Time may be organized and mastered in varying degrees 
according to the value attributed to it(37). 
In this regard, Europeans do not move the way Puerto Ricans, 
Mexicans, Arabs or Chines move. Each culture has its own evaluation, 
characteristic and use of time. As a consequence, the, rhythm and 
tempo are locally constituted; every society has a specific style of 
locomotion, sitting, standing, walking, reclining and gesturing. 
Accordingly, it is very easy to identify several differences in walking 
behaviour. For example, Europeans often move in quick tempo, while 
Arabs usually move in slow(38). Adam (1988) suggested that Western 
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societies have departed from natural rhythms, while other societies 
organise their social existence according to them(39). In this sense, 
Freedman and Edward (1988) described Western life as being 
subordinated to extreme time pressure, which is considered a major 
element producing stress. He stated: 
Many of the complaints about the stress of modern life 
revolve around the lack of time, the pressure to move 
quickly, the too fast pace of life, and so on(40). 
In Iraq despite the large scale urbanization and a degree of 
industrialization, the rhythm of life in general remains "slow". The 
data in table 8-7 might shed more light on this point. 
Table 8-7 The rhythm of life 
Speed is a 
devilish act 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 75 42 34 50.3 
Agree 17 52 46 38.3 
N. Opinion -- -- -- -- 
Disagree 8 5 16 9.7 
S. Disagree -- 1 4 1.7 
Total. 100 100 000 100.0 
X2= 48.9 D. F= 6 
According to the table, the majority of the whole sample (50.3%) 
responded positively to the content of the statement. Despite the 
significant differences, between the three groups (X2= 48.9 D. F= 6) 
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when we merge the two positive categories (Strongly Agree and 
Agree), we can see that the general attitudes of the sample strongly 
confirm the "slow" rhythm of life: 92% of the rural respondents, 94% 
of the migrants and 80% of the natives, either "Strongly Agree" or 
"Agree" that speed is devilish act, which reflects the traditional view, 
where everybody has to be slow, to maintain his prestige; in walking 
behaviour one should be quiet and slow, and spend as much time as 
possible in greeting behaviour. People might be surprised when they 
see someone in a hurry. They often say to him "Do not hurry; who is 
the father of tomorrow? ". That means one cannot get more than his 
fate, whether he goes fast or slowly; thus none can ensure the 
future. Common sayings in this regard are: 
- Better to walk a month than jump the river. 
- Do Snot be speedy father, we are waiting for you. 
- Do not be fast, death is faster. 
- If you run like the beasts, you can't get more than God determined 
for you. 
Another facet of the slow pace of life is displayed through the 
statement, "It is better to rely on your biological clock than a wrist- 
watch". This statement reveals the natural rhythm concomitant with 
the psychological aspects of traditional cultures, where the wall- 
clock or wrist-watch is not the only or the effective device to 
measure social activities and life rhythm. Natural rhythm is a 
commonplace of all beings: plants, animals and humans alike, because 
they are bound by external rhythm(41). They respond either 
biologically, as in plants and animals or culturally and 
psychologically, as modified response in the case of humans. In this 
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case the natural rhythm coexists alongside the modified one. Thus 
people might depend on their biological clock (internal sentiments) 
rather than the artificial one, so the tempo of life as a consequence 
is spontaneous, inaccurate and slow. 
The attitudes toward the biological clock as shown in table 8-8, 
reflect significant differences between the three groups (X2= 26 D. F= 
8); 45% of the rural group either strongly agree or agree that they 
depend on their biological clock rather than a watch, compared with 
37% of the migrants and only 30% of the natives. The majority of the 
natives (69%) responded against the biological clock, which is to be 
expected as urban activities are determined by the clock, while rural 
activities are more dependent on natural rhythm: day and night, 
succession of seasons , sun, moon, stars and wind movement, which 
prompt the biological clock and internal timings. 
Table 8-8 Biological clock 
It is better to 
depend on the 
biological clock 
than a wrist-watch 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 7 6 5 6.0 
Agree 38 31 25 31.3 
No opinion 5 12 1 6.0 
Disagree 45 45 69 53.0 
S. Disagree 5 6 -- 3.7 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 26 D. F= 8 
318 
Despite the significant differences between the rural and urban 
informants, a remarkable proportion of the natives claimed that they 
depend on internal timings, which reflects somewhat the penetration 
of rural traits in urban life. 
8.5. WORK AND LEISURE TIME 
There are many ways to understand social time as "social", but 
the most important one is that of looking to it as a "value". From 
this perspective, time is something that people can use, save or lose. 
However, the way in which people conceive of and use time is 
intimately related to the central values of the culture(42). 
With regard to the system of values, if any society has to 
develop its infrastructure, time should be assessed in economic terms. 
Economic values of time and its scarcity, as Rezsohazy emphasized, 
might impel humans to save it and make the most of it to do more, 
achieve more and earn more(43). That is why Sharp (1981) raised the 
possibility of dividing time into only two categories; work time and 
non-work time. Time, in this context, is money gained from the 
marriage of work and leisure(44). 
In so far as people are the producers of their society, their 
conception of time and the way in which they evaluate and use tithe 
in work, as well as in leisure, is the crucial factor in development 
and progress, but as we have already said, the value of time depends 
primarily upon the core values of the culture. Thus time has quite 
different values according to cultural variety and the degree of 
cultural and technological progress. In this regard, Rezsohazy stated: 
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The value of time is expressed by the activities or 
pastimes given social preference. For example, one society 
will say that time is money, whereas another will say it is 
recreation and a third, contemplation 
(45) 
In traditional societies such as the one under study, time is 
still treated in ineffective ways, despite the awareness of its 
importance to the nation and individuals alike. 
The data in table 8-9 might shed more light on this fact. The 
informants were asked to respond to the statement, "Time is gold but 
no one appreciates it". The overwhelming majority of the three 
groups with non-significant differences between them, responded 
positively. 90% of the rural group, 93% of the migrants and 93% of 
the natives claimed to either agree or strongly agree with the 
proposition. 
Table 8-9 Value of time. 
Time is gold but 
no one appreciates 
it 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 52 50 40 47.3 
Agree 38 43 53 44.7 
No opinion 1 1 -- 0.7 
Disagree 9 5 7 7.0 
S. Disagree -- 1 -- 0,3 
Total 100 100 100 1.00.0 
X2= 8.5 D. F= 8 N. S 
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This result, confirms the views expressed in the literature 
mentioned above, and indicates that the informants recognize the 
value of time, but in practice can not cope with it, because of the 
obstacles of the traditions which encourage the slow rhythm, 
regarding it as a criterion of individual prestige, which reflects the 
prevalence of agrarian values. 
Further evidence of the underestimation of the value of time 
was obtained by asking the respondents their reactions toward the 
statement, " Most leisure time is wasted with gossiping". The data in 
table 8-10 reveals that about three-quarters of the whole sample 
agreed that gossip is extensively used to fill leisure time. Precisely 
72% of the rural group, compared with 85% of the migrants and 73% 
of the natives, either agreed or strongly agreed that leisure time is 
wasted with gossiping. 
Table 8-10 Value of leisure time 
Most leisure time 
is wasted with 
gossiping 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 17 36 13 22.0 
Agree 55 49 59 54.3 
No opinion 1 -- -- 0.3 
Disagree 24 11 28 21.0 
S. Disagree 3 4 -- 2.4 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 27.9 D. F= 8 
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This phenomenon is not confined to Iraqi or Arab society, but 
seems to prevail in most traditional societies, and whenever people 
meet face to face, even in industrial societies. Recently, the magazine 
"Awake"(46) (1991) presented three articles discussing various 
aspects of gossip, which all show that "gossip" is a global 
phenomenon or, as it stated, "gossip is universal"(47). However, 
whereas gossip might be practiced for several minutes in the local 
community in industrial societies, it may last several hours or all day 
in traditional societies, as was found by Kimball in Brunei(48). Many 
Iraqi researchers have empirically found that leisure time is often 
passed or wasted in exchanging information, chatting and fuelling 
conversations encompassing many aspects of their neighbours and 
local community (see chapter seven of this thesis). Gossiping in 
traditional society is pervasive everywhere: neighbourhoods, offices 
and apartments, shops, parties, family and so forth. It flourishes at 
every level of the society; educated or non-educated, high or low 
class. Apart from the fact that it may be harmful and victimize 
others, which reveals a very dark side of human behaviour, it is a 
waste of time which could be used to engage in activities to benefit 
individual and society. 
In the same context, and accompanied with the harmful gossip 
phenomenon, Arab people often use the rosary to pass time. Despite 
its religious use and psychological function, the main purpose of 
using the rosary is to pass tedious leisure time, and as a 
consequence it becomes a daily habit, used not only at certain times, 
but at any time, everywhere: in offices, school, home, the street, 
shops and so on, 
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To test the extent of the rosary usage, we asked the 
informants to react to the statement, " The rosary is often used to 
pass boring time". The overwhelming majority of the whole sample 
responded positively to the statement: 90% of the rural group, 
compared with 92% of the migrants and 93% of the natives either 
agreed or strongly agreed. This attitude is manifest in the daily 
behaviour of the people, thus it does not reflect only the informants' 
attitudes, but also their real behaviour. However, in the researcher's 
experience, the rosary is not only used to pass time, but it becomes 
an individual hobby; many people enjoy collecting valuable rosaries, 
while others holding different kinds of rosary to harmonise with their 
dress, and talk proudly about it. 
In fact, with the lack of adequate public leisure facilities, the 
people create their own means of providing psychological stimulus 
and coping with their cultural context. 
Table 8-11 Use of the rosary to pass time 
The rosary is often 
used to pass boring 
time 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 55 54 26 45.0 
Agree 35 38 67 46.7 
N. Opinion -- -- -- -- 
Disagree 10 7 7 8.0 
S. Disagree -- 1 -- 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2=28 D. F=6 
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8,6. TEMPORAL ORTFNTATTON 
It is quite right that cultures share some similar 
characteristics, but in fact, there are qualitative differences which 
give each culture its own characteristics. As a consequence of 
cultural variety, every culture has its own conception of social time, 
and every society relies upon its culture to orient Its members 
temporally. The Western tradition views the flow of time as 
fundamentally linear, marked by a number of historical events which 
have been (and will he) of crucial importance to human salvation. The 
Asian civilization takes a much more cyclical view of history. Such 
temporal orientations reveal quite important information about human 
behaviour(` 9). Thus, and in the light of anthropological studies, there 
is remarkable differentiation between human cultures in their 
temporal orientation; in the advanced cultures, the people often act 
and behave according to the concept of "promptness", and exploit the 
past and present to designate and develop the future. Traditional 
cultures still associate the past with the present; the people often 
turn back to the strong inheritance of their ancestors' values, norms 
and achievements which seem to be a major obstacle that prevents 
people moving forward(50). Pronovost shed more light on this point. 
in his discussion of traditional cultures' temporal system, he stated: 
The concept of the future, in so far as we can use this 
term, is a reproduction of the traditional way of life. 
There is no clear-cut line between the past and the 
future but only a sort of relative homogeneity in 
temporal horizons, a continuity from the past to the- 
future(51) 
F. Kluckhon (1961) discussed the time. orientations of people in 
different societies and from different angles. She asserted that each 
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culture has developed its own distinctive emphasis upon either the 
past, present or future. She devised a questionnaire to examine the 
temporal orientation found in a number of social groups. She 
concluded from her empirical study of five subgroups in the American 
Southwest, that Texans and Mormons ascribed more value to the 
future, while Navaho, Zuni Indian and Spanish-American groups gave 
such value to the present. Navaho and Zuni Indians placed more 
value on the past than the future(52). 
In the Arab World, many writers have drawn attention to the 
cultural heritage dilemma and ancestorism. Ii. Saab (1973) considered 
it a dilemma of mist which covers the human mind and prevents him 
from recognise the present facts and future views(53). However, 
ancestorism or orientation to the past seems to be quite tangible, 
represented not only in verbal behaviour, but also in some rituals, 
such as frequent visits to graveyards and shrines, and some types of 
magic and sorcery(54). 
We asked the informants to express their attitude toward the 
past through the statement, "I remember the past with affection". As 
table 8-12 shows, the vast majority of the whole sample, with non- 
significant differences between the three groups, (X2= 7.1 D. F= 8) 
responded positively. Precisely 76% of rural respondents and 
migrants, and 75% of the natives, either agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement. This result reflects the informants' concern with 
the past, and at the same time indicates the attitude of the social 
organization as a whole, where most of the people, including the well- 
educated, set a high value on the past. In the researcher's 
experience, people often, when talking about the present or the 
future, refer to the virtue of the past. Thus we can conclude that 
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the sample gives the past a high value which is an indication of 
societal attitudes toward time. 
Table 8-12 Temporal orientation 
I remember the 
past with 
affection 
Rural Urban 
Migrants Natives 
Total 
S. Agree 39 37 26 34.0 
Agree 37 39 49 41.7 
No opinion -- -- -- -- 
Disagree 23 22 25 23.3 
S. Disagree 1 2 -- 1.0 
Total 100 100 100 100.0 
X2= 7.1 D. F= 8 
8.7. TIME AS A DEPENDENT VARTABLF 
This section deals with social time crosstabulated with other 
variables as follows: 
A. AG! AND SOCIAL TIME 
Biological time runs out and everybody ages. Humans have to 
change their status in cyclical time, from birth to death: passing from 
childhood to puberty, unmarried to married, adulthood to old nget55 . 
In this sense, time is recognized in different ways according to one's 
status and age. 
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In general, young people have more liberal attitudes toward all 
aspects of life, including recognition and usage of social time. 
Pronovost, in this regard, assumed that youth, in terms of movement, 
look forward to the future, more than other age groups. The present 
is striving toward the future that is made up of work and family(55). 
However, generally and at the practical level, human behaviour is 
formed culturally, and as a consequence every culture determines its 
members' behaviour and attitudes toward time with regard to the 
differentiations entailed by the age groups. The data in table 8-13 
might test this assumption in practice. According to the mean, we can 
observe that there is complete conformity in rural respondents' 
attitude, regardless of age groups, except for a slight difference 
scored by the old age group (55>). The urban group reveals 
similarity among all age groups. The mean reveals close 
correspondence between rural and urban attitudes toward the use of 
time. 
Table 8-13 One way analysis of variance of rural and urban attitudes 
toward the use of time according to age 
Age 
No 
Rural 
Mean S. D No 
Urban 
Mean S. D 
<25-34 25 32.9 3.0 50 32.8 3.3 
35-44 64 32.9 3.1 117 32.4 3.1 
55> 11 34.8 2.3 33 32.1 3.6 
Total 100 33.1 3.0 200 32.4 3.2 
F= 0.56 D. F= 2 F= 2.0 D. F= 2 
N. S N. S 
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This result reinforces our assumption, that cultural values 
might diminish the differences toward the use of time , regardless of 
age variable, in rural and urban groups alike. 
B. FDXJCATTON AND SOGTAL TIME 
As with age, it is possible that education level might play an 
important role in determining people's attitudes toward the use of 
social time, but once again, we can assume that education level may 
be less effective in some cultural contexts, so we have to see each 
education level and each social group as a microcosm of the whole 
society in Pronovost's terms(57). 
According to the data in table 8-14, the mean does not show 
any indication of differences between those who have high or low 
level of education in either rural or urban group or between the two 
settings. If we look carefully at the figures, we see that the mean of 
the low education level of urban informants, 32.8, is almost the same 
as that of those who have a high level (32.1). This is reinforced by 
standard deviation, which records convergence rather than 
divergence. Slight differences can be seen between high and low 
education levels of the rural group, but F ratio records non- 
significant differences between them (F= 0.56 D. F= 2), F ratio also 
records non-significant differences between the high and low 
education level of the urban group. 
This result confirms our assumption that education has no 
significant influence, in the predominant cultural perspective, but it 
conflicts with the finding of Robinson (1988), that the highly 
educated are likely to be able to accomplish more in the time 
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available, and they make greater gains than the less educated people 
in the least hurried activity. They described their life as being 
rushed, so they felt more under pressure of time than others, and as 
consequence used time more actively(58). 
Table 8-14 One way analysis of variance of rural and urban attitudes 
toward the use of social time according to education 
Education 
No 
Rural 
Mean SD No 
Urban 
Mean SD 
Low edu 69 33.2 3.1 58 32.0 3.1 
Middle edu 29 32.9 2.7 56 32.8 3.1 
High edu 2 33.5 2.1. 86 32.5 3.3 
Total 100 33.1 3.0 200 32.5 3.2 
F= 0.11 D. F= 2 F= 0.87 D. F= 2 
N. S N. S 
C. OCCUPATION AND SOCIAL TTMfl 
The ways in which people use social time are strongly related 
to the nature of their socio-economic activities. Agricultural work, for 
instance, has its own characteristics, and leads to a pattern of 
activity not like that usually found in the city. The people work not 
by the clock, as in the city, but according to the environment's 
requirements(59). Thus, attitudes and behaviour seems to be related 
to occupational variety. As Rezohazy emphasized, individuals learn to 
handle time in very different ways. Even in the same society, social 
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groups such as social classes, rural and urban, different generations, 
might have different attitudes toward time, e. g. making and keeping 
appointments and so forth(60). In this regard, the nature of work 
engagement, which demands some differences in pace and rhythm, 
might influence individual attitudes, though, that is not the case, 
when the question concerns collective behaviour formed by cultural 
values. The data in table 8-15 might shed some light on the ambiguity 
surrounding this point. The mean shows slight differences between 
the different occupations among the rural informants, which appeared 
in standard deviation, but shows correspondence among the urban. In 
the average, the figures indicate non-significant differences between 
the different occupations in rural and urban groups alike (rural F 
ratio= 1.82 D. F=3) and (Urban F ratio= 0.22 D. F= 3). 
Table 8-15 One way analysis of variance of rural and urban attitudes 
toward the use of time according to occupation 
Occupation Rural 
No Mean S. D 
Urban 
No Mean S. D 
Official 1 38.0 -- 71 32.3 3.2 
Peasant 95 33.0 2.9 -- -- -- 
Worker -- -- -- 88 32.6 3.1 
Self-employed 1 37.0 -- 33 32.5 3.7 
Housekeeper 3 31.3 4.0 8 31.7 2.0 
Total 100 33.1 3.0 200 32.4 3.2 
F= 1.82 D. F=3 F= 0.22 D. F= 3 
N. S N. S 
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This result is consistent with the domination of traditional 
values in both rural and urban residence, irrespective of the nature 
of economic involvement. 
D. FAMILY TNCOMF, AND SOCIAL TIME 
Family income is often used as a criterion of social class. It is 
indeed an important indication of the social hierarchy. Different 
classes might treat social time differently according to their income, 
property and style of life. More privileged families, for instance, 
might try early to inculcate in their children notions such as the 
value of time: they have to keep it, save it and not waste it. In fact, 
there is a clear classification of the concept of time in relation to 
social class(61). However, if that holds, it does so only in societies 
with clearly differentiated social classes. In the Arab World, there is 
no clear cut distinction between high, middle and low classes, so one 
can anticipate no sharp differences among them in their attitudes 
toward the use of social time. 
The data in table 8-16 reveal slight differences between 
informants with high and low family income. The mean of low income 
respondents in the rural group is 31.1, compared with 33.6 of for 
those with high family income. In the urban group it is 31.9 for those 
with the low family income, compared with 32.5 for those with high 
family income. The information reveals non-significant differences 
between the two sets (Rural F: 2.3 D. F= 3) (Urban F= 0.22 D. F= 3). 
Income does not seen to have any important impact on attitude 
toward the use of time among respondents of low and high family 
income in either the rural or urban setting. 
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Table 8-16 One way analysis of variance of rural and urban attitudes 
toward the use of time, according to family income 
Family income 
No 
Rural 
Mean S. D No 
Urban 
Mean S. D 
150< 9 31.1 2.0 29 31.9 3.3 
150-250 77 33.2 3.0 101 32.6 3.2 
300> 14 33.6 3.1 70 32.5 3.2 
Total 100 33.1 3.0 200 32.5 3.2 
F= 2.3 D. F=2 F= 0.50 D. F= 2 
N. S N. S 
This result, confirms our own assumption, that the values of 
the culture as a whole might over-ride individual social components, 
especially in traditional society. It also indicates that hypotheses and 
theories applicable in an industrial culture do not necessarily apply 
in other cultures. 
8.8. CONCLUSION 
People learn to handle time in very different ways due to 
cultural variety. Failure to recognize the cultural concept of social 
time might lead, as Bock has said, to "a great danger of 
misunderstanding the behaviour of persons from other societies" 
(62). 
For that reason, it is not, easy to understand a particular society 
without acknowledging its sense of time, or in Levine's terms "To 
understand society, you must learn its sense of time"(63). In this 
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regard, the discussion in this chapter focused on attitudes toward 
the use of social time, in order to complete the image of the 
traditional social life in an urban centre. 
The data analysis reveals that lateness, delay and inaccuracy 
prevail among the majority of the urban informants. Delay in 
appointments with friends, as well as in work, which would be 
considered in European culture as intoleratable and insulting 
behaviour, are considered normal in a traditional culture such as the 
one under study, as most of the respondents indicated in their 
responses. In the same context, the investigation demonstrated that 
informants placed little value on time, and preferred to arrange their 
activities, appointments and contact for an approximate, rather than 
exact time; for example, "I will see you between 6 and 7 P. M" or "I 
will visit you this evening", without specifying the time. The figures 
show that more than 60% of the urban informants tend to prefer 
approximate time rather than exactness, with slight differences 
between rural and urban respondents. 
Similarly, the data reveal negative attitudes toward using a 
diary to arrange daily activities; about 70% of the whole sample either 
claimed that they do not need a dairy, or had no strong opinion on 
the subject. 
The most important part of this chapter is that concerning 
time-budget. Respondents' attitudes toward time-tables were generally 
negative. Most denied being committed to a time-table, and agreed 
that time-tables make people like machines. They also claimed that 
they did not systemize their daily habits at certain times: eating, 
sleeping, shopping and so on. 
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The rhythm of life, which was reviewed also in cultural terms, 
was seen to be slow, not only in general outlook, but also in specific 
locomotion: walking, spending time in greeting, and so forth. In this 
regard more than one-third of the urban respondents expressed a 
negative attitude toward speed, and considered speed as a devilish 
act, not a way of saving time to accomplish something. However slow 
motion is considered in Arab culture, and in Iraq particularly, as a 
part of the individual's prestige. Thus one has, for instance, to eat 
or walk slowly to maintain his prestige. People express surprise if 
they see one pass in a hurry or spend less time in greeting 
behaviour. They often shout: "Do not be hurry, who can be sure of 
tomorrow? ", meaning that no amount of hurry will give you more than 
fate intends for you. 
In work and leisure, time is viewed as an economic value: "Time 
is money, time is gold" or "Time is like a sword, if you do not cut it, 
it might cut you". in practice, time is used in contemplation, 
dissipated, run out and wasted for nothing. The respondents 
therefore, expressed agreement with the statement, "Time is money, 
but no one appreciates it". More than one-third of the urban 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed, reflecting a negative 
attitude toward the value of time. Not surprisingly then, the 
overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
that they wasted time either in gossiping or in using the rosary, 
with non-significant differences between rural and urban groups. 
Temporal orientation is another facet of this investigation. The 
data reveal that the informants gives the past a high value, perhaps 
more than the present and the future; about 70% of the whole sample 
remember the past with affection. In the researcher's experience, 
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people do not talking about their achievements in the present time or 
their plans for the future without reference to the virtues of the 
past. 
To check that the attitude toward the use of time was not 
affected by independent variables such as age, education, occupation 
or family income, these variables were correlated with the sum of the 
twelve items (statements) of the scale by using one way analysis of 
variance. The findings reveal the following: 
- There are no significant differences between the attitudes of 
young, adult and elderly groups; low, middle and high 
education level; low, middle and high family income; or between 
occupations. 
- The data demonstrated conformity between rural and urban groups. 
Finally, it can be concluded that the conventional values which 
cover all aspects of life have a great impact on urban residents' 
behaviour and attitudes. They to some degree diminish the 
differentiation between rural and urban settings. This, as we have 
said earlier in this thesis, is because of the pervasive penetration of 
agrarian values in urban life, which push the city toward "rurality". 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1- THFORETTCAT, TNTRODUCTTON 
Although much has been said about the influence of the city on 
the countryside, and little about the reverse situation, traditional 
values in the city do not die under the stress of urbanization. They 
might be weakened or modified, but will stand as long as the human 
beings are influenced by religious values. 
Even in highly industrial cultures, family, kinship and 
neighbourhood are still, to some degree, active, while in less 
developed cultures, they are extremely active. 
This is not only an assumption counter to Wirth's theory or an 
overview contrast with that of the Chicago school, it is also a 
practical view derived from cross-cultural studies. Thus, it can be 
said: what has been experienced and written about a certain culture 
or society should not be taken for granted, or generalized to every 
society. 
Because of the lack of comprehensive study, not only in Iraq, 
but throughout the Third World, of the impact of traditional values 
on urban life or "ruralization of the city", the researcher undertook 
this project to compare the main aspects of social life in the city 
with their rural counterparts. 
The main assumption of this thesis is: Iraq's principal cities, 
including the capital, Baghdad, have grown several-fold in the last 
four decades, as a result of rural to urban migration. This changed 
their demography as well as their social characteristics, and caused 
what has been called "ruralization of, the city". 
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To examine the above assumption, relevant studies have been 
pursued in a global perspective. We first discussed, as theoretical 
background, the findings of the Chicago school, concentrating on the 
views of Wirth and Redfield, who put forward clear characteristics of 
rural and urban life. It was considered extremely important to survey 
urban and rural attributes in order to underline the scope of our 
own study. However, urban and rural theories are not confined to the 
Chicago school, but also appear in the early works of the pioneers. 
The ideas of Durkhiem, Tonnies, Weber and Simmel, which were 
discussed briefly, are regarded as forming the foundation of the 
classic school of sociology. They paved the way to the earlier 
sociologists such as Wirth and Redfield. The Chicago school, although 
it based its approach on the pioneers' findings, developed a new 
theoretical dimension, focusing on the nature of the city. The most 
important and problematic assumption was that of Wirth: "urbanism as 
a way of life", which gave rise to many questions and created 
controversy among sociologists. Wirth assumed that the city requires 
a way of life attributed to the socio-economic and ecological 
characteristics, which stand in strong contrast to the rural way of 
life. 
At the same time, Redfield developed a new direction. He 
claimed that there is no dichotomy, no contrast, but a continuum. 
Many sociologists regarded Redfield's approach as more reasonable, 
but both constructions are problematic. As there has been no clear 
answer as to the applicability of these two approaches, our 
investigation looked for the alternative view: the city in the Third 
World. After presenting a number of studies, we found that the 
Wirth-Redfield constructions (dichotomy-continuum) are not. adequate, 
342 
because of the spread of rural characteristics in the city, which is 
attributed to large-scale internal migration. In Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, the villagers have a dominant influence on the city 
demographically, socially and culturally. 
The researcher went on to discuss theoretically, the process of 
urbanization in Asia and the Middle East, with particular reference to 
Iraq, before presenting the empirical study. A large number of 
studies were discussed, which had as a common theme the vast 
growth of cities as a consequence of the rural to urban migration, 
reflecting economic growth and the resulting "pull" of the city's 
attractions compared with the deteriorating conditions in the rural 
areas, together with natural increase. Many studies found that there 
were no essential differences between the rural and urban milieu in 
most Asian cities; they considered that city and village are elements 
of the same civilization. Qadeer, for instance, asserted that in India, 
Pakistan and Bangla Desh, household size which indicates the family 
structure, has not undergone the kind of change normally associated 
with urbanization; the consanguine family in these countries continues 
to be a very cohesive unit. Blood loyalties, and kinship ties, which 
are continually reinforced by religious values and economic 
considerations, extended family and kinship system seems to be very 
active in the city as well as in the village. In brief, the traditional 
values have been shaping the city culture. Following Krausset: 
It is quite conceivable that such a large population 
equipped with rural values and life style, is as much 
involved in shaping the culture of the city as it is 
adjusting to it. (See chapter one P. 47) 
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In the Middle East, additional factors accelerated the pace of 
migration: discovery and exploitation of oil, emergence of the 
industrial cities and concentration of government institutions and 
amenities in urban centres. Thus the influx of a huge number of 
migrants destroyed the urban style of life and replaced it with a 
rural one. Focusing on four aspects of urban life: family construction, 
kinship system, neighbourhood and social time, which are relevant to 
our own study, we found that the urban family is still extended, 
patrilineal, patriarchal, polygamous and endogamous, like its rural 
counterpart. The kinship system, which is based on genealogical 
descent, seems to be extremely strong, important and playing a key 
role in social interaction and solidarity. Intimate neighbourhood ties 
are quite tangible and play a significant role as an informal social 
control. Studies of social time as a theme of culture, not an 
independent variable, showed a lack of information about how people 
in the Middle East used and abused time. Nevertheless, the small 
number of available studies, reveals that slow rhythm, low valuation 
of time and lateness are a normal elements of Middle Eastern culture. 
In Iraq, the picture is quite similar to that of the Middle East 
in general, because the countries of the region share the same 
cultural components: language, religious and historical heritage. 
However Iraq was the cradle of human culture, urbanization occurred 
quite early in the third millenium B. C. Many city-states emerged 
between the two rivers (Mesopotamia). In the Islamic epoch, large 
cities such as Baghdad, Basra, Kufa and Sammara flourished and 
Baghdad became one of the largest cities in the world. Iraqi cities 
declined gradually after the fall of the Abbasid empire in 1258 A. D, 
and rose again after the First World War. The attraction of the city, 
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discovery of oil and the dearth of land caused waves of migrants, 
and as a consequence Iraq become one of the most highly urbanized 
countries in the Middle East. Three factors played an essential role in 
urban growth: the rate of natural increase, the influx of migrants 
from rural areas and incorporation of pre-existing villages into the 
city or reclassification of some village groups as urban areas. 
The rate of natural increase of urban population growth was 
high: 6.2% for the period 1960-1970, and 5.4% 'for the period 1970- 
1980. The high fertility rate was attributable to the high rate of 
rural migration which shaped the city culture. Thus the main and 
decisive factor behind the rapid growth of urban population was 
rural migration. The large-scale migration started after the Second 
World War, due to the capital investment in oil revenue and industrial 
sector. During 1957-1975, migration reached an alarming scale, As a 
result, the urban growth rate was about 9% higher than the total 
national growth rate. Baghdad took the lion's share; it increased more 
than tenfold in the last four decades, compared with a six-fold 
increase for the population of the country as a whole. 
The eight years war with Iran, affected the trend of migration. 
Many people from the southern regions moved to the capital to avoid 
the danger of the war and to look for jobs. 
The bombardment by America and its allies of Iraqi cities and 
villages, which devastated most of the infrastructure, might have 
affected not only the rate of population growth, but also the age and 
sex distribution and caused movement of the population over the 
Iraqi provinces. Thus one can expect that movement toward Baghdad 
will rapidly increase in both the short and long term. 
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On the basis of the above, the urban population is a rural- 
urban mixture, the two groups living and flourishing side by side, 
with agrarian values predominating. The collision between traditional 
values and modern ways that some people have adopted, is 
responsible for the dichotomy of the personality or "dualism". As 
evidence of this dualism, the individual appears extremely urbanized 
and well adjusted, but in most social situations might soon show 
traditional values; one might be westernized in his clothes but easily 
angered, and sensitive in matters of honour. As professor Al-Ward! 
(Iraqi scholar), put it "He is Mr John on the outside, but pilgrim 
Hasson on the inside"(See chapter three). Moreover, the wide-spread 
existence of the extended family, kinship system, neighbourhood, 
loyalty and nepotism, hospitality, male superiority, and failure to view 
time in economic terms, may be considered as "ruralism" among the 
urban population. The local authorities established in successive 
epoches, encouraged traditional values, norms and behaviour, to 
maintain their authority and to be conform with the traditional way of 
life. As a consequence, many problems appeared and deeply affected 
urban life. 
To provide empirical evidence to reinforce the theoretical 
research, the researcher designed a standardized questionnaire 
covering four salient aspects of social life: the family, kinship, 
neighbourhood and social time. 
Because of the Gulf Crisis, and the accompanying difficulties, it 
was not possible for the researcher to return to Iraq to collect the 
data. For that reason, arrangements were made to send the Arabic 
formula of the questionnaire with a colleague, who had recently 
obtained his Ph. D degree from the Sociology Department, University 
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of Hull and was returning to Iraq. The aid was enlisted of two 
assistant professors from Baghdad and Al-Mustansirya Universities. 
These three collected the data according to the researcher's 
instructions. The researcher monitored and directed progress by 
weekly telephone calls. The filed survey, as described in chapter one, 
included four neighbourhoods in Baghdad city and a rural community 
as a control group, with a sample of 300 household heads, 200 
informants from Baghdad city and 100 informants from a village, 
about 115 k. m, south of Baghdad. 
The results of this part of the study can be summarized as 
follows: 
9.2 SOCTAT. CHARACTFRTSTTGS OF THE SAMPLE 
By way of introduction to the applied study, information was 
obtained on the respondents' backgrounds: sex, age, occupation, 
marital status, family components and income. This was done , not 
only to show the differences between the components of the three 
groups, but also to control the results. The sample revealed 
considerable variety, necessary to the validity of the study. 
9.3 THE URBAN FAMILY 
This part of the study explored several assumptions, relating to 
vititl aspects of urban family in Iraq: power structure, family 
planning, women's position and marriage. 
A. POWER STRUCTURE 
The Arab family is described as patriarchrtl,, patrilineal, 
patrilocal, extended, polygynious and endogamous. The oldest man 
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exercises great authority over his family members. The absolute 
authority of the father, derived from cultural traditions, is also 
supported by religious values, which seem to be very effective in the 
rural and urban milieu alike. Children learn in early childhood to 
obey their parents, to fulfil one of the most important obligations 
toward God. 
Although the mother has an important role in the family, the 
undisputed authority rests with the fattier. He is treated with respect 
and deference, and even grown-up and married sons have to submit 
their wishes to those of their father, and possibly their elder 
brothers, Thus the power structure of the family is centralized on 
the father. The investigation confirmed this view, demonstrating that 
the undisputed authority of the father is commonplace among rural 
and urban groups alike. 
The father's authority is manifested in daily life, either directly 
toward the whole family members or indirectly through the mother. 
The real power of the father is seen on the major life occasions, 
which require firm decisions. In this context, the data showed that 
two-thirds of the whole sample claimed that the father is the proper 
person to decide on issues such as, how to spend the family income, 
sons' marriage and whether to rent or buy a new house. However, 
the respondents thought that women have an effective but hidden 
role. Some women are able to exercise power and may be able to 
manipulate or pressurize the men, but even those who have 
superiority inside the family, in public should pretend to be 
subordinate to their husbands. Those men who are loss dominant in 
their families affairs, often pretend publicly that they have full 
authority, so the lack of recognition of women's role in the responses 
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of the informants may be explained in a cultural context, which 
confirm the male supremacy; the respondents have to cope with the 
expectation of roles of both males and females. 
One of the most striking evidences of male authority over 
females was displayed in the study through the status of male 
siblings. The investigation reveals that the status of the male is 
considered highly superior to that of the female. Preferences for 
males and discrimination against females start even before birth; to 
wish that someone should have a baby girl, even if he already has a 
dozen male children, is interpreted as an insult. A woman considers 
her life a complete failure if she does not succeed in delivering a 
boy child to her husband. The husband, in such cases, has the right 
to divorce his wife and remarry. Accordingly, the family who has a 
large number of males has a high status. 
All our rural and urban respondents, agreed that if they have 
a son who gets married and lives independently, they will support 
him both morally and materially. The common expression, in this 
sense, is "I have still to look after my sons as long as I live". To 
explain this, the vast majority said either that there sons are a part 
of themselves or that they need them when they reach old age. 
Support for sons reflects familial cohesion. In the Arab World, the 
family is seen as the cornerstone of society. Traditionally, the head 
of the family should direct his efforts towards the maintenance and 
continuation of the family. That, of course, requires spontaneous 
assistance, not only economic, but also social and political. On this 
basis most household heads prefer their married sons to stay with 
them under the same roof. Even those who claimed that they would 
not prefer this, reject ideas such as "To get rid of their 
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responsibility". Most of them said they live separately from their 
sons, either because their houses are too small or to avoid problems. 
Thus they think that to live separately is better for both, and might 
preserve good relation between them. 
The data, however, reflects either non-significant differences or 
slight differences between rural and urban respondents, which 
indicate the effectiveness of the traditional values in both settings. 
B. FAMTT, V PLANNING 
Under this title, the analysis pursued two main focal themes: 
birth control and management of the family budget. In the first 
theme, birth control is quite limited because of the religious 
injunction, which encourages a high rate of fertility and sanctions 
the attempt to control birth by contraception; and cultural tradition, 
which plays essential role to in supporting large numbers of children, 
who are regarded as fundamental to strengthen the family position. 
Although birth control has recently been practiced in urban 
life, it is largely still viewed as defined by strict tradition. Fertility 
seems to be not a matter of individual choice, but a familial concern, 
extending even to relatives and friends. The investigation reveals 
that a minority of all respondents were using some method of birth 
control. Because of the government restriction since 1985, and the 
obstacles of tradition, people have difficulty in obtaining 
contraceptive facilities, and get them on black market at ten times 
the normal price. Nonetheless, the majority are still against using any 
method of birth control, because either they regard it tos against 
God's will (religion), or because they accept the strict tradition. In 
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testing the impact of education and occupation on practicing birth 
control, the study demonstrated only a slight relationship between 
education, occupation and fertility. This result reflects the strength 
of tradition over education and occupation. 
In the second theme, family budget management seems to be 
intimately related to the household head's responsibility. Traditional 
values strongly support the father's full economic control over his 
family. The economic unity of the family is unconsciously recognized. 
Even those members who marry and live independently, share the 
economic burdens of their original families. Despite this economic 
unity, the extensive obligations toward its members inside or outside 
the original household, with relatives, neighbours and friends, often 
prevent the precise planning of family expenditure and demolish any 
budget that is made. The data showed that family budgeting is almost 
impossible. Less than a quarter of the urban respondents, claimed 
that they can manage the family budget, compared with less than 
one-fifth of the rural informants. The majority can not manage, 
because of unexpected visitors, unexpected occasions and unexpected 
incidents. It is common to hear complaints such as "One needs a 
treasury to fulfil his obligations, every day there is a marriage, 
funeral or visitors". Or every month a deficit could undermine any 
budget. Among the highly educated informants, only 20 out of 86 
succeeded in arranging their families' budgets according to plan. This 
number reflects the inability of education to affect people's attitudes 
and make them more rational and more urbanized. Thus the inability 
to budget seems to be a matter of cultural and societal context rather 
than merely a lack of education. Individuals with a high level of 
education might find themselves involved in more familial obligation to 
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maintain their prestige in the community, and as a consequence, find 
it more difficult to plan their family budget effectively. Similarly, 
occupational involvement had little impact on the traditional ways 
which make budgeting difficult.. 
C. WOMEN'S POSTTTON 
Because of the supremacy accorded to men, a woman has to 
submit to her father's will as long as she remains unmarried, and 
then to her husband. She learns in early childhood to reconcile 
herself to the fact that the man is much more important. 
Theoretically, women have no decision-making authority. This 
applies even for those who have a very strong position in the family, 
and for those who are well-educated. All the decisions should 
declared by the men. A common proverb, heard in Iraq is: "Ask the 
woman for her opinion and then go against it". The woman herself 
realizes her position and to some degree is satisfied with it. Even a 
well educated woman, when she has a decision to make, she does not 
say "Let me think about it", but "Let me ask my father, brother or 
husband". Although Iraqi women may wear fashionable western-style 
dress, drive cars and use Christian Dior make up, substantially their 
status and authority is really little different from that of traditional 
rural women. Well educated women recognize that they are viewed in 
rather crude terms as child-bearers and are sometimes anxious about 
that, but they realize that their inferior position is not their own 
fault or that of their husband, but it determined socially and 
culturally, so they to some extent accept it. 
352 
Although the inferiority of women tends to be taken for 
granted, women have great status in the household, especially as 
wives and mothers. This status is confirmed by religion as well as 
tradition. When a woman becomes old, she acquires full freedom, she 
may talk back to men and may gain the upper hand over her 
husband during his declining years. Such freedom is not given to 
younger women. According to the data, more than 60% of the urban 
informants admitted that the mother has less status than the father. 
In response to a provocative statement, "Woman plan and man execute 
the plan" only less than 10% agreed. The minority who admitted the 
planning role of the woman, may have done so in recognition of their 
wives' psychological influence; they may thought that such an answer 
would impress the interviewer with a sense of their modern broad- 
minded attitude, or they may really have more liberal attitudes. 
Further empirical evidence confirming the inferiority of women, was 
obtained in response to a question about who decides the number of 
children. In this case one might anticipate the mother/wife has the 
upper hand to decide, as pregnancy and childbirth are female 
concerns, but this seems to be the case only among egalitarian 
societies. In the traditional world, decisions on marriage and fertility 
does not rest with the wife or a couple alone, but with the 
patriarchal household members and their relatives. Thus responses 
were divided almost equally between the husband alone or both with 
others, while only small proportion of respondents said that the 
woman alone decided. Attitudes were the same for age groups and 
educational levels. 
The investigation also asked respondents whether they help 
their wives in household tasks. The overwhelming majority replied 
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negatively, while only 3% of the whole sample replied positively. 
When we asked those who replied positively about the type of 
assistance they offer, the majority seem to help with tasks which 
were originally not women's duties, such as ironing. Only one 
individual admitted that he helps with cooking and no one said 
cleaning or washing clothes. Basically, the husband regards any help 
as a concession, and often avoids any such concession, based on the 
traditional argument that woman is greedy, and if one helps her, she 
will demand more and more. Thus even now when a man intends to 
marry, his mother advises him to "Slay the cat" , i. e, to be harsh 
from the beginning in front of his bride, if he wishes to maintain his 
authority, otherwise he may be dominated by his wife and bring 
shame to himself and his original family. 
D. MARRTAGF. 
Marriage has been seen as a familial and societal rather than 
an individual desire. The major reasons for marriage are not romantic 
love or achievement of transitory individual happiness, but rather 
fertility, permanence and alliance of two family groups. Some 
individuals in towns and cities might marry spouses of their 
choosing, but they must first obtain their parents' consent. Often the 
parents are morally obliged to find a mate for their sons, and the 
sons are expected to accept and obey the parents' choice. 
According to Islamic tradition, a man is permitted to take up to 
four wives, but this freedom is hedged by the restriction, that a man 
should treat all of them equally. However, polygyny in Iraq is on the 
decline, because of the economic pressures of modern social life, in 
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addition to the legislation of 1977, which decreed that a man who 
would like to remarry must seek the permission of his first wife. The 
effect of these factors on polygyny appear clearly in the present 
investigation, where only two out of 300 respondents had a second 
wife, and those were not among the urban sample. 
Theoretically, the parents, especially the father, control the 
selection of mate, but nowadays, the principals exercise considerable 
influence over the choice of mate, particularly in urban centres. 
Nevertheless, the final decision remains in the hands of the parents; 
the son might suggest a bride, but the final endorsement must given 
by the parents. 
The choice of bride suggested might be wide or narrow in 
terms of the kinship group (endogamy), but generally, first cousin 
marriage is preferred. This tradition remains to some degree active, 
but recently has come under attack, especially among the younger 
generation. Nevertheless, parental supervision and consent, remain 
fundamental to fulfil marriage requirements, In our case, the vast 
majority (more than 90%) of all respondents claimed that either the 
father alone or the parents together have the absolute authority to 
choose their son's bride, with non-significant differences between 
rural and urban respondents. 
Taking into consideration, the restrictions imposed on women 
entering the man's realm, the seclusion and deliberate sexual 
segregation, in this context, it. is not surprising to see early marriage 
in Iraq for both males and females. The data revealed that the mean 
of males desirable age for marriage is 25.1. years, while: the mean for 
females is 21 years. 
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The investigation went on to discuss the residential rule. In 
fact, patrilocal residence is one of the main characteristics of Arab 
societies, while, matrilocal residence is discouraged, regarded as a 
shameful and a breaking of tradition. The bridegroom who intend to 
live with his bride's family brings shame, not only to himself, but 
also to his original family and relatives. Public opinion in Iraq calls a 
person who intend to do this "ga'dy", which means in folk idiom, a 
person who has lost his authority and lives at another's expense. 
Therefore, people avoid matrilocal residence in order to maintain their 
prestige in the eyes of their original families, friends and the whole 
community. The data showed that more than 90% of the whole sample, 
with non-significant differences between rural and urban 
respondents, rejected matrilocal residence. Some were reported as 
saying, " If I live with my wife's family, I will lose my power". The 
result is quite consistent with the findings of many writers and 
researchers. Hence, it can be concluded that the pervasiveness of 
traditional values in the urban context has diminished the margin of 
social differentiation between the rural and urban areas, creating to 
some degree, "ruralization of the city". 
9.4 KTNSIITP RFT, ATTONSIITP. 
Traditional urban sociology Underestimated the effectiveness of 
the kinship system in the city, where urbanization and modernization 
were expected to encourage individuality, transitory and superficial, 
rather than intimate relationships, loyalty or nepotism. This view, 
however is no longer tenable in view of much available evidence. This 
part of the study pursued this evidence in relation tot kinship 
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control over marriage, mutual obligation, loyalty and nepotism and 
people's attitudes toward each other as "Kin". 
A. KTNSNTP CONTROL OVER MARRIAGE 
The kinship system in the whole Arab world, has a tangible 
presence in the urban milieu. It is derived mainly from strong family 
ties and encouraged by religious values. Controlling marriage is one 
facet of kinship obligation. In fact, endogamy is quite common as a 
cultural heritage, and not a type of scandal as Bourdieu has claimed. 
It maintains ties and keeps property within the kin group. Whatever 
the reason, marriage is quite early, compulsory and completely under 
the control of family and close kin. 
So far, research about Arabic and Islamic marriage has 
demonstrated that endogamy, particularly parallel cousin marriage, is 
still preferred, even in large cities. 
In Iraq, the pattern of marriage among relatives is still 
prevalent in both rural and urban alike. Although parallel cousin 
marriage is to some degree declining, endogamy is still shaping the 
culture. The data showed that more than 60% of urban respondents 
emphasized that their wives were chosen from their relatives. 
Although there is no written law on the subject of 
intermarriage, tradition is sometimes more vital than written law; 
everybody is aware that a girl should marry a relative, if not 
specifically her "Ibn amm". The data demonstrated that more than 80% 
of those married either a parallel or cross-cousin relative. 
Respondents who got married a long time. ago, might now have 
changed their mind about intermarriage. With this in mind, we asked 
them, whether or not they still prefer for themselves and for their 
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sons to marry relatives. The responses confirmed the traditional 
attitudes rather than the modern. 
It is quite true to say, that some of the younger generation 
are attempting to break down the social order and marry non- 
relatives, but they are the exceptions to the rule; the rule remains 
firmly against change. Measuring the impact of some independent 
variables, the data revealed non-significant differences between high 
and low level of education, as well as rural and urban occupations. 
B. LOYALTY AND NEPOTTSM 
The importance of the kinship system is derived from its 
function. it is the body to which the individual turns for assistance,, 
it is a reference group, provides economic support and religious 
unity. Thus wide-spread loyalty to the group is not surprising. 
Familism is one of the most important facets of rural and urban 
residents alike. The individual with his family beyond adulthood and 
into middle age. Ingrained habits of family and kin loyalty are strong 
in both formal and informal situation. It is really difficult for a 
person to divest himself of this protective attitude, shown in seeking 
assistance, cutting through bureaucratic red tape and helping in 
daily life. 
Loyalty to a large kin group is revealed in the sense of 
nominal identity; an urban person is often not seen as belonging to 
the city as an individual, but as a member of tribe, "Ashira'} so he 
takes the tribal name as his surname, not the name of the family, as 
in the West, e. g., Al-Duliemi, attributed to Aullem tribe, A1-Zubaidy, 
attributed to Zubaid tribe. Such tribal names are quite common in 
Iraq and all the Arab culture. Sometimes people take the name of 
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their cities or district; Al-Heety attributed to fleet city, Al-Basri, to 
Basra city or A)-Adhami attributed to the Al-Adhamia district of 
Baghdad. Even those do not indicate loyalty to the city itself, but 
tend to refer to some heterogeneous community descended often from 
one original tribe. 
In view of the above, tribal surname seems to be extremely 
important, not only as a nominal identity, but also as an indication of 
a social unit. The data demonstrated that the overwhelming majority 
of urban informants regarded tribal surname as important, either 
because it reflects their original roots or because they need it 
socially. 
Further evidence was obtained to confirm the concept of 
kinship loyalty and nepotism, revealed in intercession and mediation. 
Looking for a relative as mediator to cut through bureaucratic red 
tape, is wide-spread. Although it is contrary to government 
principles, it is even practiced among those who issued the 
legislation. Moreover, mediation is not confined to cutting through 
bureaucracy, but is prevalent in every other aspect of life, including 
marriage, disputes, looking for jobs or obtaining scarce goods. The 
empirical investigation demonstrated that the majority of the sample 
were involved in intercession in favour of their relatives, irrespective 
of their milieu. 
C. MUTTUAT, OBT, TGATTON 
Reciprocal obligations among kinship groups are not confiflecd to 
members of the household, but are extended to lateral relatives: 
lineage, sub-tribe and tribe. While the obligation toward lateral 
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relatives is often nominal and confined to certain occasions, toward 
close relatives it is unlimited. It is common for those to exchange 
visits and meals, share equipment, and give many kinds of assistance. 
Exchanging visits is an expression of intimate relationship and 
mutual obligation among relatives. The urban household in Iraq 
receives visitors almost every day; such visits are considered a moral 
obligation. 
The best leisure time is that spent in visiting relatives. 
Empirical studies have shown that exchanging visits with relatives 
occupies a major portion of leisure time. In our case, the 
investigation revealed that more than three-quarters of the urban 
informants used to exchange visits with relatives, both on special 
occasions and otherwise. Another relevant point has been tested, that 
is whether or not those visitors gave prior notice to the hosts. The 
figures showed that the majority of the urban informants claimed that 
relatives do not need any appointment to visit each other. This result 
reflects the general social context, which confirms the tradition of 
intimate relationships among relatives, which do not entail any kind 
of formal consideration. 
In line with the extensive obligations of hospitality, people are 
highly concerned about the guest rooms. Compared with the tradition 
of hospitality in rural areas, urban residents often come tinder 
attack. They are accused of being miserly and greedy; in turn, urban 
residents try to demonstrate the reverse, so they give more attention 
to the guest room, of the best possible size, decoration and 
furnishing. Almost all the informants said that they have a guest 
room, The 3.7%, who did not, can be explained in the light of the 
housing crisis and poverty. 
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Marty other practical obligations prevail among relatives forming 
a backbone of cohesion and solidarity. -Obligations such as consulting 
one another in marriage of their sons, contributing to blood money 
and even showing respect for elders, are considered as a matter of 
concern. To clarify this point it was put the informants that many 
people do not believe in relative obligation, but obey under certain 
circumstances. The vast majority of the whole sample, with slight 
differences between rural and urban respondents, claimed that they 
believe in relative obligation, while only 2.4% said they do not 
believe. This proportion, however, is not statistically significant. Thus 
relatives' obligations seem to be quite important in a society deeply 
based on traditional values. 
D. PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FACH OTHER AS "KIN" 
People's attitude toward each other as "kin" depend mainly on 
two factors: the degree of relationship and economic-political status. 
Kinship terms are linguistic symbols of kinship status. Different 
status and interaction patterns between them, call for various types 
of attitudes and behaviour on the part of any one individual; close 
relatives, such as parents-sons, brothers or cousins, do not hesitate 
to help and protect each other under any circumstances. To 
determine to what extent public opinion reflects the traditional norms 
toward relatives, the informants were asked to reply to the statement: 
"I would side with my brother against my paternal cousin, and with 
my paternal cousin against any stranger". The overwhelming majority 
of the sample with non-significant differences between rural sind 
urban respondents, agreed with the statement.. Alpmost all disagreed 
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with the statement: "Relatives are scorpion-like". To reinforce this 
point, respondents were asked to react to another negative statement, 
"A man 's only relative, is his money", and most rejected it. 
Accordingly, people's attitudes toward each other as "kin" seem to be 
quite positive in the urban as well as in the rural milieu, which 
reinforces the main assumption of the study. 
9.5 NFTGHROTIRS AND NFTGJ1Rn[)RIIOnl) 
In. this part, the investigation focused on neighbours and 
neighbourhood in social rather than physical terms. These included, 
neighbours' relationship, mutual obligation, neighbours and social 
control and attitude toward neighbours. 
In fact, neighbourhood is considered one of the most important 
elements in the structure or the local community, in both rural and 
urban areas. 
Neighbourhood as a social rather than physical entity, is almost 
invisible in highly industrial cultures, since mass production, high 
technology, communication and improved transportation have led to 
privacy, alienation and distinction, while face to face relationship, 
mutual rights and obligation are still maintained in less developed 
countries. Religious values also encourage people to maintain 
traditional ties. 
A. NPTCITBOIJRS REL ATTONSTiTPS 
Although some individuals complain about neighbours' 
intervention in their domestic affairs, many others can not imagine 
life without neighbours' interactions. One can often hear In Baghdad 
such expressions as "Paradise without people would be unbcarable". 
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Thus one can easily go back and forth to one's neighbour's house at 
any time, any day. Neighbours help each other, not only in 
emergency but also in ordinary life. The investigation into the quality 
of neighbours' contact, revealed that daily contact is highly prevalent 
in urban areas. The figures reveal that the majority of all 
respondents have relationships with more than four households of 
their neighbours. For further clarification, the investigation extended 
to encompass the form of relationship which informants preferred 
with their neighbours. More than three-quarters of the urban 
informants preferred intimate relationship, while less than 20% 
preferred superficial relationships; only one individual preferred no 
relations at all. 
As a consequence, the urban neighbourhood, in terms of 
contact, seems to be quite strong, with intimate and personal 
relations and a marked absence of privacy, strain and alienation, as a 
result of agrarian values prevailing. 
B. MUTTUAT, OBLTGATTON 
Ideally, neighbours in Iraq are expected to help each other in 
times of need, exchange tools and equipment, visit, ask advice and 
chat. These expectations are fulfilled in practice. They are aware, for 
instance, of mutual rights and responsibilities, and act accordingly. 
The, investigation on this subject showed that the majority of the 
sample, with non-significant differences between rural and urban 
informants, thought that neighbours always respect each other's 
rights, help, share sorrow and happiness, protect and take sides with 
them in disputes and consult them in several cases. Other aspects of 
the relationship which were tested included exchange visits, meals, 
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help and participation on the main life occasions. It was found that 
99% of the urban informants exchanged visits with their neighbours; 
more than 60% of them do so once a week or more, while the others 
do so a few times a month. 
Exchange of meals is regarded as an aspect of the firm 
tradition of the Arab World, particularly Iraq. The investigation 
demonstrated that almost all the informants engage in such contact 
either frequently or sometimes. A similar result was found with 
regard to mutual help. The result reflected a complete conformity 
between rural and urban respondents. Involvement in mutual 
assistance and participation on main life occasions confirm the 
preceding findings; we found evidence of the continuation and 
effectiveness of primary relationships among neighbours in urban life, 
which reflect the influence of the traditional values, despite urban 
expansion. 
C. NETGIIBOIJRS AND SOCTAT, CONTROL 
In the developed world a neighbourhood may mean no more 
than a number of people living near each other in one block, and one 
may not even know one's next door neighbour. Neighbourhood in such 
position, does not mean more than a physical aggregation of 
individuals, and social control is often formal in style. Informal social 
control is characteristic of traditional societies, based mainly on 
family, kinship and neighbourhood ties. 
Although neighbourhood in traditional societies, particularly in 
Iraq, seems to be homogeneous, with cooperative interaction to 
provide informal social control, people are very sensitive toward each 
other as a consequence of curiosity, snobbery and intrusion. Thus 
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one should be careful in his behaviour to avert the gossip and 
criticism of his neighbours, who watch and may Interfere in small and 
big issues. In this regard, neighbours are considered an active social 
control device. To test this attribute, the investigation asked the 
informants whether or not they modify their behaviour to avoid 
neighbours' criticism. The result showed that the overwhelming 
majority of the whole sample, with non-significant difference, between 
rural and urban respondents, claimed that they do their best to 
avoid neighbour's criticism. 
T). NFTG IR(HJRS' ATTITUDES TOWARD EACH OTÜER 
Taking into account, the attribute described above, the attitude 
seems to be more than one of like and dislike; it is based on strong 
emotions and attachment, not only toward neighbours, but also toward 
residence. In Baghdad, one often hears people say, "I was born in 
this neighbourhood and I would like to die in it", or "This is my 
birth place and should be my grave". Thus, movement from one area 
to another is regarded as a big decision because of the strong 
emotions of attachment to people and place. However, priority has to 
be given to neighbours their reputation, behaviour and relationships 
with others. Then one might think about other factors such as 
accessibility to major roads, shops, parks, schools and so on. This 
does not mean that attitudes are always positive, of course, there are 
some negative attitudes on the individual level, but generally, 
attitudes are more positive than negative. In this regard in response 
to the question "How do you regard your neighbour? ", the majority 
of the urban respondents responded that their neighbours are like 
their families. The others claimed that they are like their friends. 
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Only one individual said "like strangers". The respondents, confirmed 
their positive attitude toward their neighbours, when the majority 
agreed that they should ask first about the neighbours, when they 
want to buy or rent a new house. Similarly in response to the 
question, "Do you think it is possible to ignore neighbours? 
", only 2% 
of urban respondents thought it was. 
The results once again confirm our own assumption that 
traditional values deeply rooted in urban life help to preserve 
community norms intact, and urbanization has non-significant 
influences. 
9-6 SOGTAT, TIME 
The final part of the empirical research focused on social time 
as a criterion to study social behaviour. The investigation 
encompassed four salient aspects: perception of time, work and 
leisure time, temporal orientation and social time as a dependent 
variable. 
A. PFRCFPTTON OF TIME 
Human events and activities take place in time and time Is 
always used as a criterion to control these activities, but people 
react to and use time in different ways according to individual 
differentiation and cultural variety. Some societies might Be(., time as 
"money", others as "pastime" and still others as "something 
mysterious". In all Middle Eastern countries, particularly in the one 
under study, people often use time with little concern for Its value, 
and rarely deal with time as being saved, spent or wasted, even 
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among those who are highly educated. In fact, most people in our 
culture claim to believe that time is money and repeat some political 
slogans such as "Waste one minute of the work time, waste an a 
opportunity to progress" or " Time is like the sword, if you do not 
cut it, it cuts you", but in practice, they behave against this ideal- 
type. This view was born out by the investigation. When the 
respondents were asked whether or not it matters to be ten minutes 
late in an appointment with friends, the majority were either agreed 
or strongly agreed, that ten minutes lateness is acceptable. They do 
not view an appointment as something important. This matter has its 
counterparts in most traditional societies. Levine, for instance, found 
that Brazilians were more often late for appointments and showed less 
regret over being late, than those from the USA. (see chapter eight 
P. 306). 
Exactness in matter of time requires a high value to be placed 
on time in every day life. However, traditional cultures do not give 
time the value given by highly industrialised cultures. Thus people 
prefer approximate time rather than exactness. The investigation 
revealed that the respondents preferred approximation in those 
matters of time. A remarkable proportion of urban respondents do not 
like to use a diary to arrange their daily activities. Some have no 
strong opinion about it, others asserted that "they do not need an 
extra mind". Tn fact, they responded culturally. 
To measure and describe how time is actually used in daily life, 
the investigation asked about time budget, which involves 
redistribution of all parts of social and individual time, to enable 
individuals and society as it whole to use time, in a way suited to 
their needs. Despite the effective use of time budget in the advanced 
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world, underdeveloped countries continue to use time in arbitrary 
ways. The data revealed that urban respondents were strongly 
against time-tables, which they regarded as inimical to humanity, by 
making people like machines. Similarly they rejected the statement, "1 
always eat, sleep, and wake up at a set-time". 
Lateness and punctuality reflect the general rhythm of life. 
According to cultural variety, it. is possible to identify several 
differences in the tempo of locomotion, sitting, walking and gesturing. 
Arab people, for instance, usually move slowly, while Westerners move 
in quick tempo. The data in this matter, showed, that informants' 
attitude toward speed is extremely negative. The majority of the 
informants also said that they usually depend on natural timing 
rather than a watch or clock. 
B. WORK AND 1, FTSTIRF TTMF 
People in the West evaluate time in economic terms: it can be 
saved or wasted, one can make the most of it to do more, achieve 
more and earn more. However, the way in which people evaluate and 
use time is intimately related to the core values of their culture. In 
traditional cultures such the one studied here, time is still treated in 
ineffective ways, despite the recognition of its importance to the 
individuals as well as to the nation's progress. To assess their 
attitude toward the value of time, the informants were asked to react 
to the statement " Time is gold but no one appreciates it". The vast 
majority of the whole sample, with non-significant differences between 
rural and urban respondents, either agreed or strongly agreed, In 
response to the statement, "Most leisure time is wasted with 
gossiping", about three-quarters of the urban respondents agreed. 
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The data showed a similar attitude toward passing leisure time by 
using the rosary. These responses are related to the core values of 
the culture, which is striving to maintain the traditional legacy. 
C. TEMPORAL. ORTFNTATION 
The conception of time dimensions -past, present and future- is 
a common trait among cultures, but different cultures may give more 
value to one or other of these dimensions. In Arab culture, for 
instance, the past is often given more respect, while such respect is 
given, in industrial cultures, to the present and future. The 
informants were asked to express their attitude toward the past 
through the statement "I remember the past with affection", the 
statement received a tremendous positive response, confirming the 
assumption that traditional culture often gives the past more value, 
This result is consistent with the researcher's experience, that people 
in Iraq often, when they talk about their plans or projects in the 
present or future refer in their speech to the virtue of the past. 
D. TIME AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
To give more validity to the impresRiorº obtained from the 
respondent's reactions, one way analysis of variance was used, 
crosstabulating social time with other independent variables, such as 
age, education, occupation and income. Urban informants revealed 
similarity among all age groups. The mean and standard deviation, 
showed relative corresponderice between rural and urban attitude 
toward the use of time. A similar result was found with respect to 
different levels of education, occupation and income. 
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9.6 FTNAT. OUTLOOK 
Taking into account all these findings, it can be concluded that 
urbanization has not changed the deep-rooted tradition. It might have 
been expected that the changes of the demography of Iraq from 
predominantly rural to predominantly urban in less than four 
decades, would influence social as well as morphological aspects of 
urban and rural life alike, but in fact, the effect is more tangible in 
morphological than social aspects. It is quite easy for people to 
change their residence style, adopting one more comfortable, but it is 
extremely difficult to depart from their norms, values customs, and 
daily habits, especially when the ingredients of radical change are 
not available. Strong family ties associated with enormous emotional 
power are accompanied by cohesive religious values and a rigid 
political power structure. All these factors combine to maintain the 
traditional values intact. Not only are agrarian values seen as a great 
heritage per se, but they represent a means by which people can 
protect themselves in the face of political, social and economic 
uncertainty. In the weakness of formal social control it is natural 
that individuals turn to other ways of preserving their safety and 
interests against: the aggression and nepotism of others. 
to fact, a society divided into categories, anharmonic parties 
and unstable superstructure creates deep contrasts in social 
organization. Many years ago, the researcher was one of many 
academics who believed that social integrity had nearly demolished 
the individual and group differentiation, but the American 
bombardment and its aftermath, have demonstrated the fragility social 
structure. "Ruralization", is not only the result of rural migration, 
although this seems to be the most tangible element. The city itself, 
370 
even before the demographic transformation, was a focal centre of 
tribalism and kinshipism. The question is: what has changed 
throughout these decades of urban accumulation? In broad 
sociological terms, nothing; absolutely nothing. Familism, tribalism and 
nepotism remain active, despite extensive demographical, morphological 
and technological change. Briefly, there is "ruralization of the city", 
mainly because no alternative social institutions have crystallized. 
Generally speaking, Baghdad city has no distinctively urban 
way of life or "urbanism" in Wirth's terms, and has not eliminated the 
diffusion of traditional social organization and values. However, 
misunderstanding might have occurred because of the long history of 
the city , which presumably provided a special urban flavour. 
Anyone who has visited Baghdad in recent years, has found a 
highly organized city: modern buildings, motorways, highways, 
traffic-lights, schools, parks, police stations, supermarkets and so on. 
However, the problem is not the morphological side of the city; it is 
socio-cultural structure and individual behaviour. It is quite evident 
that many inhabitants are practicing modernity in their residential 
environment, in their dresses and even in their thinking; they use all 
kinds of technology in their homes, and have reacted positively to 
changing manners and styles in line with the Western way of life. 
Nonetheless, they are not Westerners in actual manner. Despite the 
modernized form which makes both men and women appear like-, many 
Europeans, they often act and behave very much like their ancestors; 
they talk, for example, about normal attachment between men and 
women, but they are easily angered and respond sensitively if they 
hear that their own sisters or daughters have attachments with 
others; they will reject the groom if they discover- he has entered 
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into a pre-marital relationship with the bride. They can not permit a 
woman to challenge their superiority, they act in favour of their 
families and kinship groups and they are intolerant of breakdown in 
the patrilocal residence rules. 
The real problem is that the people are living two different 
ways simultaneously, in socio-political terms, "hypocrisy" or 
"dualism". They are fascinated by the European style of life, but 
they have been brought up in a different cultural system. The people 
of Iraq, particularly in the rural communities, who are mainly 
responsible for the rapid urban growth of Baghdad city, were in 
early childhood inculcated with the values: "I would side with my 
brother, whether he is right or wrong, victim or offender" and " The 
son and his property belong to his father". Such socialization has 
resulted in characteristics sharply contrasting with the nature of the 
city as described by classical sociologists. 
The dilemma is made more complex by the education system, in 
that the general process of socialization and formal education are 
separated. This separation brings about cultural conflict inside the 
personality; the conflict is most likely to he stronger, where the 
socialization which mainly takes place in the homes of people and is 
associated with inculcation of deep traditional values, requires close 
relationships, deep emotional attachment and mutual obligation, 
whereas formal education in schools presents curricula and course 
content derived from foreign cultures, emphasizing different valuess. 
The question is how can we explain the fact that a city, though 
having a long history, is described as traditional and ruralized, 
rather than modern? Tn fact, it is not a case of a transitional period, 
which is responsible for this chaos of conflicting values, ns one might 
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assume. There are very complicated factors overlapping to create the 
character of traditional Baghdad, which can not easily be discussed 
in terms of empirical investigation. Some of these factors are 
invisible, and some can give even specialists contradictory 
impressions. Let us explain the clinging of the people to their kin 
groups, which Wirth and his colleagues assumed would be eliminated 
by city dwelling. Under, certain circumstances, such as hunger or 
poverty, the only way to survive is to create a solidarity system: to 
help each other, exchange meals and equipment, protect each other, 
starting with close relatives, expanding to the nuclear family, 
extended family, lineage, clan and ultimately tribe, the system can 
meet basic social needs, for example by aiding the poorest people, 
helping those who would, unaided, be unable to afford to marry , by 
giving them gifts in cash and kind. In a prosperous social economy, 
the system might he modified and eliminated gradually. Indeed Wirth's 
assumptions appear to have been developed in the context of the. 
prosperous economy of the heyday of industrialization, socio-political 
stability ( democracy ), and social security. These components do not 
exist, to some extent, in Iraq, or in most other Third World countries, 
partly because of the colonial system which left many serious 
problems behind: religious, ethnic and economic. rival groups, which, 
in the scramble for power, conflicted among themselves, weakening 
the social structure and allowing scope for the world superpowers to 
achieve their objectives and maintain their strategic interests. 
Thus, the colonial legacy is partially responsible for the 
unstable superstructure in the Third World in general and- in Iraq in 
particular. The absence of constitutional institutions farmed a real 
threat to individuals, who looked for security, insurance and 
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protection to other social organization: the family, kinship, 
neighbourhood and friendship, firmly supported by religious values. 
On the other hand, the cultural challenge represented by the secular 
cultural invasion or arrival of foreign values through the media, and 
the direct interference of the superpowers in the internal affairs of 
the Third World countries, preventing them from developing their 
societies in the way they desire, might also he partially responsible 
for what are called "Cultural challenge reactions", impelling the 
people to consolidate their position by "fundamentalism", 
"traditionalism" and "ancestorism". which all reflections of the stress 
caused by uncertainty, ambiguity and insecurity. 
Moreover, Baghdad city in its long history as an urban 
agglomeration was deliberately ruined several times and reduced to 
group of small hamlets. Those natives who did not flee the city were 
left in enclaves, surrounded by huge numbers of rural migrants. 
Under the circumstances described above, the indigenous inhabitants 
were forced, after the mass influx of migrants after the First World 
War, when Baghdad rose again as the administration and political 
capital of the State of Iraq, to partially give up their urban way of 
life and adopt the way of life of the arrivals, which provided more 
effective socio-economic security and protection. It was also in 
keeping with the values supported by those in political power, who 
have mainly come from rural backgrounds, and have encouraged the 
traditions of rural people. 
So, "ruralization" is mainly and obviously, a direct consequence 
of massive rural influx, accompanied by an unstable socio-, political 
system, uncrystallized constitutional institutions, cultural challenge, 
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and powerful religious influence. All these factors have combined to 
vitalize the traditional values in Baghdad City. 
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APPEND fl 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
1.1 SEX 
a. Male....... b. Female........ 
1.2 AGE 
a. less than 25.... b. 25-34......... 
c. 35-44 ............. d, 45-54.......... 
e. 55 and above 
1.3 EDUCATION 
a Illiterate .... b. Can read and write.. 
c. Elementary ........ d. Intermediate .,. 
e. Secondary.. f. University and above. 
1.4 OCCUPATION. 
a. What is your main occupation ?..... 
b. What was your former occupation ?.. 
1.5 FATHER'S OCCUPATION 
a. What is your father's occupation ?... 
1.6 PLACE OF BIRTH 
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a. Village ..... b. Town ...... 
c. City (province) d. The Capital... 
1.7 FATHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH 
a. Village ............ b. Town ....... 
c. City (province)..... d. The Capital..... 
1.8 MOTHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH 
a. Village ............. b. Town................ 
c. City (province) ..... d. The Capital.......... 
1.9 MARITAL STATUS 
a. Single ....... b. Married ...... 
c. Divorced ...... d. Widowed ..... " 
1.10 AGE AT MARRJAGE 
a. Less than 24 .... b. 25-34...,....... 
c. 35-44 ........... d. 45 and above.... 
1.11 NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
a. None ..., b. 1-3 ..... 
c. 4-6 ..... d. 7-and above . 
1.12 'IIE INCOME OF THE FAMILY 
a. Less than 150 I. D ..... b. 150-199 I. D...,.. 
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c. 200-249 ............... d. 250-299 ........... 
e. 300-and above.......... 
1.13 NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS 
a. Less than 3 ..... b. 3-5 ..... 
c. 6-8 ..... d. 9-and above ...... 
1.14 FAMILY COMPOSITION 
Are there any of the following presently living with you in the same 
home ? 
A. PATERNAL 
a. Father/ Mother ..... b. Brothers/ Sisters ..... 
c. Grandchild........... d. Other Relative......... 
B. MATERNAL 
a. Father/Mother-In-Law ... b. Brother/Sister -In-Law. C- Other 
Relative........... 
2 FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 
Now I would like to ask you about family life and marriage, if 
you not married and have not started your, family I would like to 
know your opinion. 
2.1 What do you think about the father's authority? 
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a. Its very important inside the home .... 
b. Its very important outside the home .... 
c. Its very important both inside and outside the 
home 
d. Its not important in either situation ...... 
2.2 Who decides to spend a family income ? 
a. Father ........ b. Mother....... 
c. Oldest Son.... d. Household head (if not spouse).. 
e. Other.......... 
2.3 Who has the final word about buy or rent a new house? 
a. Father ............. b, Mother..,............ 
c. Both ............... d. Other................ 
2.4 Who choice your Wife/ husband ? 
a. Myself ............. b. Father............. 
c. Mother with father consent .... d. Other.... 
2.5 Who decides the daughter marriage ? 
a. Herself ......... b. Father.......... 
c. Mother with father consent.... d. Brothers... 
e. Other....... 
2.6 What do you think about this statement ? 
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"A family which has a large number of males has a high status" 
a. Agree ........... b. To some context...... 
c. Disagree .......... 
2.7 If you have a son who gets married and lives independently will 
you support him ? 
a. Yes......... b. No.......... 
2.8 If "yes" what kind of support will you give 
a. Material ... b. Moral .... 
C. Both .... 
2.9 Why do you support him ? 
a. Because he is apart of myself ... 
b. Because I will need him when I got old ... 
c. Because tradition demands it ... 
2.10 Would you prefer your married son and his family to stay with 
you ? 
a Yes.......... b. No............ 
2.11 If " not" why ? 
a. To avoid the expected problems .... 
b. To get rid his responsibility...... 
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c. Better for him to live independently.... 
d. My house so small....... 
2.12 Are you able to budget your family needs ? 
a. Yes ............. b. No.............. 
2.13 If "not" why ? 
a. Because of unexpected visitors ... 
b. Because of unexpected incidents ... 
c. Because of unexpected occasion, such as birth, wedding, 
funeral .. etc..... 
d. Because of all these factors 
2.14 What do you think about this statement ? 
"Males have the right to choose their marriage partners but females 
have not" 
a. Agree ...... b. To some extent... 
c. Disagree ..... 
2.15 Do you use any method of birth control ? 
a. Yes........... b. No........... 
2.16 If"not" why ? 
a. Because it is against my beliefs 
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b. Because it is against our traditions 
c. Because more children make a marriage stronger 
2.17 Do you help your wife with household tasks, such as, 
cooking, cleaning, washing ? 
a. Always..... b. some time ..... 
c. Rarely .................. 
2.18 If "always or some time" what sort of participation do you offer 
? 
a. Cleaning........... b. Washing clothes... 
c. Cooking............ d. Ironing.......... 
e. Washing dishes ..... f. Some thing else.... 
2.19 What do you think about this statement ? 
"My son's son is my son, but my daughter's son is not" 
a. Agree ..... b. To some extent........... 
c. Disagree ...... 
2.20 Suppose, when you got married, your bride/gram requested you 
to live with her/ his family, what would you do ? 
a. I would refuse ..... 
b. I would try to persuade her otherwise ...... 
c. I would agree ..... 
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2.21 Who has the final word about the number of children? 
a. Me .... b. My wife/husband ....., 
c. Both ...... d. Other factors .... 
2.22 What do you think about the following ? 
a. Mother has less status than father .... 
b. Mother has equal status to the father ... 
c Father has less status than mother ... 
2.23 How many wives have you had........... 
a. Only one ........... b. Two .... 
c. Three .............. d. Four .... 
2.24 What do you think about this statement ? 
"Women plan and men execute the plans" 
a. Agree ..... b. To some extent.......... 
c. Disagree .... 
2.25 What do you think is the best age to marriage for: 
A. ýj 
a. Less than 20....... b. 20-24.......... 
c. 25-29 .............. d. 30 and above,.., 
B. Female 
a. Less than 20....... b. 20-24........... 
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c. 25-29 .............. d. 30 and above..... 
3. KINSIIIP NETWORK 
3.1 Is your wife among your relatives ? 
a. Yes ............ b. No ................ 
3.2. If "yes" indicate the degree of relation 
a. Cross-Cousin ..... b. Parallel-Cousin .... 
c. From the lineage ..... d. from the tribe ...... 
3.3 What do You think about the tribal surname ? 
a. Important ..... b. To some extent.......... 
c. Non-important .......... 
3.4 If "important" why ? 
a. Because it indicates the original roots..... 
b. Because we need it socially ....... 
c. Some thing else mentioned ....... 
3.5 Do you think that the relatives need to have appointment to Visit 
each other ? 
a. Always .............. b. Some times.......... 
c. Never...... 
3.6 If" always" or "some times" did you and they do that? 
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a. Always for me ..... b. Always for them ..... 
c. Some times for me..... d. Some times for them..... 
3.7 Have you a separate guestroom ? 
a Yes ......... b. No .... 
3.8 If a relative needed you to intercede for him in a legal issue 
would you: 
a. Not hesitate to do so ...... b. Hesitate ....... 
c. Not do any thing..... 
3.9 what do you think about this statement: 
"Relatives are scorpion-like" 
a Agree...... b. To some extent...... 
c. Disagree..... 
3.10 Many people do not believe in relatives obligations, but they 
obey under some circumstances, what about your soli? 
a. I believe in relative obligations...... 
b. I do n't believe, but obey under some circumstances 
c. I do n't believe and would not obey....... 
3.11 When do you exchange visit with relatives ? 
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a. At wedding, funeral, illness, feasts,... etc. 
b. From time to time with out special occasion 
c. Both of the above....... 
3.12 Who do you mainly depend on, when you are in a finantial crisis 
a. Relatives..... b. Neighbours....... 
c. friends.. d. Any other (please specify) 
3.13 What do you think about this statement: 
"A man 's only relative is his money" 
a. Agree...... b. To some extent.... 
c. Disagree.... 
3.14 What do you prefer for you or your sons: 
a. To marry a relative..... 
b. To marry a non-relative....... 
3.15 What do you think about this statement: 
"I (would side) with my brother against my paternal cousin and 
with my paternal cousin against (any) stranger" 
a. Agree ..... b. To some extent...... 
c. Disagree...... 
4. NEIGHBOURS AND NEIGHBOURHOOD 
4.1 Do you or your family member exchange visits with your 
neighbours ? 
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a Yes ..... b. No...... 
4.2 If "Yes" how many times do you or your wife/husband do so ? 
a. About once a week or more ..... 
b. A few times a month....... 
c. A few times a year........ 
4.3 Do you participate with your neighbours in the main life occasion, 
such as, death, marriage ... etc ? 
a Always...... b. Sometimes...... 
c. Rarely....... 
4.4 How do you regard your neighbours ? 
a Like my family ..... b. Like my friends..... 
c. Like any other strangers..... 
4.5 What do you think about this statement ? 
"When a man wants to buy or rent a house, he should ask first about 
the neighbours" 
a. Agree ........... b. To some extent.......... 
c. Disagree.......... 
4.6 How many neighbours are you related to ? 
a. None..... b. Only one ,....... 
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c. 2-3 ................ d. 4-and more.... 
4.7 Do your neighbours respect the neighbourhood rights ? 
a Always.... b. Sometimes...... 
c. Rarely ..... 
4.8 Do you or your family exchange meals with your 
neighbours ? 
a. Frequently...... b. Sometimes..... 
c. Rarely....... 
4.9 Do you or your family call on new neighbours ? 
a. Yes........... b. No......... 
4.10. Do you think that you or your family should be careful in your 
behaviour to avoid criticism from neighbours ? 
a Always......... b. Sometimes........... 
c. Rarely...... 
4.11 What form of relations would you prefer with your 
neighbour ? 
a. Superficial ties.... b. Deep relationships...... 
c. No relationship at all...... 
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4.12 Do you think it is possible to ignore the neighbours? 
a possible ............. b. sometimes........ 
c. Impossible ............. 
4.13 Do you help your neighbours ? 
a Yes ................... b. No.......... 
4.14 If "Yes" what sort of help do you offer ? 
a Shopping.... b. Use of equipment..... 
c. Lend them money...... d. All these things...... 
5. SOCIAL TIME (ACTIVITIES) 
The following symbols ( SA. A, NO, DA SD ) denot respectivily, 
strongly agree agree, no opinion, disagree strongly disagree, ). 
5.1 It is not a problem to delay 
just ten minutes in an appointment 
with a friends SA AN DA SD 
5.2 Most leisure time is wasted 
with gossiping SA AN DA SD 
5.3 One does not need a diary 
to arrange his activities SA AN DA SD 
5.4 1 always eat, sleep and 
wake up at a set time SA AN DA SD 
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5.5 Time-table make the 
man robot-like SA AN DA SD 
5.6 Speed is a devilish act SA AN DA SD 
5.7 The rosary is often used 
to pass boring time SA AN DA SD 
5.8 Time is gold but no 
one appreciates it 
5.9 I remember the past 
with affection 
SA AN DA SD 
SA AN DA SD 
5.10 I have never seen my colleagues 
arrive late for work SA AN DA SD 
5.11 The best way to meet another 
person is at approximate time, 
such as 6-7 p. m SA AN DA SD 
5.12 dependent on biological clock 
is better than wrist-watch SA AN DA SD 
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